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I. INTRODUCTION

Utilitarian penology treats punishment as a costly instrument of public
policy, permissible only when its benefits in reducing future crime outweigh
the pain, fear, and public expense it imposes. According to utilitarian
penology, therefore, the aim of maximizing welfare both justifies and limits
the institution of punishment. While utilitarian penology has traditionally
emphasized deterrence, reform and incapacitation as mechanisms by which
punishment might reduce crime, it values any crime-inhibiting effect of
punishment. Utilitarian penology also compares punishment to other
policies which might achieve greater crime reductions at less social cost.
Deterrence, for example might be most cost-effectively achieved by
increasing the availability and benefits of lawful employment, or by
technologies of law enforcement and urban design that increase the certainty
of apprehension. Likewise, character reform might be better achieved by
early education and by drug rehabilitation than by incarceration.
Utilitarian penology has a distinguished history. Utilitarians such as
Beccaria and Bentham championed such key reforms as the development of
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police forces, comprehensive penal codes and penitentiaries, the
abandonment of torture and corporal punishment, and reduced reliance upon
capital punishment. Nevertheless, utilitarian penology has recently lost its
luster, at least in the United States. The 1970's witnessed an explosion of
retributivist thought among philosophers, legal scholars and publicists.
Retributivists held that beneficial consequences provided neither a necessary
nor a sufficient reason to punish, and that bad consequences provided
neither a necessary nor a sufficient reason to refrain from punishing.
Punishment could only be justified-and limited-by the moral desert of
offenders.
Retributivists participated in public debates over criminal justice policy,
attacking probation, parole, indeterminate sentencing, rehabilitative
programs, and determinist accounts of crime, whether invoked to excuse
individuals I or to justify ameliorative social programs. 2 Retributivists
promoted determinate sentencing and thereby contributed to the passage of
the harsh federal sentencing guidelines. 3 Retribution was invoked by the
Supreme Court as a constitutionally legitimate purpose of punishment in
4
upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty.
Retributivist attacks on utilitarian penology resonated with some sectors
of the American public: retributive punishment bore witness to the
inviolability and inflexibility of certain moral standards during an era of
social change and cultural conflict. Increasing pessimism about the efficacy
of government policy-particularly in influencing the behavior and lifechances of the poor-decreased public confidence that a combination of
penal and social welfare measures could control crime. Popular perception
painted urban centers as dangerous jungles in which anonymous offenders
confronted little meaningful risk of apprehension, and were pathologically
resistant to rational incentives.
In the face of these public attitudes, criminal legislation seemed to shift
from the domain of public policy to that of symbolic politics. 5 Rather than
1.
2.

Michael Moore, Causationandthe Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1985).
Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology:A Reply to Judge Bazelon,

49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1976).
3.

FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND

SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); RICHARD SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY
AND DESERT (1979); THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS (1976).

4. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5. Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L.
REV. 689 (1995); Markus Dirk Dubber, Note, The Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat
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serving as part of a public crime control policy, punishment became a
medium for expressing hatred of criminals. Retributivism reassured
decisionmakers and voters that it was unnecessary-and indeed
unprincipled-to ask whether punishment would reduce crime or enhance
social welfare. It sufficed that an offender deserved it. In short, the public
effect of retributivist rhetoric was to erode the utilitarian scruple against
unnecessary punishment.
Ironically, while the public effect of retributivist rhetoric was to increase
punishment, the retributivist arguments that were most influential among
philosophers and legal scholars asserted that utilitarianism could lead to
excessive rather than insufficient punishment. Retributivists evoked the
libertarian sensibilities of academics by warning that utilitarianism could
justify punishment that transgressed the retributivist prohibition against
undeserved punishment. Thus, indeterminate sentencing could lead to
lengthy terms for minor offenses, based on discretionary and perhaps
prejudicial predictions of dangerousness, or assessments of progress toward
rehabilitation. 6 Harsh punishment of a few hapless individuals might
effectively deter millions from committing minor offenses. Worst of all,
deterrence might be served, public fear might be dissipated, and vigilante
violence forestalled, by framing and punishing innocent persons. A related
argument, against utility as a limitation on punishment, contended that the
benefits of punishing the guilty could be achieved at less cost by merely
pretending to punish them. 7 These claims about the unfair practices
endorsed by utilitarianism depend on the image of a deceitful official,
scheming to maximize utility by manipulating the public.
This paper is a defense of utilitarian penology, against the familiar
retributivist charge that it promotes framing the innocent, and other charges
similarly depending on the notion that utilitarianism encourages officials to
deceive the public. Our defense proceeds from the striking fact that
utilitarianism's critics do not cite textual evidence that the originators of
utilitarian penology in fact endorsed punishing the innocent or deceiving the
public. Instead, critics claim that these unsavory policies follow logically
from the premises of utilitarianism. Our argument, in brief, is that the charge
of framing the innocent rests on a misunderstanding of utilitarian penology
Offenders; "A Critique of California'sHabitual Criminal Statute," 43 STAN. L. REV. 193
(1990).
6. Francis A. Allen, CriminalJustice, Legal Values, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in
JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT: THE CORRECTIONAL PROCESS

ed., 1973).
7. MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 233-43 (1984).

193-96 (Leonard Orland
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as an application of an "act-utilitarian" ethic governing individual behavior.
We contend that utilitarianism began as a normative theory of law and legal
process aiming not just at happiness in general, but also at security in
particular, and that this theory was methodologically committed to publicity,
regularity and representativeness of legal decisionmaking. We argue further
that utilitarian penology was the original and paradigmatic application of
this theory of law and legal process, and should be so understood. When
understood in this way, utilitarian penology cannot endorse punishment of
the innocent, which violates either the security aim, or the publicity
condition, or both. Indeed, utilitarian penology cannot endorse any program
of official manipulation of the public that restricts information to a
putatively utilitarian elite. 8 It is simply not true that eschewing unnecessary
punishment of the guilty logically entails willingness to punish the innocent.
A further implication of our argument is that the enterprise of "actutilitarian ethics" bears little relation to the original project of utilitarianism.
Other contemporary off-spring of utilitarianism are more deserving heirs of
utilitarianism's legacy of accomplishment. These contemporary variants of
utilitarianism emphasize its role as a public philosophy concerned with
public policy, legal process and institutional design. 9 By contrast, actutilitarian ethics miscasts utilitarianism in the pastoral role of giving
individuals advice about how to manage their moral obligations. Nor does it
do justice to utilitarianism's status as a normative philosophy of law to
redefine it as a "rule-utilitarian ethics" that urges individuals to follow rules
that would maximize utility if followed universally. Rule-utilitarianism is
the wrong answer because it answers the wrong question. The right question
is not "what ethical standard for individual acts advances utility while still
avoiding punishment of the innocent?" The right question is "what practice
of philosophy helps us identify and administer the kind of institutional
processes that will best secure happiness?"
Thus beyond the question of the nature of utilitarianism lie deeper
questions of method in normative philosophy. What does it mean to have a
theory of a practice like punishment? What does it mean to understand a

8. See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,in UTILITARIANISM, FOR AND
AGAINST 138-40 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, eds.); Robert E. Goodin, Government
House Utilitarianism,in THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE 140-60 (Lincoln Allison ed., 1970).
9. See JAMES WOOD BAILEY, UTILITARIANISM, INSTITUTIONS AND JUSTICE (1997);
ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1995); RUSSELL HARDIN,
MORALITY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON
COOPERATION (1980).

(1988);

DONOLD

H.

REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND
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school of thought like utilitarianism? 10 The debate over utilitarian penology
has been distorted by procrustean assumptions about the nature of normative
philosophy. As a result, the critics of the utilitarian theory of punishment
have attacked what they assume such a theory must be, rather than actually
reading and attempting to understand utilitarian works about punishment.
Critics of utilitarianism have presumed a foundationalist model of
justification in value theory. According to this model, normative theorizing
must begin with a general conception of value, correct for all contexts,
which must then be applied as an ethical criterion for evaluating all human
acts. Since political and institutional decisions are made by means of human
acts, political and legal theory are only applications of ethical theory which,
in turn, is an application of the general standard of value. According to this
model, the proper domain of any theory of value is universal, and the
restriction of any normative standard to a particular context is an apparent
inconsistency requiring explanation and defense.
Thus, if it is good for governments to seek to establish utilitymaximizing institutions and policies it must be good for individuals to seek
to perform utility-maximizing acts. According to this way of thinking, all
good things must share some quality in common, some essence of the good,
which it is the task of philosophy to discover. Thus all normative theories
must be founded on claims about the essence of value, if they are to count as
philosophical theories. And such theories can be refuted if they are shown to
rest on no foundational view about the nature of value, or a poor one. This is
how critics of utilitarian penology can ascribe to it ethical claims about the
obligations of individual actors to bear false witness without quoting or
citing any such claims. And this is why they see efforts to clear
utilitarianism of the charge of punishing the innocent as disingenuous
attempts to artificially "restrict" utilitarianism.
We offer here a very different strategy for reading Bentham and other
utilitarian writers on punishment. We do not assume that a normative theory
about an institutional practice like punishment in particular, or about
government more generally, must be tied to a theory about individual ethics.
Nor do we assume that practices must rest on a universally applicable
standard of value. The foundationalist model of justification inspiring these
assumptions is unpragmatic: that a practice cannot be linked to some general
account of value does not by itself give us a good reason to abandon that
practice.1 1 Unless people are self-consciously engaged in a certain brand of
10. For a very useful meditation on this problem, see William Twining, Maccabean
Lecture in Jurisprudence:Reading Bentham, 75 PRoc. BRrr. Ac. 97 (1989).

11. On the distinction between foundationalist and pragmatic or contextualist
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moral philosophy they don't ordinarily justify practices by reference to
foundational conceptions of value. Instead, they commonly invoke the
purposes the practice serves in some practical context. And so we need to be
very sure that utilitarian penology was part of a practice of foundationalist
philosophizing before we go ascribing foundationalist views to it. If we wish
to understand utilitarian writings, we need to understand utilitarianism as a
practice. We need to ask: What recommended utilitarianism to its original
proponents? What features of their social context made it meaningful to
them? How did they make use of it? What problems did utilitarianism
address? What alternative views did it compete with?
We read Bentham and his colleagues as practical reformers and
rhetoricians, developing a new discourse of value and a new method of
analysis for use in an emerging context of democratically accountable
legislation aiId administration. This new discourse of law and politics was
not an application, let alone a "restriction" of some utilitarian ethical
philosophy that existed apart from it. This new discourse of law and politics
was utiliarianism itself. Indeed, a key to understanding Bentham is to bear in
mind that his training and his interests were in law, not in philosophy, and
certainly not in the academic discipline of "ethics." The "utilitarianism" to
which modern penal institutions owe their inspiration is a legal theory and a
rhetorical practice, not an ethical philosophy.
This Article is divided into seven sections. Section II explicates the
charge that utilitarianism requires punishing the innocent, and the related
charge that it requires the fictitious punishment of the guilty. It also
examines five responses to these charges offered by contemporary
utilitarians: acceptance, definitional evasion, minimization, comparison and
restriction. This discussion will show that the charge of punishing the
innocent depends on the premise that utilitarianism dictates public
deception. Section III examines Bentham's actual statements on punishing
the innocent and fictitiously punishing the guilty. It concludes that while
Bentham permitted some exaggeration of the rigors of punishment, he
opposed outright deception of the public and emphatically opposed
approaches to normative justification see DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS:
JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL THEORY (1985) and Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism:
Law as Practiceand Narrative,in WrITGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis M. Patterson

ed., 1992). Examples of works in ethics and political theory proceeding by contextualist
argument include JAMES GOUINLOCK, REDISCOVERING THE MORAL LIFE: PHILOSOPHY AND
HUMAN PRACTICE 110 (1993); EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, QUANDARIES AND VIRTUES: AGAINST
REDUCTIVISM IN ETHICS (1986); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
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deliberately punishing the innocent. He did recognize that some inadvertent
punishment of the innocent was an inevitable cost of punishing the guilty, a
cost that should discourage us from freely resorting to the punitive sanction.
If the-founder of utilitarianism explicitly opposed framing the innocent,
how can critics ascribe this practice to utilitarianism? They must argue that
Bentham was confused about his own commitments and that framing the
innocent is logically entailed by his premises and purposes. Thus, they
assume that Bentham is committed to endorsing all acts that enhance utility
in any conceivable world, including framing the innocent. But just as
Bentham's particular views on punishing the innocent cannot be identified
without reading him, neither can his premises and purposes. Accordingly,
Sections IV and V examine these purposes and premises. Section IV shows
that Bentham' s theory of punishment did not derive from any general ethical
theory. Bentham, like his chief forebears Hume, Helvetius aid Beccaria,
thought of public utility as a standard of value for public action, such as
legislation. He assumed that private action was ruled by private utility (i.e.
self-interest) so that there was little point in directing arguments about the
general welfare to individual ethical actors. Section V shows that in
assessing public action, Bentham was far less concerned about consequences
than has generally been supposed and far more concerned about process. He
identified utility with security of expectations and the rule of law. As a
result, he endorsed public actions that could be seen to have emerged from a
rational and well-informed debate about their consequences for the public
welfare. Utility was not a definition of the good or a guide to conscience, but
a standard designed for use in public, deliberative debate. And,
utilitarianism was not so much a philosophical theory as a rhetorical
practice, a transparent language of analysis and argument for use in political
deliberation.
Section VI further elaborates the procedural conditions presupposed by
utilitarian discourse. Section VI begins by demonstrating Bentham's
commitment to a conception of legality, involving legislative promulgation
of formal rules, faithfully and applied by rigidly constrained bureaucrats and
judges. Next, it demonstrates Bentham's commitment to democratic
representation of the public in devising legislation. Finally, it demonstrates
Bentham's commitment to publicity in government decisionmaking.
Utilitarian policy required public scrutiny of all decisions and the
information and reasons considered in making them.
In sum, sections IV through VI show that Bentham's utilitarianism was
primarily concerned with the problem of how to design government so that
it could accurately identify and faithfully pursue the public good, and be
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seen to do so. Bentham therefore conceived utility as a standard for official
rather than private action. Bentham's utilitarianism is more fundamentally
committed to publicity of official decisionmaking than to any particular
policy judgment about the public welfare. It follows that Bentham's utility
principle does not require him to endorse deceiving the public and framing
an innocent person.
Section VII sums up the larger utilitarian project of legal reform that
motivated utilitarian penology. It then turns to the question of where, if
anywhere, the venerable project of utilitarian penology fits in the
topography of contemporary utilitarian philosophy. Our conclusion is that
utilitarian penology should not be seen as an extension or application of any
modem doctrine of utilitarian ethics, since it preceded all such doctrines and
does not rely on any ethical doctrine. The best contemporary analogue to
early utilitarian writing is policy oriented legal scholarship. But we shall see
that a number of contemporary utilitarian philosophers have begun to
struggle towards a conception of utilitarianism as a political philosophy
concerned with the design and function of institutions, rather than an ethical
philosophy concerned with individual moral obligations. These efforts to
develop a utilitarian "public philosophy"' 12 or "institutionalism" 13 may be
seen as extensions of Bentham's original project of legal reform. Their
authors may proudly claim this heritage, which does not commit them to
framing the innocent. That charge is a frame-up.
II. THE DEBATE OVER PUNISHING THE INNOCENT
A. The Charge
Many philosophers have asserted that utilitarianism requires framing
14
and punishing an innocent person when doing so will advance utility.
12. ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILrFIARIANISM AS APUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1995).

13. See BAILEY, supra note 9; HARDIN, supra note 9, at 11-12.
14. See G.E.M. Anscombe, Modem Moral Philosophy, in ETHICS 206-07 (Judith J.
Thomson and Gerald Dworkin, eds. 1968); PHILIP BEAN, PUNISHMENT 34 (1981); E.F.
CARRrr, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1947); Alan Donagan, Is There a Credible
Form of Utilitarianism?, in CONTEMPORARY UTRLTARIANISM 187-202 (Michael D. Bayles
ed., 1968); CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 59-64 (1978); Alan H. Goldman, Beyond
Deterence Theory: Comments on Van Den Haag's Punishment as a Device for Controlling
the Crime Rate, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 721, 722 (1981); L.H. GOODMAN, ON JUSTICE: AN
ESSAY ON JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 50 (1991); D.H. HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM
(1967); D.K. Lewis, Utilitarianismand Truthfulness, 50 AUSTALASIAN J. PHIL. 17 (1972);
Steven Lukes, Five FablesAbout Human Rights: What It Would Be Like If, 40 DISSENT 427
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Dozens of legal scholars have repeated some version of this charge,
generally citing it as the principal objection to utilitarian penology. 15 E.F.
(Fail 1993); J.D. Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152 (1939); H.J. McCloskey, A NonUtilitarian Approach to Punishment, 9 INQUIRY 249 (1965); H.J. McCloskey, An
Examination ofRestricted Utilitarianism,66 PHIL. REV. 466 (1957); Richard A. McCormick,
Ambiguity in Moral Choice, in DOING EvIL TO ACHIEVE GOOD 7, 33 (Richard A. McCormick
& Paul Ramsey eds., 1978), EDMUND PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 33-35
(1966); Jeffrey Reiman & Ernest Van Den Haag, On the Common Saying that it is Better that
Ten Guilty Persons Escape than that One Innocent Suffer: Pro and Con, in CRIME,
CULPABILITY AND REMEDY 234-35 (Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Miller Jr., & Jeffrey Paul eds.,
1990); GEORGE SCHEDLER, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION AND "PUNISHMENT" OF THE INNOCENT:
TOWARDS A JUSITIFICATION OF THE INSTITUTION OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 11-20, 73-99 (1977);
C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT AND PUNISHMENT, A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 13-14 (1987);
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL
QUESTION, 27-29 (1975); Ernest van Den Haag, Punishment as a Device for Controlling the

CrimeRate, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 706 (1981).
15. See Donald L. Beschle, What's Guilt (Or Deterrence) Got To Do With It?: The
Death Penalty, Ritual, and Mimetic Violence, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 507 n. 119
(1997); Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: Tfie Problem of
Preventive Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 781 (1996); David De Gregorio,
People v. Marreroand Mistake of Law, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 279 n.220 (1988); Anthony
Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime
Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1015, 1026 (1997) ("utilitarianism would recommend such
counter-intuitive practices as . . . convicting those known to be innocent if sufficient
deterrence was achieved."); James Duane, What Message Are We Sending to CriminalJurors
When We Ask Them to "Send a Message" With Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 565, 603
n.121 (1995) (asserting that punishing the innocent is a "perennial problem for the utilitarian
model of punishment"); David J. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J.CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 328, 386 n.269 (1988) ("From a utilitarian point of view, punishment of
innocent persons is perfectly justified for its deterrent effect, at least if the suffering prevented
by the deterrence of future crime outweighs the suffering inflicted by present punishment.");
Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67 (1992); Kent
Greenawalt, Punishment,in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336, 1337-38 (1983)
("utilitarianism admits the possibility of justified punishment of the innocent"); Kent
Greenawalt, See PrescriptiveEquality: Two Steps Forward, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1288
n.62 (1997) (asserting that utilitarians need to qualify their position by imposing
deontological restraints if they are to avoid condoning the punishment of the innocent);
Helene Greenwald, Capital Punishmentfor Minors: An Eight Amendment Analysis, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1471, 1508 n.200 (1983) (under "utilitarian rationale, a man whom
the authorities knew to be innocent could be punished, if members of the community believed
him guilty and threatened to seek personal revenge unless he were punished."); John L. Hill,
Law and the Concept of the Core Self. Toward a Reconciliation of Naturalism and
Humanism, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 289, 314 n.94 (1997); Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms
of Arm-Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1586 (1993) ("utilitarian account of
punishment... would permit the punishment of mere innocents for the sake of some
utilitarian goal."); Karen Lutjen, Culpabilityand Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimus and
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Carritt and H.J. McCloskey leveled the best known versions of this attack.
Carritt reasoned that:
if some kind of very cruel crime becomes common, and none of the
criminals can be caught, it might be highly expedient, as an example, to hang
an innocent man, if a charge against him could be so framed that he were
universally thought guilty; indeed this would only fail to be an ideal instance
of utilitarian 'punishment' because the victim himself would not have been
so likely as a real felon to commit such a crime in the future; in all other
16
respects it would be perfectly deterrent and therefore felicific.

McCloskey posed the question:
whether all useful punishment is just punishment. When the problem of
utilitarianism in punishment is put in this way, the appeal of the utilitarian
approach somewhat diminishes. It appears to be useful to do lots of things
whaich are unjust and undesirable.... [w]hat ...

most utilitarians now seek

to avoid admitting is the implication that grave injustices in the form of
the FederalSentencing Guidelines: The PunishmentNo Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 N. D. J.
L. ETHICs & PuB. POL'Y 389, 392 (1996); Leo Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and
Punishment Revisited, 10 VA. TAX REV. 535, 573 n.160 (1991); Toni M. Massaro, Shame,
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1896 n. 80 (1991);
Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare
Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2042 (1996) ("Bentham (although perhaps not Mill) would have
considered the punishment of the innocent person to be a morally right act if ultimately it
resulted in more total happiness than would have existed if the person had not been punished.
Under Bentham's form of consequentialism, the end of more total happiness justifies the
means of punishing innocent persons."); Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How the
Expansion of the Civil ForfeitureAct Has Laid Waste to Due Process,45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
911, 973 (1991); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1878
n.105 (1987) (claiming utilitarians need "fancy footwork" to avoid endorsing punishment of
innocent people); Nancy Rhoden, The Judge In the Delivery Room: The Emergence of CourtOrdered Cesareans,74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1995 (1986); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL
CRITICISM OF LAW 232-33 (1977); Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A
FurtherExploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment,65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 324
n.93 (1990) ("If a judge were actually to follow a utilitarian theory of punishment, the judge
might actually be required to punish a defendant who was widely believed to be guilty, even

if the judge knew the defendant to be innocent."); Louis M. Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and
Criminals: UtilitarianTheory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 320-21
n.1 1 (1984); Kenneth Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 504 n.141
(1992). R.J. Spujt, The Relevance of Culpabilityto the Punishment and Preventionof Crime,
19 AKRON L. REV. 197, 199 (1985).
16. E.F. CARRrrT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1947).
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punishment of the innocent, of those not responsible for their acts, or harsh
punishments of those guilty of trivial offenses, are dictated by their theory.
We may sometimes best deter others by punishing, by framing, an innocent
man who is generally believed to be guilty, or by adopting rough and ready
trial procedures, as is done by army courts martial in the heat of battle in
17
respect of deserters, etc.
In a key example, McCloskey asked us to:
[s]uppose that a sheriff were faced with the choice of either framing a Negro
for a rape that had aroused hostility to the Negroes (a particular Negro
generally believed to be guilty but whom the sheriff knows not to be
guilty)-and thus preventing serious anti-Negro riots which would probably
lead to some loss of life and increased hatred of each other by whites and
Negros-or of hunting for the guilty person and thereby allowing the antiNegro riots to occur, while doing the best he can to combat them. In such a
case the sheriff, if he were an extreme utilitarian, would appear to be
18
committed to framing the Negro.
McCloskey concluded that utility requires the sheriff to sacrifice the welfare
of the innocent person to save the many who might be killed or injured in
the ensuing riot. McCloskey also provided a variant of the example, in
which the utilitarian framer is a stranger passing through town rather than a
public official. 19
McCloskey provides no textual evidence that Bentham, Beccaria or
other utilitarian writers on punishment thought that framing the innocent
was necessary or desirable. 20 Neither do most of the scores of philosophers
and legal scholars who have repeated this charge. 2 1 Indeed, one legal
scholar who recently charged that "under Bentham's form of
consequentialism, the end of more total happiness justifies the means of
punishing the innocent," was compelled to admit in the supporting footnote,
that "Bentham actually opposed the punishment of innocent people . . .
because Bentham believed it would not serve the ultimate aim of the

17. McCloskey, A Non-utilitarianApproach to Punishment, supranote 14, at 253.
18. McCloskey, An Examinationof RestrictedUtilitarianism,supranote 14, at 468-69.
19. McCloskey, A Non-utilitarianApproach to Punishment,supra note 14, at 256.
20. McCloskey's two influential articles do not cite Bentham, Beccaria or Mill at all.
21. See IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 24-26, 30-31, 42 (1990) for
the one notable exception.
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criminal law, which was deterrence." 22 Another accuser supported his claim
that utilitarianism "would allow ... for the punishment of the innocent,"
with Bentham's statement that "[i]f hanging a man in effigy would produce
the same salutary impression of terror upon the minds of the people, it
would be folly or cruelty ever to hang a man in person." 2 3 Thus, critics of
utilitarian penology either ignore Bentham's writings altogether, or
perversely present his arguments against unnecessary punishment as
evidence of his willingness to punish the innocent.
B. Five Responses
Surprisingly, modem defenders of utilitarianism have also ignored the
writings of the original utilitarians. 24 Instead of reexamining their proposals
and premises, modem utilitarians have generally responded to the charge of
punishing the innocent in one of five ways: by accepting that punishment of
the innocent is an implication of utilitarianism, denying the possibility of
this consequence by imposing a "definitional stop," minimizing the
likelihood of such a consequence, charging that retributivism entails the
same consequence, and reinterpreting utilitarianism as a "restricted
utilitarian" or "rule utilitarian" ethics.
1. Acceptance
One response, favored by the unabashed act-utilitarian J.J.C. Smart,
involves forthrightly, albeit reluctantly, embracing the potential conflict
between desert and utility asserted by McCloskey:
Surely if it is shown that, in certain circumstances ... a utilitarian ought, on

his own principles, to commit a serious injustice, such as punishing an
innocent man, then it seem that this does and should weaken the appeal of
utilitarianism. And yet one can be made to vacillate back again. We also
reflect that the serious injustice would ex hypothesi be the only possible
alternative to an even greater total misery than would be caused by the
injustice.... If a case really did arise in which injustice was the lesser of two
22. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis,
supranote 15, at 2041.
23. Leo P. Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and Punishment Revisited, 10 VA.
TAX REV. 535, 573 (1991) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 28-29
(1830)).
24. A noteable exception is John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 44 PHIL. REV. 3, 8,
n.10 (1955).
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evils (in terms of human happiness and misery, that is) the anti-utilitarian
conclusion is a very unpalatable one too, namely that in some circumstances
one should choose a greater total misery. 25

On these terms, the conflict between desert and utility is simply a tragic
choice which the toughminded utilitarian faces candidly. 26 Smart's response
has the merit of consistency, but it seems unlikely to persuade anyone who
is genuinely troubled by McCloskey's example. McCloskey claimed that
Bentham also adopted this response to the charge of punishing the innocent,
27
but cites no evidence.
2. Definitional Evasion
A second response is the so-called "definitional stop," which claims that
punishment of the innocent is a logical impossibility because punishment
implies inflicting harm on account of guilt. Stanley Benn insists that the
charge of permitting punishment of the innocent rests:
[o]n a misconception of what the utilitarian theory is about. 'Punishment'
implies, in its primary sense, inflicting suffering only under specified
conditions, of which one is that it must be for breach of a rule. Now if we
insist on this criterion for the word, 'punishment of the innocent' is a logical
impossibility, for by definition, suffering inflicted on the innocent.., cannot
be 'punishment.' It is not a question of what is morally justified, but of what
is logically possible .... The short answer to the critics of utilitarian theories

25. J.J.C. Smart, The Methods of Ethics and the Methods of Science, 62 J. PHIL. 344,
347-48 (1965); see also J.J.C. SMART, AN OUTLINE OF A SYSTEM OF UTILITARIAN ETHICS
(1961).
26. A recent example of this strategy in legal scholarship is provided by Louis Kaplow
and Steven Shavell, Principlesof Fairness versus Human Welfare: On the Evaluation of
Legal Policy, Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper no. 277, 34445 (Harvard Law School, 2000). Fortunately, Kaplow and Shavell place little reliance on this
strategy for the excellent reason that they are exclusively concerned with the relative merits of
utilitarian and retributivist analyses of legal policy. Since, as they point out, the utility of a
systematic policy of framing the innocent (as opposed to an isolated act) is most unlikely, it is
not clear that there is any conflict between utility and desert here. The strategy of acceptance
is unnecessary if one treats punishment of the innocent as a policy question, and views policy
questions as the only kind of question utilitarianism is designed to address.
27. McCloskey, A Non-utilitarianApproach to Punishment,supra note 14, at 254.
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of punishment, is that they are theories of punishment, not of any sort of
28
technique involving suffering.
This response is obviously question-begging. It misses the point of
McCloskey's example, which is that utilitarian ethics might tempt someone
to misapply punishment by framing the innocent. Even if purposeful
punishment of the innocent is a logical contradiction, framing the innocent
so as to cause others to punish them is not. Neither is framing the innocent
so as to create the public impression that they are being punished.
In any case, the definitional stop cannot be derived from Bentham's
conception of punishment. Bentham carefully avoided defining punishment
to require the deliberate punishment of the guilty, precisely to avoid begging
the question of the utility of punishing the innocent. 29 For like reasons, he
argued against restricting the term punishment to the purposeful ("directly
intentional") as opposed to the knowing or reckless ("mediately
intentional") infliction of suffering on account of a prior act. 30 On
Bentham's definition, the suffering of an offender's family as a result of his
incarceration or execution is also punishment.
This, however, is but a question of words. Take any lot of evil you will, ....
[slay that it is punishment, the reason for avoiding to produce it, if
unavoidable, will not be the stronger; say that it is not punishment, the
31
reason for avoiding to produce it, if avoidable, will not be the weaker.
3. Minimization
A third response argues that utility would never, or would only very
rarely, be served by punishing the innocent in any realistic or probable
scenario. First, utilitarians disfavor punishment in general because its
immediate effect is to inflict pain with no compensating production of
pleasure. Second, punishment can often be very expensive to inflict. Third, a
publicly announced policy of punishing the innocent would appear to have
antideterrent effects. In a world where only innocents are punished,
28. S.I. Benn, An Approach to the Problems ofPunishment, 33 PHIL. 331-32 (1958).
29. "But so [punishment] be on account of some act that has been done, it matters not
by whom the act was done. The most common case is for the act to have been done by the
same person by whom the evil is suffered. But the evil may light upon a different person, and
still bear the name of punishment." JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW BOOK I, Ch.
1, I WORKS 391 (John Bowring ed., 1962).

30. Id. at 476-77.
31. Id. at477.
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everyone has an incentive to offend. And to the extent that there is even
some chance of non-offenders being punished, the attractions of offending
marginally increase. So in the ordinary course of things, an announced
policy of punishing the innocent seems counter-productive.
Yet, there are many examples of societies or authorities that have
adopted policies of deliberately harming nonperpetrators as a response to
crime. Are these policies utility-maximizing? Let us consider four types of
possibly rational policies that might be considered forms of punishing the
innocent: punishment of associates, punishment based on low standards of
proof, preventive incapacitation and, finally, framing the innocent.
(a) Punishment of Associates
We might hope to deter offenses by punishing the relatives or associates
of offenders instead of the offenders. They might be easier to apprehend
than the offender, or the offender might care more about them, or they might
be more vulnerable to suffering, or the offender might be offending for the
very purpose of benefitting them. We might also hope to increase deterrence
by punishing an offender's associates in addition to the offender. In fact,
punishing an offender usually does inflict suffering on the offender's family,
an undeserved consequence of retribution which retributivists should not
evade by means of a definitional stop.
We most often encounter the systematic punishment of offender
associates in three closely related sorts of settings: bloodfeuds, campaigns of
political or religious repression, and wars. None of these conflicts are utility
maximizing. None would arise within a properly regulated utilitarian
community. Bloodfeud societies have a highly solidaristic clan structure and
no centralized authority with a monopoly on legitimate force. 32 Punishment
in such societies proceeds on the premise of group responsibility. 33 Because
the different groups are competing to out-offend one another rather than
cooperating to minimize the overall rate of offending, it seems unlikely that
a bloodfeud system maximizes utility. By contrast, utilitarianism presumes a
single overarching authority equally concerned for the welfare of everyone
32. See generally WILLIAM
AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND

IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW

(1990) (detailing the processing of bloodfueds in medieval

Iceland); George B. Wall, CulturalPerspectiveson Punishment ofthe Innocent,in 11 PHIL. F.
492-93 (1971).
33. See generally MILLER, supra note 32 (group liability rendered feud a more effective
instrument of social control than if only the wrongdoer suffered the consequence of his

actions).
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subject to its jurisdiction. Repressive regimes and occupying armies
sometimes impose collective responsibility on subject populations for acts
of resistance. Here too, there are special conditions that seem incompatible
with the pursuit of utility. Such regimes are usually unrepresentative,
unpopular and unconcerned with the welfare of the targeted population.
Hence, they are unconcerned with the costs of deterrence, and they need to
impose collective responsibility because they do not have public cooperation
in identifying and apprehending offenders. Even liberal regimes impose a
kind of collective responsibility when they defend themselves against enemy
states. In organized warfare, in military reprisals, and in imposing
"economic" sanctions against other nations, liberal regimes attack ordinary
people rather than political leaders. And the more repressive and
unrepresentative the enemy state is, the more undeserved these attacks on
ordinary persons are likely to be. A utilitarian political community may
decide to defend its boundaries at a great cost in welfare to those outside
those boundaries. But in so doing it is probably not consulting utilitarian
principles because the conditions for developing and implementing
utilitarian policy do not obtain. In sum, groups may find it useful to impose
collective responsibility on other groups, whose welfare they do not count as
equal to their own. But that does not mean that collective responsibility is
utilitarian.
(b) Punishment Based on Low Standards of Proof
Governments adopt varying standards of proof. The lower the proof
standard, the more guilty offenders will be punished, but also the more
innocent suspects. Governments may lower standards of proof for criminal
offenses directly, or they may do so indirectly by criminalizing conduct
which correlates with those offenses (e.g., inchoate offenses), attaching
unpleasant sanctions to ostensibly noncriminal judgments (e.g., civil
commitment, civil contempt, civil forfeiture, bail, deportation), or by
redefining offense elements as sentencing factors. Regardless of what
technique for lowering burdens of proof we are discussing, utilitarians have
no more reason to risk punishing the innocent by adopting low standards of
proof than retributivists. Both are interested in punishing the guilty, whether
for deterrence or desert, and both are interested in avoiding punishment of
the innocent. But only the utilitarian seeks to avoid profitless punishment of
the guilty. Given that desert is violated by acquitting the guilty as well as by
condemning the innocent, it does not appear that desert requires more
exacting burdens of proof than does utility.
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(c) Preventive Incapacitation
Utilitarian penology, concerned with prevention, seems open to
preventive incapacitation of potential wrongdoers. Retributive penology,
concerned primarily with denouncing past wrongdoing, might be thought to
clearly to oppose to preventive incapacitation. Yet things are not so simple.
On the one hand, Bentham did not consider preventive incapacitation as
punitive unless it was a response to a past criminal act. 34 On the other hand,
retributivists do not object to the use of coercive force to prevent crime, so
long as it is not mischaracterized as punishment. Retributivists uniformly
permit the preventive use of force by law enforcement officers and private
citizens, provided that the threat of wrongdoing is sufficiently manifest and
imminent. 35 Apparently, the objection is to basing restrictive force on
unreliable prediction rather than on prediction per se. Thus, there may be
little practical difference between retributivist and utilitarian attitudes
toward preventive detention.
The utilitarian may agree that, as things now stand, it is disutilitarian to
detain based on predictions of future criminality because such predictions
are often unreliable and are easily distorted by prejudice. These dangers
would make the institution of preventive detention a source of constant
anxiety for any who might be detained wrongly. The utilitarian may add that
detention does not even succeed in preventing crime unless prisoners are
kept isolated from one another at great public cost.
(d) Framing the Innocent
Finally, what about framing the innocent, the problem posed by Carritt
and McCloskey? Here we must distinguish two variants of the problem: (i) a
systematic policy of framing the innocent and (ii) the isolated act of an
individual.
(i) An institution
Rawls has argued that an institutionalized system of framing the
innocent to enhance deterrence would be self-defeating if it were publicly

34. See BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 476-77.
35. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND
THE LAW ON TRIAL 20-21 (1988) (discussing the blurred line between legitimate defensive
force and illegitimate preemptive force).
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known and that keeping it secret would require repression on a scale that
would exact huge utility costs.
Try to imagine, then, an institution (which we may call "telishment")
which is such that the officials set up by it have authority to arrange a trial
for the condemnation of an innocent man whenever they are of the opinion
that doing so would be in the best interests of society. The discretion of
officials is limited, however, by the rule that they may not condemn an
innocent man to undergo such an ordeal unless there is, at the time, a wave
of offenses similar to that with which they charge him and telish him for....
Once one realizes that one is involved in setting up an institution, one
sees that the hazards are very great. For example, what check is there on the
officials? How is one to tell whether or not their actions are authorized? How
is one to limit the risks involved in allowing such systematic deception?
How is one to avoid giving anything short of complete discretion to the
authorities to telish anyone they like? In addition to these considerations, it is
obvious that people will come to have a very different attitude towards their
penal system when telishment is adjoined to it. They will be uncertain as to
whether a convicted man has been punished or telished. They will wonder
whether or not they should feel sorry for him. They will wonder whether the
same fate won't at any time fall on them. If one pictures how such an
institution would actually work, and the enormous risks involved in it, it
seems clear that it would serve no useful purpose. A utilitarian justification
36
for this institution is most unlikely.
Igor Primoratz has responded that "Rawls' thesis that it is 'most
unlikely' that the institution of 'telishment' could have a utilitarian
justification simply will not stand."'3 7 Primoratz dismisses the concern that
such an institution will be liable to abuse by asserting "we can assume for
the sake of the argument," that well-meaning people will administer the
institution. But of course a utilitarian designing an institution to endure over
time under unpredictable circumstances to be staffed by unknown persons
cannot make such an optimistic assumption. Utilitarian psychology is
premised on the assumption that persons pursue their rational self-interest.
Thus, utilitarians must assume that a governing elite which is in a position to
systematically deceive the public will serve its own interests rather than
those of the public.
36. Rawls, supranote 24, at 11-12.

37.

IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 127 (1989).
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Primoratz is obviously interpreting utilitarianism simply as the principle
that each decisionmaker (whether individual or institutional) should do
whatever will maximize utility on any conceivable set of empirical
assumptions. He thereby ignores two aspects of utilitarian thought which
Rawls apparently thinks make a utilitarian justification for telishment "most
unlikely." First, utilitarianism cannot be "applied" to any conceivable set of
empirical assumptions if it includes certain empirical assumptions-as, for
example, about human psychology-among its fundamental premises.
Second, utilitarianism does not treat individual decisionmakers and
institutional decisionmakers as interchangeable. Individual decisionmakers
predictably (perhaps even appropriately) maximize their own utility.
Decisionmaking processes require an appropriate institutional design if the
individuals participating in the process are to have the means to discover and
the incentives to pursue the general welfare. Rawls is not simply arguing
that telishment should only be used if its regular use would maximize utility.
He is arguing that telishment should only be used if a utility-maximizing
decisionmaking process can govern its use. He insists that we assess
telishment not just as a government policy, but as a governing institution.
Primoratz concedes that a publicly announced policy of telishment
would be self-defeating. 3 8 But he goes on to argue that a secret institution of
telishment is both a conceptual and an empirical possibility. 3 9 It is a
conceptual possibility because "internal institutional rules are .
possible... rules which are known to those who hold offices within an
institution and to them only. Some institutions, the secret police, for
...... -40 Primoratz proceeds to argue that an
instance, have just such.. rules
institutional practice of systematically framing and imprisoning the innocent
is not only a conceptual but an empirical possibility, pointing to the Gulag
Archipelago. 4 1 But this rejoinder misses Rawls' point, which is not that
secret institutional practices are conceptually impossible. Rawls merely
argues that such practices are unlikely to maximize utility. Obviously, the
fact that the Soviet government adopted such a practice is no evidence that
this practice served the welfare of the Soviet population-indeed, Primoratz
quite obviously thinks it did not. Nor does the fact that the Soviet
government claimed that it was acting in the public interest mean that it
actually did so. Of course a utilitarian "justification" of any horrendous
institution is possible in the trivial sense that officials might defend such an
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
See id. at 127-28.
Id. at 127.
See id. at 128.
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institution as welfare maximizing, just as they might defend any such
institution as fair. But Rawls' claim is that a true-as opposed to a
putative-utilitarian justification of telishment is most unlikely. Hence the
horrors of the Soviet example support-rather than refute-Rawls'claim.
(ii) An individual act
McCloskey's example of an isolated act of framing the innocent by a
sheriff or a passing stranger is designed to avoid the problems associated
with a systematic policy of framing the innocent. Yet even here T.L.S.
Sprigge finds the claim that utility would recommend such conduct
implausible. Where Rawls focuses on the kind of institutions that would
required to implement a policy of framing the innocent, Sprigge focuses on
the kind of information that would be required to justify an individual act of
framing the innocent. He notes that framing the innocent produces certain
misery for the person framed, that the expected benefits of the frame turn on
the deception not being exposed, and that such exposure is highly probable.
Then he points out how speculative the predicted benefits of the frame must
be. How does the framer know that race riots will cease rather than being
further fueled if he bears false witness against a member of the vilified
group? How does he know they won't subside on their own? How does he
know how violent they will be? Sprigge acknowledges that there are
exceptional situations in which framing the innocent would produce the
most felicific results. What he denies is that an individual, acting alone and
in secret, is ever likely to know this before the fact. The elaborate and exotic
fact scenarios that retributivists dream up to confute utilitarians are
necessarily highly unusual situations, in which it is impossible for
individuals to rely on habits or time-tested generalizations. The decision to
frame an innocent person, Sprigge argues, must rely on a "hunch" that is
likely to be wrong. And if the hunch is indeed wrong, the resulting decision
may be disastrously destructive of human happiness. 4 2
Retributivists sometimes argue that the infrequency with which utility
demands punishing the innocent is normatively irrelevant as long as
utilitarianism could conceivably approve punishing the innocent under some
circumstances. But Sprigge responds that the infrequency with which
framing the innocent serves utility is cognitively relevant, because prudence
requires reliance on generalization. An implicit theme in Sprigge's argument
is that practical judgment about the utility consequences of social action
42. T.L.S. Sprigge, A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey, 8 INQUIRY 254, 275-78
(1965).
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depends upon large numbers of people pooling information and experience
and deliberating soberly. Individuals are likely to have very limited and
misleading information, to interpret it in ways that are distorted by selfflattery, and to act on it impulsively. Isolated individuals are poorly
qualified to serve as utilitarian policymakers.
4. Comparison
A fourth response attacks the comparison between utilitarianism and
retributivism implied by the charge that utilitarianism approves punishing
the innocent. First, unlike retributivists, who see punishment of the guilty as
an unalloyed good, utilitarians never approve punishment. They accept it as
an evil, sometimes outweighed by beneficial consequences. And the bad
consequences likely to follow from punishment of the innocent are very
much greater than the bad consequences likely to flow from punishment of
the guilty. So that even if a utilitarian were to accept punishment of the
innocent in some exceptional circumstance, she would do so with
considerable regret.
Now, consider the other side of the comparison, the implied claim that
the retributivist could never under any circumstances accept punishment of
the innocent. This might be plausible if retributivism were only a limiting
principle, forbidding punishment of the innocent. But retributivism is also an
affirmative principle, requiring punishment of the guilty. And since these
two principles can come into conflict quite easily, both cannot be adhered to
absolutely. In actual practice, neither can be adhered to absolutely, with the
result that retributivists must, however reluctantly, expect some punishment
of the innocent, as David Dolinko explains:
[S]ince any actual criminal justice system is inherently fallible, any such
system will inevitably inflict punishment on some people who are actually
innocent and thus do not deserve it. Unless the retributivist rejects all
possible systems of legal punishment, therefore, she is endorsing a system
that she knows will condemn and punish innocent people. Presumably, she
believes that the unjustified punishment of these innocents must be accepted
to avoid the far greater injustice that leaving all of the guilty unpunished
would produce. But isn't the retributivist then "using" those actually
innocent persons who end up wrongly condemned? To be sure, she is
ignorant of exactly who those unfortunate persons are. Yet this seems
irrelevant: the terrorists who blew up Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
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Scotland ... were "using" the hapless passengers to score a political
43
identities.
passengers'
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unaware
were
they
likely)
is
even if (as
Recall that McCloskey's accusations include the utilitarian's supposed
tolerance for "summary" (and hence possibly inaccurate) trials. It looks very
much as if the retributivist is in the same boat as the utilitarian: accepting as
necessary, although not desiring, the infrequent punishment of the innocent.
In fact, as we noted above, punishment of the innocent relatives of the
offender is a frequent consequence of punishing the offender. And if
punishment of the innocent is an inevitable byproduct of punishing the
guilty, it may be that the retributivist-who sees punishment of the guilty as
an intrinsic benefit-is more willing to accept punishment of the innocent
than the utilitarian, who sees punishment of the guilty as an intrinsic cost.
One may argue that the utilitarian is more culpable than the retributivist
in accepting punishment of the innocent although, as Dolinko points out, it
is hard to specify a culpability standard that distinguishes them. Is it that the
utilitarian desires the punishment of the innocent? No, even McCloskey's
sheriff regrets it. Is it that utilitarian knows it will result from her acts and
the retributivist does not? But-and this is Dolinko's point-in adopting a
proof standard of less than a hundred percent the retributivist also knows
that innocents will be punished. And we might add that where the
retributivist punishes the parent of young children, she even knows which
innocents she will cause to suffer.
The utilitarian may point to additional predictable violations of desert
accepted by the retributivist. Crime imposes undeserved harm on victims.
Since the retributivist is indifferent to crime prevention, she is indifferent to
these violations of desert. If retributivist punishment predictably permits
more crime than utilitarian punishment, additional desert violations are
likely to result as the criminal justice system predictably errs in responding
to some of these additional crimes. More criminals will wrongly go
unpunished and more innocents will be punished unfairly. 44
5. Restriction, or Rule Utilitarianism
A fifth response involves interpreting utilitarianism in a different way
than do its retributivists critics. According to this response, utilitarianism
does not judge acts by the standard of their contribution to utility. Instead it
43. David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1623, 1632
(1992).
44. See Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 26, at 330-31.
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judges acts by the standard of their conformity to a rule which, if universally
followed, would advance utility. In other words, utilitarian ethics is "ruleutilitarian" rather than "act-utilitarian." 4 51t follows from this interpretation
that utilitarianism could only endorse acts of framing the innocent if it also
endorsed a general rule or policy of framing the innocent. This interpretation
of utilitarianism, if accepted, considerably eases the utilitarian's task. The
utilitarian need not show, as Sprigge attempted to do, that an individual act
of framing the innocent could never be foreseen to be utility maximizing.
The utilitarian need only show, as Rawls tried to do, that a systematic policy
of framing the innocent would not be utility maximizing. Indeed, Rawls
argument has been interpreted as an endorsement of a rule-utilitarian
46
ethics.
Rule-utilitarianism has traditionally been attacked, however, on the
grounds that it arbitrarily restricts the utility principle. If the good is that
which produces the happiest consequences, then the best act under the
circumstances is the act producing the happiest consequences, even if under
most circumstances that act would produce unhappy consequences. If the
rule-utilitarian agrees that the ultimate good is the production of happy
consequences, she has no reason to shrink from breaking a rule in the
exceptional circumstance when that will produce more happiness. And to
admit that it is sometimes better to produce less happy consequences is to
admit that the production of happy consequences is not the ultimate good. If
the utility principle does not apply universally, the critic reasons, the utility
47
principle is wrong.
A second powerful argument against rule-utilitarianism is that the
distinction between acts and rules for acting is a purely formal distinction
with no normative significance. If under some state of affairs act x appears
to be the most felicific act, then presumably that state of affairs includes
some set of conditions sufficient to make x appear to be the most felicific
act. Hence, in all states of affairs sharing all of those conditions, x will also
appear to be the most felicific act. In other words, for every act judged
utility-maximizing, it should be possible to state a rule of conduct applying
to relevantly similar cases. Hence, if it sometimes seems advisable to frame
the innocent, the rule-utilitarian would have to endorse a rule of framing the
innocent under some set of conditions. Thus, rule utilitarianism would
45. For definition of these terms see R.B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 380 (1959).
46. See Igor Primorac, Utilitarianismand Punishment of the Innocent, 57 REVISTA
INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIrr-ro 582, 598 (1980).
47. See id. at 608; John Jamieson Carswell Smart, Extreme and Restricted
Utilitarianism,25 PHIL. Q. 344 (1956).
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appear no less vulnerable to the charge of framing the innocent than act48
utilitarianism.
It seems to us that these arguments demonstrate that the rule-utilitarian
position fails to capture the considerable insight in Rawls's argument. Rawls
does not succeed in demonstrating that no class of cases could ever be
identified in which it was felicific to frame the innocent. He does show that
it would be imprudent to set up a legal institution to define and carry out the
function of framing the innocent. The position supported by such an
argument is not a rule-utilitarian ethics, or indeed any ethics. It is the
position that legal and political institutions should be designed to maximize
happiness. This position need not be formulated as a restriction on utilitarian
ethics or some general utilitarian theory of the good. It may be formulated
simply as a normative theory of social control.
C. The State of the Debate
What is left of the charge of punishing the innocent after considering the
five modem responses?
It seems to us that the strategies of acceptance and definitional evasion
leave the charge untouched. Anyone disturbed by the prospect of undeserved
punishment is unlikely to be soothed by the revelation that technically, it is
not punishment. Nor are they likely to be persuaded that they should just
grow up and accept life's unfairness.
The strategies of minimization and comparison, however, do succeed in
reducing the scope of the charge. They reveal that there is little reason to
think that utilitarianism requires lower burdens of proof or readier resort to
preventive coercion than does retributivism. They show that a utilitarian
regime is no more likely than a retributivist regime to impose burdens on the
family and associates of offenders. They show that however useful
collective punishment may be to a repressive regime, it is not utilitarian.
And they show that a utilitarian regime cannot pursue a systematic policy of
framing the innocent, whether in public or in secret.
Thus, the strategies of minimization and comparison dispose of a good
deal of the charges on the retributivist indictment. Yet they leave open
whether utilitarianism permits individuals to frame the innocent, if
sufficiently confident that they can keep their deception secret. The strategy
of restriction is a failed attempt to answer this question in the negative. It
fails because it interprets utilitarianism as hedonistic ethics, but offers no
48. See Primorac, supra note 46, at 600-01.
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very good reasons why hedonistic ethics should be restricted to
universalizable rules, and why it is not possible to universalize a rule of
framing the innocent whenever it can be done secretly and beneficially.
Ultimately, the strategy of restriction fails because it misconceives
utilitarianism as an ethical theory (which can only be defended by restricting
it to the ethics of policymaking). But utilitarianism is not an ethical theory.
It is a legal theory.
Most critics and some defenders of utilitarianism have assumed that
deception of the public cannot be ruled out categorically as a means to the
public good, because they assume that utilitarianism is a theory only about
the appropriate ends of human action, not about the appropriate institutional
means for defining and pursuing those ends. If instead we assume that
utilitarianism is a theory about both ends and the institutions and procedures
for defining those ends, then it is possible that it could prioritize institutional
over individual actors, and certain procedural devices like publicity of
decisionmaking over certain substantive goals like deterrence. Such a theory
could eschew framing of the innocent as a counterproductive policy without
committing itself to the view that framing the innocent would always be a
counterproductive act. Moreover, a theory about institutions and procedures
can be contingent on empirical facts, perhaps concerning human
psychology, available technology, or prevailing cultural norms. Thus, a
utilitarian theory of institutions can condemn framing of the innocent as a
counterproductive policy without demonstrating that it would be
counterproductive in all possible worlds. Such a theory would be a theory
for its own world and time as Bentham's was.
In the next section, we will examine Bentham's statements on
punishment of the innocent and fictitious punishment of the guilty. This
discussion will demonstrate that Bentham rejected these practices. Later
sections will show why this view followed from Bentham's conception of
the utilitarian project.
III. BENTHAM ON PUNISHING THE INNOCENT
The one critic of utilitarianism who actually examines any of Bentham's
writings about punishment is Igor Primoratz. In developing his charge that
Bentham approves punishment of the innocent and fictitious punishment of
the guilty, Primoratz focuses almost entirely on two brief sections of
Bentham's Principlesof Penal Law: Part II, Book IV, "Of the Proper Seat of
Punishment," and Part II, Book I, Chapter V, "Expense of Punishment."
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A. "Unavoidable Mis-Seated" Punishment
Primoratz introduces his interpretation of Book IV by noting correctly
that Bentham "emphasizes that it is (logically) possible to punish an
innocent man. . . ."49 Primoratz then poses the question "may it be done,
morally speaking?"' 50 Primoratz concedes that Bentham refers to such
punishment "as 'mis-seated,' 'misapplied' or 'mistaken' punishment," 5 1 but
denies that these designations entail any disapproval. According to
Primoratz,
[T]he crucial role belongs to the distinction between the cases in which such
punishment can be avoided and those in which it is unavoidable. The word
"unavoidable," however, is not taken in its usual, literal sense-for in that
sense no punishment is unavoidable-but with an important qualification:
"without preponderant inconvenience." On account of this qualification, his
distinction is actually a distinction between cases in which punishment of the
innocent cannot be avoided, except at the price of mischief, harm, pain, or
evil greater than that which would affect the innocent person punished, and
cases in which we can desist from such punishment without thereby opting
for such an inconvenient result. In a word, the distinction comes down to the
52
one between profitable and unprofitable punishment of the innocent.
The implication of this paragraph is that the terms "mis-seated,"
"misapplied," and "mistaken" have no normative significance or negative
connotations, but are simply categories of possibly profitable punishment;
and that the word "unavoidable" means the same thing as "profitable,"
"beneficial" or "good." Thus, Primoratz implies, we should not be misled by
Bentham's statements that punishment is misapplied to the innocent or that
punishment of the innocent should be avoided, to the extent possible. What
Bentham really means, Primoratz insinuates, is that we should zealously
punish the innocent as often as is profitable, and for any purpose we desire.
According to Primoratz, Bentham:
[D]oes not take innocence in itself to be a limit to legitimate punishment. For
him it is only the ground for a utilitarian presumption against punishing:
punishment of the innocent is generallyunprofitable, and therefore generally
49.
50.
51.
52.

PRIMORAT"Z, supra note 37, at 24; see also BENTHAM, supra note 29 at 391.
PRIMORATZ, supra note 37, at 24.
Id.
Id. at 24-25.

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32:115

unjustifed. Thus his demand that punishment be remissible is not based
simply on the fact that an innocent person can be punished by mistake; it is
based on the fact that an innocent person can be punished by mistake and
without a good utilitarian justification for punishing her.... 53
But of course this is not what Bentham is saying at all. The fact that a
person is known to be innocent is always a sufficient reason to not punish
her. Bentham is simply saying that while the innocent should never be
punished intentionally, some mistaken punishment of the innocent is an
unavoidable price of punishing the guilty, because errors are inevitable.
Thus:
When ... punishment is inflicted on any person by whom no part is borne in
the offense, it may be said to be mis-seated .... Where it is avoidable, misseated punishment ought in no case to be employed. Wheresoever
punishment not being, in the case in question, in itself undue, it is in your
power to apply to the guilty . . . without having recourse to the innocent,
there the evil ... that would be produced by the infliction of punishment on
the innocent, is avoidable. ... [W]heresoever the nature of the case admits of
the distinguishing who is innocent from who is guilty, the infliction of
54
suffering on the innocent is avoidable.
Harming the innocent loved ones and dependents of the guilty-which
Bentham regards as derivative or "extravasative" punishment-is another
unavoidable price of punishing the guilty.
Whether in the way and for the purpose of punishment, or in any other way,
and for any other purpose, a man cannot be made to suffer, but his
connexions... are made to suffer along with him; and forasmuch as it can
only be by some rare accident that a man can be found who has not.., any
connexions; thense it follows, that if, where it is unavoidable, the certainty or
probability of its extravasation were regarded as a sufficient cause for
forbearing to inflict punishment, it would only be by a correspondingly rare
accident that any thing could be done for the prevention of offences of any
sort; the consequence of which would be general impunity to crimes of all
sorts, and with it the destruction of society itself. 5 5

53. Id. at 31.

54.

BENTHAM,

55. Id.

supra note

29, at 475-76.
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These predictable harms of deserved punishment are not of course
absolutely unavoidable, since we could avoid such harms by avoiding all
punishment. Nevertheless some mistaken and derivative punishment of the
innocent is unavoidable relative to the goal of punishing the guilty.
When the epithet unavoidable is on this occasion employed, some such
limitative clause as is expressed by the words without preponderant
inconvenience, must be understood. For, in point of possibility,
punishment.., being on the part of the legislator and the judge an act of the
will, to avoid inflicting it will... be respectively in their power at all times..
. On so simple a condition as that of seeing government, and with it society
56
itself, perish, you may avoid inflicting punishment altogether.
Bentham is trying to be clear about two points that retributivists
typically obscure: that punishment of the innocent is an unavoidable
concomitant of punishing the guilty, but that punishment of the guilty is an
avoidable policy choice. Thus, when retributivists claim to adhere rigidly to
the principle of no undeserved punishment, they deceive themselves. If they
really regarded avoiding punishment of the innocent as an absolute duty they
could in fact adhere to it by avoiding punishment. They do not appreciate
that they are responsible for choosing to punish the innocent because they do
not see punishment of the guilty as discretionary.
Retributivists in fact treat punishment of the guilty as an absolute duty
which compels sacrifice of the innocent. Bentham points out that mistaken
and derivative punishment of the innocent is not absolutely necessary, but
necessary only relative to the goal of punishing the guilty. This goal is
merely a contingent instrument of social welfare to Bentham, though an
intrinsic good to retributivists like Primoratz. Accordingly, Bentham regards
punishment of the innocent as less justifiable than do his retributivist critics,
because he does not assume the necessity of punishing the guilty. Thus "to
inflict punishment when, without introducing preponderant inconvenience,
the infliction of such punishment is avoidable, is, in the case of the innocent,
contrary to the principle of utility. Admitted:-and so is it in the case of the
57
guilty likewise."
Unnecessary punishment of the innocent, like unnecessary punishment
of the guilty is "groundless: as such it is thrown away; it is so much evil
expended in waste. .".."58 But, by the same token, where punishment of the
guilty is on balance beneficial, taking account all of its costs, it is necessary
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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to the public welfare. And if these costs include mistaken and extravasative
punishment of the innocent then these are necessary as well. This is all that
is meant by Bentham's provocative sounding statement that "[t]o punish
where, without introducing preponderant inconvenience, such punishment is
unavoidable, is not... contrary to the principle of utility;-not in the case
of the guilty: no, nor yet in the case of the innocent."' 59 This is not an
endorsement of purposefulpunishment of the innocent. It is a justification of
the unintended costs predictably imposed on the innocent in punishing the
guilty.
B. "Collective" Punishment
Citing only the statements quoted above, Primoratz insinuates that
Bentham regards purposeful punishment of the innocent as permissible for
any goal whatsoever. He supports this insinuation with another misleading
gloss. Primoratz asserts that Bentham thinks it is sometimes necessary to
punish a large number of innocent people in order to ensure punishment of a
few guilty persons:
Sometimes... it cannot be established who is guilty and who is innocent.
Then the aims of punishment cannot be attained by inflicting it exclusively
upon the guilty, and therefore punishment of the innocent cannot be avoided
"without preponderant inconvenience." In such cases the course of action
with the best consequences attainable will not be to desist from punishing the
innocent, but to punish them.
An example of punishment of the innocent which in Bentham's view, can
sometimes be useful, and thus also justified, is collective punishment. When
it cannot be established who is the perpetrator of an offense, and therefore
the guilty cannot be punished without the innocent being punished at the
same time, and when the suffering [that is inflicted on the former is not
greater than the good secured by such punishment,] it will be useful, and
therefore also justified, to punish the whole group which is known to include
60
the unidentifiable offender or offenders.
But of course, Bentham does not think it is ever absolutely necessary to
punish anyone. To mistakenly punish some innocent people is necessary
only to the goal of intentionally punishing some guilty persons. But since
59. Id.
60. PRIMORATZ, supra note 37, at 26.
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punishment of the guilty is itself only a particularly costly and cruel means
to the public welfare rather than an intrinsic value, it should only be
employed where the costs (i.e., the wasted capacities and suffering of the
guilty and innocent punished, the suffering of their families and friends, the
expense of imprisonment, and the public insecurity, antideterrent incentives
and popular disaffection arising from the inevitable punishment of the
innocent) are not too great. Thus, the "aims of punishment cannot be
attained" by punishing anyone, where the offender cannot be identified with
a very high degree of probability.
Bentham does indeed discuss collective punishment, and he does state
that it can only be justified where the guilty cannot be distinguished from
the innocent and where "the suffering of the innocent, when added to that of
the guilty will not, in the whole, compose a mass of evil more than
equivalent to the benefit of the punishment. ' 6 1 But this is not an
endorsement of collective punishment and he does not endorse it. Quite the
contrary. He continues that whether the guilty can be distinguished from the
innocent "is easy enough to be judged of." Whether the benefits of collective
punishment outweigh the combined suffering of the innocent and the guilty,
however, "must be left to vague conjecture." 6 2 It would seem that the first
criterion will often condemn collective punishment as unnecessary and the
second criterion will never recommend it as clearly beneficial.
And this is indeed how Bentham applies these criteria to three
illustrative examples. His first example is the well "settled" but "rarely
exercised" power to forfeit the privileges of a municipal corporation for "the
misconduct of the corporators." Bentham concludes that "the insidious and
unconstitutional use that was attempted to be made of it in the reign of
Charles II has cast a stigma on the general doctrine ....
Such a mode of
punishment is plainly unnecessary and inexpedient. The particular
delinquents in this way may always be ascertained .... ,"63 Bentham's second
example involved a fine assessed against the city of Edinburgh after a mob
stormed a prison and lynched a reprieved prisoner. Bentham observes that
the fine probably had little effect, but served as an appropriate expression of
disapproval and in any case was deserved because "it may be presumed...
that there was a complicity of affection, in virtue of which all the inhabitants
joined in endeavouring to protect the offenders from the visitation of the
law." 6 4 If so, it did not qualify as collective punishment of a largely
61. BENmmAM, supra note 29, at 483.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 484.
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innocent group. Bentham's third example would not strike us as a
punishment: a legislature responded to a vote selling scheme by some
members of the gentry in a given locale by broadening the franchise
throughout the electoral district to all smallholders. Bentham concludes
reasonably that this diminution of the gentry's power was not justifiable as a
collective punishment, since the guilty parties were known, but was
justifiable as a democratic reform. 6 5 None of these discussions concludes
that the collective punishment of a largely innocent group is justified by the
goal of punishing a few offenders. Certainly these discussions do not
endorse executing or imprisoning groups on such a basis. Nor is such a
conclusion likely on Bentham's premises. If "it cannot be established who is
guilty and who is innocent," punishment of the innocent can and should be
avoided by simply "desisting" from punishing anyone. This choice best
serves "the aims of punishment" which are not to maximize punishment but
to maximize happiness and security.
Primoratz's characterization of collective punishment as "an example"
of useful punishment of the innocent that Bentham would endorse implies
that there are other such examples. But there are not. Bentham's critical
discussion of collective punishment appears in the course of a systematic
analysis and critique of all forms of "mis-seated punishment."'6 6 Bentham
divides these into vicarious punishment whereby an innocent only is made to
suffer for the act of a related guilty party; transitive punishment, where an
innocent is punished along with a related guilty party, collective punishment
and random punishment, where an unrelated innocent alone is made to
suffer. Of vicarious punishment, Bentham expostulates:
I was about to exhibit the absurdity and mischief of this mode of
punishment, but what end would it answer? A simple statement that, that one
man is punished for the offense of another, is calculated to produce a
stronger impression on the mind, than could be produced by the aid of logic

and rhetoric.

67

Against transitive punishments, Bentham reasons that offenders are
more likely to be moved by the prospect of their own suffering than that of
their relatives and that these relatives are unlikely to have much control over
the offenders. 6 8 He considers such penalties costly, inefficient and
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 475-90.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 481.
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unpopular. 69 He does suggest that forfeiture of the property of entire
families may be warranted for the crime of rebellion, when the entire family
is guilty. 70 In the category of random punishments, Bentham places
forfeiture of property purchased in good faith from an offender, and
punishment of persons convicted because of arbitrarily excluded evidence.
Bentham attacks both practices at length. 7 1 Bentham concludes by
explaining "mis-seated punishment" as arising from the hatred felt by men
72
in power, which they gratify at public expense.
Bentham considered mis-seated punishment extremely dangerous to
public confidence in government. Even inadvertent punishment of the
innocent could produce a state of "alarm" 7 3 if it became known. According
to William Twining, the idea that Bentham saw utility in punishing the
innocent "overlooks the disrespect and loss of confidence arising from
admission that the laws cannot protect the law-abiding; that the courts may
make terrible mistakes and that each wretch who goes to the scaffold may be
an innocent victim." 7 4 In his Treatise on Judicial Evidence, Bentham
instructed the judiciary to take every precaution against punishing the
innocent:
[I]t ought to be a maxim with the judge, that it is better to let a guilty man
escape, than to condemn an innocent one; or, in other words, he ought to be
much more on his guard against the injustice which condemns, than the
injustice which acquits. Both are great evils, but the greater is that which
produces most alarm ....

Generally speaking, a too easy acquittal excites

regret and uneasiness only among men of reflection; while the condemnation
of an accused, who turns out to have been innocent, spreads general dismay;
all security appear to be destroyed; no defense can any longer be found,
75
when even innocence is insufficient.
Bentham here recognizes the possibility that punishing an innocent person
could undermine the legitimacy of the government. By threatening citizens
69. Id. at 482-83.
70. Id. at 482.
71. Id. at 485-89.
72. Id. at 489-90.
73. See G.J.Postema, The Principleof Utility and the Law of Procedure: Bentham's
Theory of Adjudication, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL AssEssMENTs 308, 328 (Bhikhu
Parekh ed., 1993); WILIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EvIDENCE: BENTHAM & WIGMORE 99
(1985).
74. TWINING, supra note 73, at 96.
75. JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 197 (1825).
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with arbitrary punishment, a policy of framing the innocent would squander
the public sense of security that deterrent punishment aims to produce.
C. "Apparent" Punishment
Primoratz bases his charge that Bentham approves pretending to punish
the guilty on a brief chapter of the Principles of Penal Law entitled
"Expense of Punishment." The basic idea of this chapter is that "a
punishment is economic when the desired [deterrent] effect is produced by
the employment of the least possible suffering." 7 6 Bentham next introduces
a distinction between the "real value" of a punishment, experienced by one
subjected to it, and the "apparent value" anticipated by one who might yet
be subjected to it. Bentham adds that "it is the real punishment that is the
expense-the apparent punishment gives the profit."'7 7 Bentham next argues
that since the welfare of the offender counts equally with that of all other
community members, punishment should be as "economical" as possible:
Ought any real punishments to be inflicted? Most certainly. Why? For the
sake of producing the appearanceof it.... Every particle of real punishment
that is produced, more than what is necessary for the production of the
requisite quantity of apparent punishment, is just so much misery run to
waste. Hence, the real punishment ought to be as small, and the apparent
punishment as great as possible. If hanging a man in effigy would produce
the same salutary impression of terror upon the minds of the people, it would
78
be folly or cruelty ever to hang a man in person.
Note that Bentham does not in fact say that real punishments ought not
be inflicted or that purely apparent punishments ever can achieve deterrence.
A policy of fictitious punishment could only succeed in utilitarian terms if
systematic deception of the public were possible-in utilitarian terms. Such
a policy would only succeed if it achieved deterrence or other benefits
exceeding its utility costs. And systematic deception of the public would
only count as possible in utilitarian terms if it could be done at a utility cost
below the utility gain achieved thereby. Does Bentham suggest that the
marginal gain from avoiding actual harm to the offender outweighs the very
considerable utility costs of systematically deceiving the public? We will
later see the enormous emphasis that Bentham places on the transparency or
76. Bentham, supra note 29, at 398.
77. Id.
78. Id.

2000]

FRAMED: UTILITARIANISM AND PUNISHMENT

publicity of government decisionmaking as a "security against misrule." But
for now it is enough to note that Bentham never presents fictitious
punishment as a realistic possibility, nor proposes it as a policy. He speaks
of it hypothetically, in order to clarify the analysis of the costs and benefits
of punishment. He uses this arresting hypothetical to dramatize the point that
utilitarianism counts the suffering of the offender as a cost, whereas
conventional retributivist thinking treats it as a benefit. But the entire book
is dedicated to the proposition that actual punishment of some offenders is
necessary despite its human costs.
If Bentham does not think fictitious punishment of offenders is a useful
policy, does he think it can be done at all? In a footnote, he offers one
recorded example of fictitious punishment, which Primoratz reads as an
endorsement of the practice:
At the Cape of Good Hope, the Dutch made use of a stratagem which could
only succeed among Hottentots. One of their officers having killed an
individual of this inoffensive tribe, the whole nation took up the matter, and
became furious and implacable. It was necessary to make an example and
pacify them. The delinquent was therefore brought before them in irons, as a
malefactor: he was tried with great form, and was condemned to swallow a
goblet of ignited brandy. The man played his part;-he feigned himself dead,
and fell motionless, His friends covered him with a cloak and bore him
away. The Hottentots declared themselves satisfied. "The worst we should
have done with the man," said they, "would have been to throw him into the
fire; but the Dutch have done better-they have put the fire into the man." 79
What are we to make of this passage? Certainly it serves Bentham's
pedagogic purpose in graphically illustrating fictitious punishment. It is also
calculated to identify readers with the interests of the offender, a European
like themselves, facing what they were bound to see as a horde of angry
savages. A trading ship or colonial garrison is an insular and precarious
microsociety in which the utility of each individual to the welfare of the
whole is magnified. Thus a reader could be expected to approve of the
clever ruse devised by the Dutch to save the garrison and a valued officer.
Nevertheless, this is far from an endorsement of fictitious punishment.
What are its utility benefits here? Saving lives by preventing war or
massacre? But this could have been accomplished by actual as well as by
fictitious punishment. The utility benefits lie only in saving the life of the
79. Id. at 398-99.
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offender, a benefit achieved at a cost and a risk. The cost is in deterrencethe Dutch party is taught it need not fear punishment for offenses against the
Hottentots. This cost to the welfare of the Hottentots is presumably ignored
by the Dutch, who would not similarly indulge the murderer of a Dutchman.
The risk is that the deception will be discovered and many lives will be lost
after all. This risk is presumably minimized by the naivete of the Hottentots
and the limited contact they have with the Dutch interlopers. Bentham
characterizes the ruse as one which "could only succeed among the
Hottentots." The implication is that it is not so easy to fool Europeans. Not
so easy, but also not so justified if the reader assumes that their welfare
counts-that the legal authorities are their servants, not their masters.
Bentham is certainly not proposing that his own compatriots subject
themselves to a regime of fictitious punishment. Nor is he proposing that the
British public authorize officials to deceive it. Nevertheless Primoratz offers
this gloss on the above passages:
Whenever the deterrent effects of punishment on the general public can be
attained by having the offender punished only apparently, without actually
inflicting punishment, this will be the best option from the utilitarian point of
view .... According to the utilitarian theory of punishment, whenever this
would be the alternative with the best possible consequences, a feigned
80
punishment should be staged instead of a real one.
These claims are exaggerations of the chapter's actual conclusion, which is
"that a punishment that appears of greater magnitude, in comparison of what
81
it really is, is better than one that appears of less magnitude."
It is of course true in the abstract that whatever alternative has the best
consequences is best from a utilitarian point of view, but this begs many
important questions about who judges what is best, and how, and for whom.
If, for example, the public is to be the judge of what policies yield the best
consequences for themselves, then a policy of deceiving the public will not
likely recommend itself. To contemporary retributivist critics of
utilitarianism, these questions of institutional competence and design are
irrelevant. What policies and institutional arrangements actually serve utility
is merely an empirical question, whereas they are interested only in ethical
principles which hold regardless of the circumstances. But Bentham's
enterprise was to develop a clear-sighted and empirically-informed analysis
of policies and institutions. For him, empirically informed judgments about
80. PRIMORATZ supra note 37, at 42-43.
81. See BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 399.
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what institutional arrangements create the best chance of advancing the
public welfare in the face of uncertainty and venality are the very heart of
the matter.
D. PublicDeception
In neither of the sections of the "Principles of Penal Law" glossed by
Primoratz does Bentham endorse fooling the public. In the chapter "Expense
of Punishment," he does identify an overlooked benefit of fictitious
punishment, not in order to recommend that practice, but in order to remind
the reader the offender's welfare must be considered in evaluating any
practice. In Book IV, "Of Mis-seated Punishment," Bentham does not
discuss or consider, let alone endorse, framing the innocent. He is again
primarily concerned with pointing out the utility cost of punishment-in this
case, the inadvertent but predictable harm to innocent persons. Bentham's
relentless message is that we are not obliged to punish all the guilty and we
cannot hope to spare all the innocent. Punishment is a necessary evil, a blunt
and brutal weapon that harms the innocent along with the guilty. In
reiterating these impious truths, Bentham is not approving but combatting
deception of the public.
Bentham occasionally sees utility in deceiving individuals-e.g., to
spare their feelings or prevent their malicious use of information-but we
will look in vain for recommendations to deceive the public. We can
imagine why some critics of utilitarianism might be led to believe that
Bentham would condone telling lies in certain circumstances, since Bentham
expressed no ethical aversion to dishonesty. 8 2 His objection to it was purely
prudential. As a result, some modem critics have cast Bentham as a
proponent of deception, 83 and this reading of Bentham is encouraged by
Henry Sidgwick's later reconstruction of utilitarianism as an ethical theory.
In his Methods ofEthics, Sidgwick argues that lying is often the lesser evil:
[T]here seems to be circumstances under which . . . Honour prescribes

lying.... Just as each man is thought to have a natural right to personal
security generally, but not if he himself is attempting to injure others of life
and property: so if we may even kill in self-defense of ourselves and others,
it seems strange that we may not lie, if lying will defend us better against a
palpable invasion of our rights. .... just as the orderly and systematic
82. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGISLATION 205, (J.H. Bums and H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996).
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slaughter which we call war is thought perfectly right under certain
circumstances, though painful and revolting: so in the word-contests of the
law-courts, the lawyer is commonly held to be justified in untruthfulness
within strict rules and limits. .

.

.And ...Common sense ...seems to

concede that it may sometimes be right [to deceive men for their own good]:
for example, most persons would not hesitate to speak falsely to an invalid,
if this seemed the only way of concealing facts that might produce a
dangerous shock: nor do I perceive that anyone shrinks from telling fictions
to children, on matters upon which it is thought well that they should not
know the truth. But if the lawfulness of benevolent deception in any case be
admitted, I do not see how we can decide when and how far it is admissible,
except by considerations of expediency; that is, by weighing the gain of any
particular deception against the imperilment of mutual confidence involved
84
in all violation of truth.
Here Sidgwick reasons that if utility, not veracity, is the ultimate value,
dishonesty may often be utility maximizing.
One token of Bentham's supposed tolerance of dishonesty is his
statement that "Falsehood, taken by itself. . . can never, upon the principle
of utility constitute any offense at all."'8 5 Yet read in its context-a
discussion of criminal fraud and libel-this statement simply says that lying
should not be defined as a criminal offense unless it yields harm. This hardly
commends lying to officials entrusted with maximizing the public security.
The paragraph continues, "[c]ombined with other circumstances, there is
scarce any sort of pernicious effect which [falsehood] may not be
instrumental in producing." 86 Bentham believed lying tended to produce
undesirable results. 8 7 As Sissela Bok explains, "utilitarian calculation .. .
often appears to imply that lies, apart from their resultant harm and benefits,
are in themselves neutral [since iut seems that a lie and a truthful statement
which achieve the same utility are equivalent." However, she continues, "in
ordinary life, as Bentham would be the first to agree, falsehood cannot be
taken 'by itself'; most lies do have negative consequences for liars, dupes,
all those affected, and for social trust."' 88 Instead of maintaining an abstract
84.

HENRY SIDGWICK,METHODS OF ETHICS 292-93 (1874).
85. JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 205; see also FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG, supra
note 14, at 59-60; Ernest Van den Haag, Punishment as a Devicefor Controllingthe Crime
Rate, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 706, 709 (1981).
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aversion to lying, Bentham expressed his disinclination in terms of the
consequences usually resulting from deception.
Due to these consequences, Bentham "elevated honesty to the chief, if
not sole, virtue, ' 89 and he believed it was "necessary as the light of day to
us." 90 Bentham regarded falsehood as the "common instrument of all
wrong" and the "irreconcilable enemy of justice" which is "passed off as the
true friend and necessary instrument of justice."9 1 Bentham believed that:
[v]eracity is one of the most important bases of human society. The due
administration of justice absolutely depends on it; whatever tends to weaken
it, saps the foundations of morality, security, and happiness. The more we
reflect on its importance, the more we shall be astonished that legislators
have so indiscreetly multiplied the operations which tend to weaken its
92
influence.
Such was the importance of official veracity, that dishonesty was a "poison"
debilitating political life, and Bentham believed publicity was the only
antidote. 93 Any assertion that official deception maximized utility was "the
product of erroneous conceptions, the effect of which was to engage men to
concur in the sacrifice of the universal to the sinister interest."'9 4 Bentham
expected that utilitarian justifications of lying would be self-serving and
would accordingly tend to discount its public costs.
Proponents of political deception are likely to have failed to consider the
entire scope of effects such a decision will cause. 9 5 If I lie to achieve some
perceived good, I will lie again to shore up the original lie. My integrity
96
might suffer, and I could come to lie whenever it suited my purposes. If
89. NANCY L.L. ROSENBLUM, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 40-41 (1978).
90. 1 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM

78 (John Bowring, ed., 1962).

91. Jeremy Bentham, The Elements of the Art of Packing as Applied to Special Juries,
Particularlyin the Cases of Libel Laws, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 92 (John
Bowring ed., 1962).
92. Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Reward, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
210 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
93. JOHN DINWIDDY, BENTHAM 57 (1989).
94. L.J. Hume, Bentham as a Social and Political Theorist, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM:
CRrrICAL ASSESSMENTS 482, 487 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993) (citing Jeremy Bentham.
Manuscripts at University College, London, Box clviii, folio 68).
95. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
PUNISHMENT 82, 90-91 (E. Ezorsky ed., 1973); BOK, supra note 88, at 61.
96. BOK, supra note 88, at 52.
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my lie is ever discovered my credibility be will diminished, and "[s]o
dishonorable and pernicious to a man is the reputation of habitual or
frequent falsity ...that, without the least prejudice to any other individual,
by even a single departure from veracity it may happen to a man to do
irremediable mischief to himself."' 97 Such a blemish would be particularly
damaging if I were a public official or representative, since if the public
came to believe that government lies and secretly breaks rules, it would have
a profoundly subversive effect on the community's respect for the law. A
"truly.massive utility loss" can result from lying, and thus there is a "very
heavy surcharge, in utility terms, to be assessed against" any act of
98
deception.
While the framing of an innocent man might produce certain immediate
benefits, these necessarily speculative gains are arguably outweighed by the
risks. Robert Goodin imagines that:
Once it becomes public knowledge that, as a matter of policy, we are willing
to hang innocent people to assuage a baying mob ...

then everyone starts

worrying: Who will be next? The anxieties associated with such thoughts
systematically occurring across the whole population will more than suffice
to cancel the utility advantages of ...throwing one prisoner to the mob on
99
any given occasion.

97. Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence Specially Applied to English
Practice, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 267 (John Bowring ed., 1962) [hereinafter
Rationaleof JudicialEvidence].
98. ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS APUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 76 (1995).
99. Goodin explains further:
My point is instead that public officials cannot systematically violate people's rights,
as a matter of policy, and expect that policy to continue yielding the same utility
payoffs time and again. Take the case of punishing criminal offenders, for example.
The criminal sanction deters crime only insofar as it is imposed on the guilty and
only the guilty. Introducing any probability that the innocent will be punished along
with the guilty narrows the expected utility gap between criminal and noncriminal
conduct, and increases the temptation for everyone to commit a crime. Thus, if we
are as a matter of policy to punish people whether or not they were guilty, just
according to some utilitarian calculation of public convenience on a case-by-case
basis, then the utilitarian advantages of punishing the occasional innocent person
would quickly diminish, and probably soon vanish altogether.
The reason utilitarian policy makers are precluded from violating the rights of the
innocent, as a matter of policy, is that policies soon become public knowledge. If
nothing else, they are easily inferred from past experience. Once news of such a
policy gets out, people revise their expectations in the light of it-in the case of
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In sum, Bentham disapproves of punishing the innocent, and deceiving
the public. Thus, the charge of framing the innocent is belied by Bentham's
own statements. How can so many philosophers and legal scholars have
attributed this view to Bentham? The answer is that they consider Bentham's
own tediously detailed statements about his views irrelevant. To them, he is
a utilitarian moral philosopher and is therefore chargeable with all
implications of the principles that the good is pleasure, that ethical acts are
those which maximally produce pleasure or reduce pain, and that laws and
policies are good in so far as they are ethical acts. Bentham's own beliefs
about what institutional arrangements and policies would best serve utility
are irrelevant because these are empirically contingent, and hence
unphilosophical. We shall next examine the question of whether Bentham is
a moral philosopher in this sense, and whether his utilitarianism is such a
moral philosophy.
IV. UTILITY AN ETHICAL PRINCIPLE?

Critics of utilitarian penology ascribe a willingness to frame the
innocent to Bentham belied by his own statements. They do so on the
assumption that, as a utilitarian moral philosopher, Bentham is committed to
approving any act that could maximize utility under some conceivable set of
circumstances. Bentham appears to give some warrant for this interpretation
in a few passages appearing at the beginning of his best known book, An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Particularly
interesting to modem professional philosophers is the following statement:
The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work ....

By the

principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of
every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in
question ....
I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of
every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government. 100

criminal punishment, their expectations of being punished even if not guilty. There
are major utilitarian payoffs to be had from sustaining certain sorts of expectations
and from avoiding others, Settled policies ofone sort or another are characteristically
required to produce socially optimal effects in both directions. That is one reason for
utilitarian policymakers to abide by settled policies, even when greater utilitarian
gains might be achieved in any given instance by deviating from them.
Id. at 70-71.
100. BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 11-12.
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But we will argue here that this passage is misunderstood as a claim that the
work to follow is the application to legislation of an ethical philosophy.
Hence, it would be a mistake to conclude from this passage that Bentham's
legislative proposals commit him to some view about the moral obligations
of individuals.
A. Utility in Bentham's Predecessors
To understand Bentham's conception of utilitarianism, it is helpful to
consider the work of the three predecessors who most influenced him, David
Hume, Baron Helvetius and Cesare Beccaria. Bentham derived his
formulation of the utility principle from Beccaria, 10 1 who in turn drew it
from Helvetius. 102 Helvetius in turn drew many important elements of his
thought from Hume. 10 3 Bentham claimed to have been greatly inspired by a
reading of Hume, and to have borrowed the term "utility" from him.1 04 Of
these three writers only Hume had any real interest in morality, and this was
a sociological interest in the genesis and function of social norms rather than
an ethical interest in the obligations of individuals. All three conceived of
utility as a public value, to be pursued through institutions.
1. Hume
Hume's credentials as a utilitarian rest primarily on two works: Volume
three of his Treatise ofHuman Nature, first published in 1740, and the more
popular and accessible Enquiry Concerning the Principlesof Morals, first
appearing in 1751. In both works he applied his empiricist methodology to
problems of value, arguing that judgments of value were ultimately based on
sense impressions. Hume did not distinguish among different types of value:
"morals" included the subjects of aesthetic, economic and, especially,
political value. 10 5 Rather than deriving standards of law and morals
deductively from some concept of the good, Hume proceeded inductively,
101.
Frederick Rosen, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 82, at li. For a
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by examining social practices of praising and blaming. 106 He concluded that
prevailing ideas of virtue were associated with practices generally
promoting human welfare or "utility." 107 These practices became widely
endorsed because they were frequently associated with the experience of
pleasure or of sympathy. While personal pleasure and sympathy for those
nearest us were more powerful motives for action than concern for the
general welfare, they were less prominent in moral discourse because they
could not ground persuasive, or even intelligible arguments.
'[T]is impossible we could ever converse with one another on any
reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as
they appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent
those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of

things, we fix on some steady and generalpoints of view; and always, in our
10 8
thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation.
By the exercise of imagination we are able to extrapolate from our own
situation to that of other persons, both real and hypothetical and so to
identify generally beneficial qualities and practices, worthy of praise. We
thereby correct for our own partisan and ephemeral points of view in
developing moral claims that will be intelligible to others and that will
remain persuasive to ourselves over time. "Experience soon teaches us this
method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our
language .... 109 Morality requires a common point of view because it is a
public, discursive practice. I10
Thus, Hume concluded, the attitude of disinterested benevolence that
characterizes much moral discourse should not be taken as evidence that
morality is founded on reason. 1 11 All human values, Hume insisted, spring
from hedonic sensation. The common moral attitude of impartial
benevolence emerges from the discursive filtering of hedonic sensation in
the context of a social practice of praising and blaming. Hume reasoned that
a hedonistic style of valuation comes naturally to creatures that are self106.

DAVID

HUME,

ENQUIRIES

CONCERNING

HUMAN

UNDERSTANDING

AND

CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 174 (1975) [hereinafter ENQUIRIES].

107.
108.

Id.at 172, 180, 183, 192, 231.
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 581-82 (1978) [hereinafter

TREATISE]; see also ENQUIRIES, supra note 106, at 228-29.

109.
110.
111.

TREATISE, supra note 108, at 582.
ENQUIRIES, supra note 106, at 272-73.
TREATISE, supra note 108, at 581-83.

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32:115

interested and endowed with a capacity for sympathy. Concern for the
abstraction of public welfare is "artificial" rather than natural, however. It
arises from the human need to cooperate in developing and sustaining
mutually beneficial institutions.
In analyzing moral discourse, Hume observed that value judgments are
typically expressed as character judgments, ascriptions of praise or blame to
persons for manifesting virtues or vices. 112 Virtues were divisible into
kinds, "natural" and "artificial." Natural virtues, such as courage and
kindness, benefited particular persons and could be explained by the selfinterest or sympathy of the actor. 1 13 "Artificial" virtues involved adherence
to social norms which generally benefited the public. 114 For the whole
complicated enterprise of valuing, praising and blaming to have any point,
virtues had to be beneficial to human welfare most of the time. But that did
not mean that moral discourse must refer directly to utility, nor did it mean
that every act must advance utility to be considered praiseworthy. Utility
would more likely be advanced by inculcating and enforcing generally
beneficial rules than by encouraging each individual to judge for him or
115
herself how best to serve the general welfare on a given occasion.
Pursuing utility was a cooperative enterprise, best mediated by institutions.
Accordingly, Hume was far more interested in artificial than in natural
virtues. 116
Hume's paradigmatic virtue was "justice," the virtue of obedience to
useful laws. The types of laws he chiefly emphasized were those that
encouraged productive labor, investment and exchange by securing property
and enforcing promises. 117 Such laws were necessary for human flourishing
in a world in which human beings were self-interested but not self-reliant,
and in which necessary goods were available but scarce, and capable of
being appropriated by individuals. 118 In such a world, rules of property and
contract would enhance human welfare, provided that they were generally
respected and enforced. Different regimes of property and contract could
fulfill this function: the specific content of such a regime mattered much less
112.

ENQUIRIES, supra note 106, at 173-74.
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than its widespread acceptance and enforcement. 1 19 Since particular rules of
property and contract were useful only as part of regimes that were generally
accepted, obedience to such rules was useful only when it was widespread.
This meant in turn that the "virtue" of justice depended upon an
institutionalized social practice. It was an "artificial" virtue depending on a
social convention. 120 If a particular society were to suddenly alter its regime
of property and contract, obedience to the old regime would be disruptive
12 1
rather than useful, and so would no longer be virtuous.
According to Hume, acts tend to be deemed virtuous within the context
of legal regimes and other cooperative social practices useful to the public
welfare. Hume has sometimes been classified a "rule utilitarian" 12 2 because
he did not offer any criterion of value for acts. 123 It would be more accurate
to say that he developed the concept of utility as part of a description of how
institutions like law solve problems of cooperation. Hume saw morality
itself as an institution, a discursive social practice of praise, blame and
argument, 124 that helped form and sustain utilitarian institutions. Because he
sought to understand morality as a contingent social practice, he did not seek
to discover the foundation of morality in some essence of the good. Morality
was "founded" on utility1 25 only in the sense that morality grew out of the
practical need to cooperate in securing the conditions of human survival,
peace, and prosperity. Thus, that utility was the "foundation" of morality did
not mean that individuals were obliged to cast prevailing moral norms aside
and maximize utility. Although socially useful, morality remained morality:
126
a social practice of invoking and following norms.
2. Helvetius
Helvetius was chiefly a psychologist, philosopher of mind and political
theorist. His most influential work, Of the Spirit (1758), was devoted to two
parallel arguments: that genius was entirely a function of education and did
WHELAN, supra note 105, at 233.
120. ENQUIRES, supranote 106, at 202; TREATISE, supra note 108,at 491-97.
121.
ENQUIRIES, supra note 106, at 199.
122. HARRISON, supra note 117, at 31-33.
123. Id. at 27-28, 33.
124. ENQUIRIES, supranote 106, at 273.
125. Id.at 174, 231.
126. Hume obviously employed a foundationalist approach to justification in
epistemology. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 160 (1979).
For an argument that Hume's overall approach to normative justification was
nonfoundationalist, however,see HEtzOG, supranote 11, at 161-202.
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not depend on personal characteristics, and that the good was entirely a
function of institutional arrangements and did not depend on personal
qualities of virtue at all. 127 These arguments proceeded from three key
premises, all traceable, in part, to Hume: (1) an empiricist account of mind,
according to which all our ideas result from sense impressions, combined
and associated together; 12 8 (2) an emotivist account of value, according to
which all our judgments are rooted in passions, and especially in selfinterest; 12 9 and (3) an egoist characterization of human nature as essentially
self-interested.
Helvetius proceeded to argue that both virtue and vice are illusions1 3 0 in
that both good and evil actions proceed from the same sources: passion and
self-interest. Moreover, all that we mean in characterizing another's action
as good is that it serves our aims. Since we can only derive our ideas of the
good from the experience of desire and its gratification, the only common or
public meaning this term can be given is that of serving the welfare of the
largest number of people. 13 1 The language of evaluation is meaningful only
in so far as it refers to the self-interest of the audience; the language of
obligation is meaningful only in so far as it refers to the self-interest of the
actor.
This point about the language of value is crucial in understanding the
focus of early utilitarians like Helvetius and Bentham on public policy rather
than private ethics. 13 2 Since Helvetius and his readers have a common
interest in inducing others to serve the public welfare, he can use the words
"good" and "virtuous" in referring to behavior that serves the public welfare.
These terms have a common meaning only in the context of a public
discussion about how to influence the behavior of third parties. Little is
gained by addressing individuals and urging them to sacrifice their own
interests to the public welfare so as to be "good"-for "goodness" would not
have that meaning to them. Instead, "the good" would be synonymous with

127.
FACULTIES

CLAuDE

A. HELvErlus,

DE L'EsPRrr, OR ESSAYS ON THE MIND AND rrS SEVERAL

7 (1970).

128. Id.
129. Id. at 10, 39.
130. Id. at 29.
131.
Id. at 92, 102-03.
132. As noted below, the utilitarian William Paley shared the view that talk of
obligation was meaningless without an enforcement sanction. Unlike Helvetius, however,
Paley reasoned that individuals were obliged to perform ethical duties by the sanction of
divine judgment. WILLIAM PALEY, MORAL AND POLrrICAL PHILOSOPHY INWORKS OF WILLIAM

PALEY 37-39 (1831).

2000]

FRAMED: UTILITARIANISM AND PUNISHMENT

their own self-interest. 133 It only makes sense to urge the pursuit of the
public welfare if one is addressing the public or its institutional
representatives. Helvetius identifies his subject as including "that part of
all
morality at least, which is common to men of all nations, and which in 134
advantage."
public
the
than
view
in
object
governments can have no other
From this public perspective, "a man is just when all his actions tend to
the public welfare." 13 5 For Helvetius, this principle can dictate that those
exercising public power must cruelly sacrifice individuals for the public
good. Helvetius offers, as an example, the practice among stranded and
starving sailors of drawing lots to determine who should be killed to feed the
rest: "this vessel is the emblem of the nation; everything becomes lawful,
and even virtuous, that procures the public safety." 13 6 A second example
involves undeserved punishment. To stop a wave of nocturnal murders, a
sultan imposes a capitally enforced curfew; he then enforces the curfew
strictly against a stranger who was not aware of its imposition. 13 7 For our
purposes though, the significant thing about these examples is that they are
open and candid exercises of public authority, in keeping with a focus on
policy rather than private ethics.
Thus, for Helvetius, public happiness is the aim of public policy, not of
private morality. Only by influencing laws can the philosopher hope to
improve behavior:
If morality hitherto has little contributed to the happiness of mankind it is
not owing to any want of perspicuity... in the moralists; but... it must be
owned, that they have not often enough considered the different vices of
nations as necessarily resulting from the different form of their government;
yet it is only by considering morality in this point of light, that it can be of
138
any real use to men.
I say, that all men tend only toward their happiness; that it is a tendency
from which they cannot be diverted; that the attempt would be fruitless, and
even the success dangerous; consequently, it is only by incorporating
personal and general interest, that they can be rendered virtuous. This being
granted, morality is evidently no more than a frivolous science, unless
133.
134.
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blended with policy and legislation: whence I conclude that, if philosophers
would be of use to the world, they should survey objects from the same point
of view as the legislator .... The moralist is to indicate the laws, of which

the legislator insures the execution, by stamping them with the seal of his
authority.

139

Helvetius conceives of law as a scheme of positive and negative
incentives to encourage individual service of the public interest. He also
urges a regime of broad education and unrestricted speech, to encourage
intellectual achievement and ensure public scrutiny of the performance of
government. Indeed, an enlightened and vigilant public is the only means by
which lawmakers can be compelled to listen to the prescriptions of moral
philosophers. While not explicitly advocating democracy, Helvetius
comments that "if force essentially reside in the greater number, and justice
consist in actions useful to the greater number, it is evident that justice is in
its own nature always armed with a power sufficient to suppress vice, and
place men under necessity of being virtuous."' 14 0
3. Beccaria
Beccaria's immensely influential reformist tract, On Crimes and
Punishments(1764) was greatly inspired by the utilitarianism of Helvetius,
but also by Rousseau's Social Contract.14 1 Beccaria offered his extensive
package of criminal law reforms as an application of political theory rather
than ethics. His political theoretical premises were essentially liberal and
contractarian. Thus, the government was legitimate in so far as rationally
consented to, and rational persons would consent only to so much public
coercion and injury as served their common interests. 14 2 While law should
serve the common welfare, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number,"
lawmakers inevitably served their own interests and profited by the public's
ignorance and misplaced trust. 14 3 Hence legitimate law could only arise
from the will of an enlightened general public, and the function of the
philosopher was to enlighten the, public as to its own interest. 14 4 Like
139.
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140.

Id. at 178.

141.
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Helvetius, Beccaria used utility as the touchstone of policy analysis, because
it was a principle on which individuals of differing views could rationally
agree; 14 5 hence it could provide the basis for a social contract. 14 6
Beccaria argued that public coercion and injury served the common
interest only to the extent that they prevented greater private coercion and
injury. 14 7 It followed that deterrence of crime was the only legitimate basis
for punishment, and then only where noncoercive measures would not
suffice. 14 8 And the most important noncoercive crime control device was
149
the "public tranquility" achieved by establishing legitimate government.
Like Helvetius, Beccaria assumed that citizens were by nature ruled by
passion and self-interest, 150 and that all social achievement proceeded from
harnessing or enabling these energies rather than unnaturally suppressing
15 1
them.
152
Beccaria also insisted that both laws and their enforcement be public
and regular. 15 3 He reasoned that certain punishment deterred more
effectively than severe punishment for two reasons. First, certain
punishment did not allow the offender the hope of escaping punishment.
Second, both severity and discretion undermined deterrence and security by
delegitimizing the law. If laws were too severe, citizens would refuse to
cooperate with the investigation, prosecution and punishment of crimes.
Hence, the more severe punishments became, the less certain, and so the less
deterrent. 154 Moreover, if the law could be bent, citizens would seek
advantage by turning their energies to intrigue rather than productive
accomplishment. 155 Citizens would lose respect for law, and perhaps oppose
it by force. 15 6 Rulers would criminalize dissent, causing unnecessary
unhappiness and squelching enlightenment, art and science. Thus Beccaria
157
was profoundly wary of discretion in the administration of justice.
Beccaria accordingly insisted that justice was public and that private
145.
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forgiveness of crimes should not play a role in the administration of criminal
law. In a well-conceived regime of punishment, characterized by mildness
15 8
and regularity, pardons would also be unnecessary.
Thus Beccaria concluded that optimal deterrence of crime depended on
avoiding over-criminalization, on certain but mild punishment, and above
all, on regular administration of the criminal law. However, Beccaria's
concerns transcended optimal deterrence. His larger concern was with
rational, utility-maximizing governance. Here, governmental rationality
depended on popular enlightenment, 159 participation in lawmaking, and
scrutiny of the administration of the laws. 16 0 In sum, Beccaria's theory is
about the legitimate use of public coercive power, rather than the private
moral obligations of officials. "[O]nly the law may decree punishments for
crimes, and this authority can rest only with the legislator, who represents all
of society united by a social contract."' 16 1 Officials are expected to openly
serve utility as an enlightened public defines it, by rigorously adhering to
rules. 162 If they do so, an enlightened public will accept and abide by the
laws, 16 3 the great aim of public security will be achieved, 164 the productive
16 5
energies of society will be freed, and public happiness will flourish.
Utility plays two primary roles in this argument. First, utility is a
principle of psychology: thus elites, potential offenders and the wider public
are presumed to be bent on maximizing their self-interest. Elites are
presumed either to know their own self-interest or to profit unwittingly from
received arrangements. The general public, however, depends on
philosophical enlightenment for knowledge of the public interest. Thus, the
second role for the idea of utility is evaluative and forensic. In arguing to the
general public for law reforms, the philosopher should advert to the effect of
the proposed reforms on the general welfare. If a proposed reform serves the
public welfare, it may be rationally consented to. If there is rational consent,
the reform is legitimate. Thus, the normative significance of utility rests on a
contractarian theory of the legitimacy of laws, not on a general theory of
value, or a theory of moral obligation. There is no room for officials to
secretly pursue utility since this contributes nothing to the legitimacy of
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 80.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 74-75.
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government and risks destroying it. "The right to inflict punishment does not
166
belong to an individual, but to all citizens or to the sovereign."'
Accordingly, officials charged with the administration of punishment had to
be closely observed, to prevent their betraying the public interest in favor of
67
their own. 1
Now that we have examined the utility principle and the place of private

ethics in the writings of Bentham's most important predecessors, we are in a
better position to read Bentham's statements about the utility principle in the
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. None of
Bentham's main influences proposed utility as an ethical principle for
evaluating or directing individual acts. 16 8 Hume identified utility primarily
166.
167.

Id. at 55.
Id. at 78.
168. See PLAMENATZ, supra note 102, at 47-48.
Other utilitarians preceded Bentham but did not influence him as substantially. Bentham
occasionally claimed to have derived his formulation of utility as the greatest good of the
greatest number from Joseph Priestley's Essay on the FirstPrinciplesof Government (1771),
which proposed this only as the proper end of government, not of all human action. Frederick
Rosen, Introduction to BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 205; JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, POLITICAL
WRITINGS

14, 31, 46 (1993).

Three other eighteenth century utilitarians-John Gay, David Hartley, and William
Paley--did offer utility as an ethical principle. See John Gay, DissertationConcerning the
FundamentalPrinciple of Virtue or Morality (1731) in ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON
TO MILL 769-85 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939); DAVID HARTLEY, OBSERVATIONS ON MAN, His
FRAME, HIS DUTY, AND HIS EXPECTATIONS (scholars' facsimiles & Reprints 1966 (1749));
PALEY, supra note 130 at 37-39. Their theories shared the psychological assumptions of the
theories discussed in the text: all three authors assumed that ideas were formed by associating
together sense-impressions, and that human action was motivated first by self-interest and
second by sympathy. They joined Hume, Helvetius, Bentham, and Beccaria in the worry that
this hedonistic account of human motivation left public-regarding action unexplained. As we
have seen, Hume, Helvetius, Beccaria, and Bentham offered institutions like law as the
solution to this problem and rational discourse as the means by which self-interested creatures
could agree to form such institutions. Gay, Paley, and Hartley all adopted a very different
response to this problem: human beings were bound to serve the general welfare by divine
will. For Gay, that God wished his creatures to be happy sufficed to explain why all were
obliged to serve the general welfare; they were motivated to do so by habits developed in the
pursuit of affection and esteem. For Hartley and Paley, however, the compelling motivation to
serve utility was the sanction of divine judgment in the hereafter. HARTLEY, supra,at 364-65,
395-97. For Paley, divine judgment was necessary to explain not only the motivation but also
the obligation to pursue utility. Although a cleric, he was shockingly positivistic about morals
and scoffed at the notion that there could be obligations not enforced by sanctions. In this
sense, his utilitarian ethics were nothing more than a utilitarian theory of law, with divine
sanctions substituted for human ones. PALEY, supra note 132, at 37-39. Like Hume,
Helvetius, Beccaria, and Bentham, Paley thought that utility must be pursued by enforcement
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with the artificial virtues that depended upon social institutions like law.
Helvetius argued that an ethical philosophy would be useless, and that
philosophers could only serve utility by proposing legislation. Beccaria
proposed such legislation, and endeavored to show that it would be
perceived as politically legitimate, rather than showing that it would meet
some ethical standard. All three authors offered public utility as an
appropriate evaluative criterion for use in publicly legitimating legal policy,
because it was a criterion on which they thought self-interested actors were
able to agree. Utility also provided a standard by which the public could
monitor and control self-interested officials.
B. Bentham's Utility Principle
Bentham's use of the utility principle in the Introduction is consistent
with this general approach. Despite the title, the book is almost entirely
about penal legislation and hardly about morals at all. Bentham's preface
describes the work as an introduction to a penal code, 16 9 and confesses that
it does not live up to its title. 170 According to Bentham, the book's
contribution to the study of morals consists only of its "analysis of...
pleasure, pain, motive and disposition." 17 1 He notes that he has nothing to
say on the subjects of virtue and vice. He does not even include within the
subject the topics that a contemporary ethicist would expect to find: an
analysis of the nature of the good, and of personal duties. He apparently
considers morals to be the descriptive and normative study of character. The
former is what we would today call psychology, and it is only that part of
the subject of "morals" that the book addresses. The preface goes on to
of generally beneficial rules, rather than case by case. Paley's reasoning was based on
deterrence theory: he argued that governance of individual behavior required clear standards
of behavior tied to certain enforcement sanctions. Since persons could only be obliged to
fulfill standards of behavior that were enforced, they could in principle only be obliged to
fulfill standards of behavior that were enforceable. And these must be clear and easily
monitored rules. Id. at 39-40. Thus for Paley, as for Hume, Helvetius, Beccaria, and Bentharn,
utility was more a feature of institutions than of acts. The utility of a norm depended upon its
form as well as its content. Paley expressed this idea by distinguishing between the particular
consequence of an act, and its more important general consequence (not its consequence if
regularly repeated, but its compatibility with beneficial rules of conduct). Id. at 39. Thus the
utility of an act depended more on its formal than on its substantive effect.
169. BENT'HAM, supra note 82, at 1, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLEs OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996).
170. Id. at3.
171. Id.
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outline an ambitious plan involving ten more books, all on the subject of
17 2
legislation, none on the subject of "morals."
The forensic function of the principle of utility is announced in the
opening paragraph of the book. It exactly parallels the place of utility in the
arguments of Beccaria and Helvetius:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as
well as to determine what we shall do .... They govern us in all we do, in all
we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection
will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to
abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.
The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the
foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity
by the hands of reason and law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in
sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of
light. 173

This is the now familiar argument: individuals are self-interested, and
cannot be persuaded to be good at their own expense. They can only be
induced to be good by laws offering rational incentives. Arguments
supporting such laws either rationally explain how such laws will gratify the
audience or they are empty cant, merely indicating that such laws will
gratify the speaker. When equated with utility, "the words ought, and right
and wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they
have none." 174 This is not a claim about the nature of the good, but about
the nature of political discourse among self-interested actors. As H.L.A says
of this passage, "it is ...intended to convey an idea which is central to his
whole argument, namely that when so used [the words ought and right and
wrong] raise a rationally settleable issue because only then do they invoke
an external standard which reasonable men would accept for the
determination of right and wrong."' 17 5
It is in this limited sense that the principle of utility provides the
foundation of Bentham's argument. Bentham's argument is about good
legislation. The audience for such argument is necessarily a public audience,
and such an audience can only be rationally persuaded by arguments about
172.
173.
174.

Id. at6.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.

175.

Hart, Bentham'sPrincipleof Utility, in BErNTHAM,supranote 82, at xc.
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the consequences of laws for the public welfare. And evaluation of acts
according to the public welfare is the meaning of the utility principle when
the actor one is trying to persuade is the public. When the actor one is trying
to persuade is an individual, the principle of utility has the quite different
meaning of self-interest. Here is how Bentham draws the line between the
subjects of ethics and legislation:
Private ethics teaches how each man may dispose himself to pursue the
course most conducive to his own happiness, by means of such motives as
offer themselves: the art of legislation (which may be considered as one
branch of the science of jurisprudence) teaches how a multitude of men,
composing a community, may be disposed to pursue that course which upon
the whole is most conducive to the happiness of the whole community, by
17 6
means of motives to be applied by the legislator.
Just as Bentham conceives morals as psychology, the study of character, he
regards ethics as something like psychological therapy or self-help, the art of
composing one's character so as to achieve happiness.
Thus in identifying the utility principle as the foundation of his book on
legislation, Bentham by no means implied that individuals are morally
obliged to serve the public welfare. Such a claim would be pointless, since
individuals are naturally compelled to serve their own welfare. It is only in
the context of a work on legislation that utility stands for the greatest
happiness of the greatest number. And it is only from this legislative
perspective that even individual acts are to be evaluated and encouraged or
discouraged according to their contribution to the public welfare. 17 7 Thus
the "utility principle," interpreted as a public welfare standard, is
fundamental to a work on legislation because it provides a useful standard of
value. That does not mean that public welfare is foundational in the sense
that it constitutes the essence of the good.
C. Bentham's InstitutionalAccount ofMorality
In moral psychology, Bentham followed Helvetius: all passions are
178
good, or at least not bad. Actions are valuable according to their effects,
and every passion or "motive" can be rendered useful by appropriate
176. BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 293.
177. Id. at 12-13.
178. JOHN BOWRING, II DEONTOLOGY;
[hereinafter II DEONTOLOGY].

OR, THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY

44-46 (1834)

2000]

FRAMED: UTILITARIANISM AND PUNISHMENT

sanctions. 179 In general, self-love is a highly useful passion, because
individuals can be counted upon to augment their own happiness efficiently,
expertly, and spontaneously, without any legislative prompting, thereby
contributing to the aggregate welfare of society. 180 Like Helvetius, Bentham
based libertarian policies on utilitarian reasons.
Bentham discussed morality in one other way in the Introduction: as an
informal system of social sanctions, deploying the currencies of honor and
shame, esteem and contempt. 18 1 The availability of such informal "moral"
sanctions reduces a society's need for formal legal sanctions. Such sanctions
may achieve the utilitarian aims of the law at less cost. Bentham further
developed this conception of morality in his one work on ethics,
Deontology, assembled posthumously by his disciple John Bowring, from
notes and fragments. A striking feature of the view of morality revealed in
this book is how much it resembles Bentham's positivist conception of law.
Bentham shared with Hume and Paley the view that morality is an
institution, like law. Like law, morality is an instrument of social control,
that cannot exist without enforcement sanctions.
[W]here actions are supposed to be beneficial over so large an extent as to
demand the attention of the legislative or administrative authorities, public
recompense is brought to reward them. Beyond these limits vast masses of
enjoyment and suffering are produced by human conduct, and here is the
province of morality. Its directions and its sanctions become a sort of
factitious law. Those directions are of course dependent on the sanctions to
which they appeal; and it is only by bringing men under the operation of
these sanctions that the moralist, or the divine, or the legislator, can have any
18 2
success or influence.
Just as there can be no descriptive claims about law that are not claims about
positive law, there can be no descriptive claims about morality that are not
claims about a functioning system of social control. Terms like "the right,"
"the good," and "virtue" have the same status for Bentham as terms like
"natural law." They are nonsense.
Of course, one can make prescriptive claims about morality, just as one
can about law. But these are not, for Bentham, claims about how it is right to
act. They are claims about what acts we should encourage and with what
179.

BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 32, 100.

180.

Id. at 284.

181.
182.

Id. at 34-35.
II DEONToLOGY, supra note 178, at 2-3.
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reasons, and what acts and reputations we should esteem and approve. These
are prescriptive claims about institutional reform-about how the informal
sanctions of morality should be organized and directed. And just as it would
be puerile to propose a legal conduct rule without giving any thought to how
that rule could be enforced, it would be silly to propound a dictate of
morality without giving any thought to whether and how that dictate could
be realized.
For Bentham, the overwhelmingly salient constraint on any program of
social control was the hedonistic basis of human motivation. 18 3 Thus, actors
would only obey conduct standards if those standards either served their
interests or were backed by sanctions. 184 A moral sanction involves societal
disapproval rather than state coercion, but is nonetheless a sanction. 18 5 A
moral standard has no validity unless a society can be induced to approve
and disapprove conduct on its basis. A morality, then, is not a conception of
the good, but a policy. A moralist proposes and advocates a morality not
primarily to those who must decide whether to obey it, but to those who
must decide whether to enforce it. He advocates it not on the basis of its
rightness, but on the basis of its realizability and its service to the interests
of its enforcers.
Bentham's Deontology, accordingly, endeavored to show that a good
deal of conventional morality could be defended as compatible with the
18 6
enlightened self-interest of the actor.
'Give me,' may the utilitarian teacher exclaim,-'give me the human
sensibilities-joy and grief, pain and pleasure-and I will create a moral
world. I will produce not only justice, but generosity, patriotism,
philanthropy, and the long and illustrious train of sublime and amiable
187
virtues, purified and exalted.
Bentham argued that most "virtues" can be reduced to prudence or
benevolence. 18 8 We can easily encourage prudent behavior by teaching
actors that it serves their long terms interests. 189 And we can reward
benevolent behavior with gratitude and esteem-thereby encouraging
183.
184.
185.
[hereinafter
186.
187.
188.
189.

II DEoNToLoGY, supranote 178, at 10-12.
Id. at 7, 133.
JoHN BOWRING, I DEONTOLOGY; OR, THE SCIENCE OF MORAUTY 21-22 (1834)
I DEONTOLOGYI.
II DEONTOLOGY, supranote 178, at 130-31.
Id. at 10.
I DEONTOLOGY, supranote 185, at 10.
II DEONTOLOGY, supranote 178, at 28.
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behavior that serves our own interests. 190 By presenting benevolence as a
means to gratitude and esteem, utilitarian morality encourages the actor to
make these social responses the measure of benevolence. In this way
utiltiarian morality discourages paternalism. Bentham denied that a high
opinion of one's own motives qualifies individuals to define the interests of
others. Individual moral actors are simply not sufficiently competent or
trustworthy institutions to identify or pursue the welfare of others, let alone
the general welfare. 19 1
Bentham advocated reforming moral discourse 19 2 to emphasize the
compatibility of virtue and self-interest, 19 3 because only by these means
could we render morality effectual as a tool of social control. 194 This would
involve some reform in the content of moral discourse as well. Bentham
advocated these changes not to bring morality in line with "the right" or "the
good" (these terms are empty vessels) 19 5 but to make it effectual. The
reform of moral discourse also would ensure that it would make a rational
appeal to its audience and not deceive them into a blind subjection to the
196
will of the moralist.
If morality is a sanctions system, backed by public opinion, it makes
little sense to say that McCloskey's sheriff is morally obliged to secretly
frame a scapegoat. Morality in Bentham's sense only comes into play in
judging acts that are publicly known and therefore capable of being
encouraged or condemned by public opinion. Successful deception of the
public may or may not maximize utility; it cannot be commanded by
utilitarian morality because utilitarian morality can offer the actor no reason
to fool the public. Indeed, deception of the public subverts the sanction
system of utilitarian morality. Perhaps for this reason, Bentham's
Deontology emphasizes veracity as a virtue, 197 and publicity as a requisite
for morality's efficacy. "The more men live in public, the more amenable
they are to the moral sanction. The greater dependence men are in to the
190.
191.
192.

Id at 39-41, 165-66.
1d at 288-89.
I DEONTOLOGY, supra note 185, at 132-39; II DEONTOLOGY, supra note 178, at

314.
193. I DEONTOLOGY, supra note 185, at 10.
194. I DEONTOLOGY, supra note 178, at 73-76.
195. Id. at 10-11.
196. Id. at 17,306.
197. II DEONTOLoGY, supra note 178, at 66-67, 145-46; I DEONTOLOGY, supra note
185, at 239-41. Bentham especially urges the sharing of tangible information with the public;
it is less important, and sometimes even spiteful or cruel, to publicize one's opinions. I
DEONTOLOGY, supra note 185, at 280.
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public, that is, the more equality there is among them, the clearer the
evidence comes out, the more it has of certainty in its results." 198 While
morality cannot coerce publicity, it can reward those who make their
behavior easy to monitor with public esteem and punish those who are
secretive with disapproval. Law can assist morality by ensuring freedom of
press and speech. 19 9 Should the law further restrict privacy in order to
strengthen the moral sanction? Doing so threatens utility by reducing the
autonomy of individuals and excessively empowering government officials.
Utility is probably best served by holding only official conduct to the most
stringent standard of publicity, even at the cost of weakening the moral
sanction.
This Benthamite conception of morality as a practical system of social
control rather than an ideal standard of behavior has implications for another
traditional criticism of utilitarianism. Critics have assumed that utilitarian
ethics required each individual to maximize the public welfare. This would
seem to require enormous individual sacrifices of energy, attention and
wealth: e.g. giving all of one's money to Oxfam, adopting and caring for
dozens of orphans, directing all of one's attention to the welfare of
strangers. 20 0 But readers of Bentham's Deontology are not likely to
conclude that utilitarian morality imposes such burdens. Such an ethic
would make no appeal to the rational self-interest of the actor. It would be
totally unrealizable and hence pointless as an institutionally enforced
standard of behavior. No one would follow it and no one would cooperate in
disapproving those who refused to follow it. Bentham does urge
benevolence as a source of pleasure: but the pleasure derives from the
gratitude of those helped, the admiration of others, and from selfapprobation. If morality sets an impossibly high standard of benevolence, it
strips all attainable levels of benevolence of these pleasurable consequences
and so proves an impediment rather than an encouragement to benevolence.
Such a severe morality would not advance utility. 20 1 Hence it would not be
utilitarian.
Bentham recognized a further difficulty with the notion that each
individual is morally obliged to act so as to maximize the public welfare.
Not only have individuals little motivation to pursue the public interest to
198.
199.

I DEoNTroLoGY, supra note 185, at 100.
Id.
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the detriment of self-interest, but they are not especially competent to do so.
They may know a great deal about their own preferences, but little about
those of other people, or of the circumstances facing them, and even that
knowledge is likely to be distorted by self-interest. Bentham found
individuals to be "essentially unapt ' 2 0 2 to perform the skills of utility
calculation, lawmaking, and governance, and therefore he wrote:
Were every man his own legislator laws would be made as badly as cloathes
would be, if every man were his own tailor... it is not every man that can
make a shoe; but when a shoe is made every man may tell whether it fits him
without much difficulty. Every man can not be a shoe maker but any man
203
may chose his own shoemaker.
It should be clear that for Bentham, utility is not an ethical principle.
Instead, utility is a practical standard for judging institutions. It follows that
Bentham's theory of legislation is not subordinate to an ethical view.
Instead, his proposals for reforming law and his proposals for reforming
morality are both subordinate to utility, his standard for evaluating
institutional reforms. Morality has exactly the same logical status as law in
his theory. Both are institutional means to advance value. 2 04 Neither is a
standard of value. But while morality and law have the same derivative
status in his theory, they are not equally important. Morality is a less
effectual instrument of the public welfare than legislation, and less amenable
to systematic reform. 20 5 In any case, morality does not supply the utility
principle. Instead, the utility principle is a procedural standard for resolving
policy disputes among self-interested actors of relatively equal power and
20 6
authority.
202. Jeremy Bentham, Constitutional Code, in 9 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 98
(John Bowring ed., 1962) [hereinafter ConstitutionalCode).
203. Jeremy Bentham, Manuscripts at University College, London, cxxvii 2, cited in
Ross HARRISON, BENTHM 209 (1983). Similarly, Bentham writes: 'Whether it be possible
for every man to be made a lawyer by a book is what I shall not be positive about: but that I
know, that if it be, it must be by a book of the Legislature's writing." Jeremy Bentham,
Manuscripts at University College, London, lxxa, 105 (quoted in D. Lieberman, Bentham's
Digest, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRrrICAL ASSESSMENTS 339 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993))
[hereinafter Manuscriptsat UniversityCollege, London].
204. I DEONTOLOGY, supra note 185, at 27-28.
205. Id. at 2-4.
206. Bentham clearly fashions the utility standard for use in a context in which no one
can simply impose their views by force or authority. Even though laws are to be framed by
expert legislators, they still must convince the lay public of the utility of their proposals. Thus
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V. UTILITY AS PROCESS AND DISCOURSE

Utilitarianism is ordinarily thought of as a substantive theory of value,
concerned with the good consequences, rather than the right origins, of
action. Yet our recharacterization of utilitarianism as a theory of government
rather than a general theory of value complicates this picture. Bentham turns
out to be very concerned about the procedures by which governmental
decisions are made. The rightness of action turns out to be role-dependent:
some acts may be done only by persons acting in an official capacity and
pursuant to a public decision. As in any theory about law, the normative
status of action often depends on whether it is duly authorized. The
correctness of a decision often turns on the process by which the decision is
made.
Moreover, Bentham's substantive criterion of value, happiness, turns out
to be less consequentialist than is commonly supposed. Human happiness, as
Bentham defines it, is not simply a function of actions. It is substantially
influenced by the procedures that exist for determining action. This result
follows from Bentham's assumptions about the phenomenology of pleasure
and pain.
A. Security and Procedure
For Bentham, the distinctive feature of human hedonic experience was
the human ability to anticipate future experience and to feel pleasure and
pain about these expectations. This capacity to anticipate the future enables
humans to sustain personal identity and to formulate and calculate selfinterest. It also greatly expands the capacities of human creatures to enjoy
207
and suffer and accounts for their superior weight in the felicific calculus.
But the human capacity to anticipate future hedonic experience had another
implication for Bentham as well. It meant that humans were generally riskaverse, deriving constant pleasure from the contemplation of security, and
constant anxiety from the contemplation of danger and risk. Declining
the utility standard presupposes a context of discursive equality. For Bentham, equality was a
substantive as well as a procedural ideal: "Like security, though placed in an inferior position,
equality served as one of the ends of legislation and hence was also a necessary condition for
achieving the greatest happiness .... Bentham argued that the greatest happiness principle
meant an 'equal quantity of happiness' for every member of the community in question ....
Bentham justified this emphasis on equality by introducing the idea of diminishing marginal
utility." Rosen, supra note 101, at xxxvii.
207. See Jeremy Bentham, Principlesof the Civil Code, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS 308
(John Bowring ed., 1962).
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marginal utility 2 08 meant that humans were more interested in securing for
themselves the basic constituents of survival and contentment, than in
risking all for a chance at ecstatic heights of pleasure. Bentham's strong
identification of happiness with security made security the primary aim of
his normative theory of law. As Frederick Rosen comments,
The importance of security in Bentham's utilitarian system has often been
overlooked. . . . Security became, for Bentham, a means to the end of
happiness and a necessary condition for its maximization. As with Hume, the
maintenance of secure possession of one's life and property was considered
the main task of government, and Bentham was led through the emhasis on
security to embrace an indirect form of utilitarianism. This interpretation of
Bentham's utilitarianism... rejects the view that Bentham was a simple actutilitarian intent upon the maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain
20 9
without regard to its distribution ....
Because of the importance of secure expectations for public happiness,
Bentham emphasized clearly defined and securely protected entitlements,
and predictability of government action. The result was a theory of
government emphasizing the rule of law.
While guaranteeing physical security and property was the main
function of government, there was of course no guarantee that necessarily
self-interested officials would carry out their public function. In addition,
the coercive powers necessary to carry out government functions also posed
a threat to security. Government officials could only be expected to fulfill
their public functions if their personal interests were tied to the public
interest by a disciplinary regime of positive and negative sanctions
combined with public monitoring. Accordingly, Bentham devoted
considerable attention to designing a utilitarian process of policymaking and
administration equipped with "securities against misrule." These securities
involved the subordination of judicial and administrative functions to
legislative functions; legislating formal rules rather than teleological
standards; the democratic election of legislators; a clear, analytically precise,
and common language of legislation and policy debate; and, above all,
publicity of government operations.
208.
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For Bentham utility was not, as it is for many modem academic
philosophers, an ideal standard for judging hypothetical actions in
hypothetical worlds. Bentham acknowledged that a judgment about the
public interest requires information about preferences and consequences,
and a judge whose personal interest is tied to the public interest by political
and legal sanctions, backed by the monitoring of an enlightened, mobilized
public. Thus Bentham's utilitarian standard of value cannot be separated
from the institutional process by which it is formulated and applied. For all
practical purposes, there is no utility apart from some reliable institutional
process of gathering information about the public interest, conducted under
the scrutiny of a public with the means to protect itself.
Utilitarian procedures must precede any substantive definition of the
public welfare. Otherwise , the utility costs resulting from the insecurity of a
public vulnerable to despotic oppression would dwarf any conceivable good
consequences achieved by a "dictatorship of the utilitariat." Nor, on
Bentham's psychological assumptions, would any good consequences
accrue from such elite rule. Rulers capable of ruling in their own interest
would be virtually certain to do so. Hence, what utility demands must be
determined by a democratically controlled process of inquiry and
deliberation, not by isolated sheriffs-or moral philosophers. If the
utilitarian standard of value is freed from procedural constraints tying it to
the interests of actual people it ceases to have any empirical referent. It
becomes no more meaningful than the idle chatter of moralists about right
and good and virtue and natural law.
B. UtilitarianLanguage in the Policy Process
1. Utilitarianism as a Rhetorical Practice
To understand the meaning of Bentham's utility standard it is necessary
to understand the rhetorical practice in which Bentham used it and intended
that it be used. What Bentham proposed and defended was the practice, not
the standard. Bentham famously eschewed any logical "proof" of the utility
principle: "for that which is used to prove everything else, cannot itself be
proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. To
give such a proof is as impossible as it is needless." 2 10 The proof was in the
performance. As H.L.A. Hart notes,

210.

BENTHAM,

supra note 82, at 13.
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Bentham is plainly not at his ease in philosophical argument as he is in the

close, minute analysis and classification of concrete detail, attention to which
is required in the application of the principle of utility.... He writes as one
too long convinced of the principle and too eager to hurry on to demonstrate
how it could be fruitfully applied to the practical problems of social life to
211
pause long over metaphysical argument.
Hart adds that Bentham did not consider his distinctive contribution to be
discovering the normative importance of hedonic consequences-this had
been pointed out by Helvetius, among others. 2 12 Bentham considered his
distinctive contribution to be developing and demonstrating a method for
reasoning about such consequences. Helvetius had shown to Bentham's
satisfaction that the "moral philosopher" must adopt the perspective of the
legislator. Bentham resolved to do what Helvetius had not done: to adopt
that perspective and to develop and put into practice a science of legislation.
The result was the discursive praictice of public policy analysis. That today
we have difficulty imagining how modem governance would proceed
without this tool is precisely the sort of practical proof at which Bentham
aimed. Bentham did not care whether the utility principle was a true
definition of the good for all possible worlds; he sought to show that it was a
useful criterion in his world by showing how it could be used beneficially.
Before we can evaluate Bentham's "moral philosophy" we must
understand it. And we cannot understand it unless we recognize that the
function he ascribed to moral philosophy is very different from the function
presupposed by the discipline of ethics today. The function of moral
philosophy laid down by Helvetius and pursued by Beccaria was to improve
human happiness by proposing useful laws. The aim of the utilitarian
"system," acording to Bentham was "to rear the fabric of felicity by the
hands of reason and law." 2 13 Moral philosophers of course had no armies or
police or formal lawmaking authority. They could improve legislation and
contribute to happiness only by mobilizing public opinion, their only
enforcement sanction. Moreover, since laws can best produce utility by
inspiring a feeling of security, moral philosophers could enhance the utility
of good laws by explaining their operation and effects. Accordingly, the job
of the utilitarian "moral philosopher" is to propose laws and to equip the
public to rationally evaluate these proposals and alternatives.
211.
212.
213.

Hart, supra note 175, at vxxxvii.
Id.
BENTHA, supra note 82, at 11.
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Accordingly, a major aim of Bentham's utilitarianism was to develop
and put to use a transparent language of legislation and public policy
analysis. A precise terminology, free of such spectral entities as legal
fictions, natural rights, and moral virtues, would preclude legislatures from
disguising the operation and effect of laws. A precise language would
prevent judges and officials from legislating under the guise of interpreting
ambiguous terms. Finally, a precise language would discipline participants
in political debate to offer reasons intelligible to all. In Bentham's view, the
public should treat obfuscatory laws as bad laws and obscure reasons as no
reasons. Because the utility of laws could not be guaranteed without
transparency, transparency was lexically prior to utility as a criterion of
legitimacy.
2. The Language of Law
Bentham believed that the "excellence and efficacy of every system of
Laws will depend upon two grand points belonging to it: the policy or matter
or purport of the laws ... and the form of tenor of them." 2 14 All types of
obscurity corrupted the tenor of the law and therefore prevented it from
achieving its objectives. If laws were not clear and accessible, the public
would not be aware of the rules governing them. This would compromise
the expressive, formative, and deterrent effects of the law. And without a
clear understanding of the contents of the law, the public would have little
opportunity to critically evaluate and reform its legal system.
The whole of the law was "of no use farther than it is known." 2 15 A
body of law should be judged, therefore, "not from the quantity of what is
extant, but from the quantity of what is known." 2 16 Yet while the "notoriety
of every law ought to be as extensive as its binding force" and "no axiom
can be more self-evident: none more important," none was "more
universally disregarded. '2 17 By Bentham's count, "the greatest part of the
people are unapprised of the 99 parts in a hundred of the Laws that govern
them." 2 18 Until this "grievance [was] remedied," he declared, "the business
2 19
of legislation is from the beginning to the end of it cruel mockery."
214.
215.
216.
Everett ed.,
217.
218.
219.

Bentham, Manuscriptsat UniversityCollege, London, supranote 203, at xxvii.
Id. at lxxix.
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LimsS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 193 (Charles Warren
1945).
JEREMYBENHAM, OFLAWSiNGERAL 71 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970).
Bentham, Manuscriptsat University College, London, supranote 203, at lxxa.
BENTHAM, supranote 217, at 71.
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Bentham's career as a notable reformer and polemicist began with his
Comment on the Commentaries,2 2 0 a critique of the obscurity of the
common law as distilled and defended by Blackstone. Bentham complained
of the "dark Chaos" and "glorious incertainty" of the common law, that set
the interpreter "loose into the wilds of perpetual conjecture." 22 1 Rife with
technical legal terminology, "smothered amidst a redundancy of words,"
riddled with "unmeaning," and often contradictory, the law appeared to the
lay reader as a "flock of chimeras." Blackstone's Commentaries2 2 2 only
compounded the common law's incomprehensibility. "His nomenclature,"
wrote Bentham, "is like a weathercock: you never meet the same term twice
together in the same place" and his definitions provided "strings of identical
propositions... explaining ignotum per ignotius. ' '2 2 3 Antiquated legal terms
lived on without any consensus on their contemporary meaning, and
encouraged lazy habits of thought:
The long acquaintance we have had with it makes us take for granted we
have searched it already; we deal by it, in consequence, as the custom-house
officers in certain countries, who, having once set their seal upon a package,
so long as they see, or think they see that seal upon it, reasonably enough
22 4
suppose themselves dispensed with from visiting it anew.
The obscurity of the common law produced an uninformed public.
. For Bentham the incomprehensibility of the law not only reduced the
ability of legitimate laws to deter, but it cloaked counterproductive rules and
unregulated official discretion. Concealed from public scrutiny by the law's
unintelligibility, ambition and corruption stood a greater chance of going
undetected: "The case is this. A large portion of the body of the law was, by
the bigotry or artifice of Lawyers, locked up in an illegible character, and in
a foreign tongue.... [T]he pestilential breath of Fiction poisons the sense of
every instrument it comes near." 2 25 "A fiction of law may be defined,"
Bentham explained, as "a willful falsehood, having for its object the stealing
legislative power, by and for hands which durst not, or could not, openly
220. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES (J.H. Bums and H.L.A.
Hart eds., 1977).
221.

Bentham, Manuscriptsat University College,London, supra note 203, at lxxix.

222.

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-1769)

(1979).
223. BENTHAM, supranote 220, at 349.
224. BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 74-75.
225. Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 235 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
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2 26
claim it; and, but for the illusion thus produced, could not exercise it."
More broadly, Bentham defined "fiction in the sense in which it is used by
lawyers ...[as] a false assertion of the privileged kind, and which, though
acknowledges to be false, is at the same time argued from, and acted upon,
as if true." For Bentham such deception could never maximize utility:
"[f]iction of use to justice? Exactly as swindling is to trade."'2 27 Bentham
complained that

[bly wrapping the real dispositions of the law in a covering of nonsense, the
knowledge of it is rendered impossible to the bulk of the people-the bulk of
those whose fate depends upon it. What meets their eyes is gross and
palpable nonsense .... In jargon such as this, no man in whose brain the
natural provisions of common sense has not been eaten out by false science
can avoid beholding so much vile and scandalous nonsense; but if, by the
help of that portion of common sense which each man's fortune has
imparted to him, it were possible to him to divine what disastrous sense may
2 28
be at the bottom of this nonsense, the nonsense would miss its mark.
Worse even then a deception and confusion of the public wrought by
legal fictions, was its corruption of the public mind. The law's use of fiction
taught the lesson that deception was an acceptable practice and even a
necessary condition of justice, 22 9 thus "corrupting the morals of the people."
"Wheresoever the use of fiction prevails," Bentham maintains, "every law
'23 0
book is an institute of vice; every court of judicature is a school of vice."
Fictions were also responsible for "[c]orrupting the intellectual faculties of
the people .... To what state of debility and deprivation," he asks, "must the
understanding of that man have been brought down, who can really persuade
himself that a lawyer's fiction is anything better than a lie of the worst
sort.. .".-231 Bentham complained that lawyers

226. Quoted in Charles K. Ogden, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAm, THE THEORY OF
FIcTIONs xviii (C.K. Ogden ed., 1959).
227. BENTHAm, supra note 226, at 141.
228. Id. at 148.
229. "Legislator and people confirmed in the habit of bowing down to falsehood and
absurdity, and recognizing them as being, what lawyers are continually proclaiming them to
Id. at 148-49.
be, necessary instruments in the hands of justice .....
230. Id. at 149.
231.

Id.
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.. . refuse to administer justice to you unless you join with them in their
fictions; and their cry is, see how necessary fiction is to justice! Necessary
indeed; but too necessary; but how came it so, and who made it so?
As well might the father of a family make it a rule never to let his
children have their breakfast till they had uttered, each of them, a certain
number of lies, curses, and profane oaths; and then exclaim, "You see, my
dear children, how necessary lying, cursing, and swearing are to human
' 23 2
sustenance!
Bentham concluded that obfuscation "has never been employed but to a bad
purpose. It has never been employed but to any purpose but the affording a
justification for something which otherwise would be unjustifiable. '2 3 3 A
legal system's tolerance of such artifices therefore "affords presumptive and
conclusive evidence of the inaptitude of the form of government in support
of which it is employed . . . [and] of intellectual weakness, stupidity, and
234
servility, in every nation by which the use of it is quietly endured."
The project of cleaning up legal "word magic" became the "necessary
concomitant and forerunner of improvement of the law."' 23 5 Laws must be
written in the common language of the people, and "[w]heresoever it is seen
to differ, it will be seen to differ to its disadvantage:-peculiar absurdity the
immediate effect-peculiar mischief the result."' 23 6 Law should be
comprehensible to "the meanest understanding" and should aspire toward
"the maximum of comprehensive simplicity." To achieve such clarity, the
law must possess four qualities: "Precision, Apprehensibilty, Brevity, and
Amplitude." 23 7 Since "all questions of Law are no more than questions
concerning the import of words," the process of securing proper definitions
was essential. "Nothing has been, nothing will be, nothing ever can be done
on the subject of Law that deserves the name of Science," Bentham
believed, "till that universal precept of Locke, enforced by Helvetius, be
steadily pursued, 'Define your words.'"238 "Fixation" of words "has for its
purpose, the removal of ambiguity: explanation, the clearing up of
Id. at 149-50.
Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 77.
Id.
Bentham, Manuscriptsat UniversityCollege, London, supra note 203, at xxvii.
Jeremy Bentham, Nomography; or the Art of InditingLaws, in 3 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 241 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
237. Bentham, Manuscriptsat UniversityCollege, London, supra note 203, at lxxa.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
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obscurity,"2 39 and for Bentham these "verbal distinctions are equally tedious
and indispensable." 240
Bentham took pains to separate and clarify terms such as power, right,
and trust. He replaced eulogistic terms like "purity" and dyslogistic terms
like "lust" with neutral language in order to rid arguments of their emotive
appeal. Bentham sought to replace all references to institutions and
principles "considered an object of respect and veneration" with references
to the fallible legal actors representing them. Bentham's famous
renunciation of the language of natural rights as imaginary "nonsense upon
stilts" belongs to this project to purge the law of fictions and he devotes a
24 1
chapter in his Theory of Fictionsto this problem.
3. The Language of Policy Reform
Bentham believed that the discourse of policy reform was just as corrupt
as the discourse of law. He reasoned that would-be despots and aristocrats
would naturally seek power by criticizing corrupt leaders rather than the
institutional arrangements that bred corruption, and by proposing ineffectual
reforms that left opportunities for corrupt leadership in place. Accordingly,
every corrupt, deceptive regime was destined to generate its own equally
corrupt and deceptive dissenters and reformers. The existence of vigorous
political debate might create the appearance of democratic participation in
policy formation, but such debate was often nothing more than squabbling
among thieves, designed to mislead the public and preempt meaningful
critique and reform.
Unhappily, for the members of the democratical section, their conceptions,
their judgments, their suffrages, their language, have till this time been
placed almost completely under the guidance, and almost, as it were, under
the disposal of, those of the aristocratical: and thus it is, that by the sinister
interest of these their adversaries, not only have they been placed and kept
under the yoke of misrule, but the only instrument in which they could seek
relief ...has been employed ... in the aggravation of it, and in keeping
242
them, as far as may be, from all thoughts of applying a remedy.

239. Jeremy Bentham, RadicalReform Bill, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENrHAM 593
(John Bowring ed., 1962).
240. Ogden, supra note 226, at xxvi (quoting Bentham).
241. BENTHAM, supra note 226, at 118-22.
242. Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 44.
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No meaningful criticism and reform was possible unless the public's
attention was directed at the consequences of policy for their interests. And
this was only possible if debate was conducted in the lucid terminology of
costs and benefits, interests and desires, pleasures and pains, incentives and
sanctions. Thus a transparent language of policy debate was just as
important as a transparent language of law. Chapter II of the Introduction to
the Principlesof Morals and Legislation is largely devoted to a critique of
phrases used in 18th century moral and political argument like "moral
sense," "common sense," "understanding," "rule of right," "fitness of
things," "law of nature," "right reason," and "natural justice." 24 3 "The
mischief common to all these ways of thinking and arguing," Bentham
concluded, "is their serving as a cloak, and pretence, and ailment, to
despotism. .. "244 These were all empty phrases, conclusions about right
and wrong masquerading as reasons. It was not that arguments from
religious revelation, or moral sense, or aesthetic judgments of fitness, were
necessarily wrong. It was just that arguments of this type had no discursive
function: privately experienced intuitions could not justify an action to
anyone else or settle a disagreement.
'But is it never, then, from any other considerations than those of utility, that
we derive our notions of right and wrong?' I do not know: I do not care.
Whether a moral sentiment can be originally conceived from any other
source than a view of utility, is one question: whether upon examination and
reflection it can, in point of fact, be actually persisted in and justified on any
other ground, by a person reflecting within himself, is another: whether in
point of right it can properly be justified on any other ground, by a person
addressing himself to the community, is a third. The first two are questions
of speculation: it matters not, comparatively speaking, how they are decided.
The last is a question of practice: the decision of it is of as much importance
24 5
as that of any can be.
By contrast to the various languages of moral intuition prevalent in
eighteenth century writing, utilitarian discourse was uniquely suitable for
reasoned public deliberation about public policy.
In his quest to reform the language of law and politics, Bentham devoted
considerable energy to inventing and defining terms for use in legislation
and policy analysis. Some of these neologisms, "international," "maximize"
243.
244.
245.
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and "codify"for example, have proved their utility and entered the language.
Most, like "adscititious" remain on the shelf. Bentham's esoteric
terminology and his interminable litanies of definitions and distinctions
render his voluminous writings unbearably tedious, which probably accounts
for their unfamiliarity among commentators on utilitarianism. Thus at one
level, Bentham's efforts to reform political and legal discourse were
ironically Quixotic: his idiosyncratic terminology constitutes a sort of
jurisprudential esperanto. But at another level, his efforts were a resounding
success: all contemporary policy analysis begins with costs and benefits; all
contemporary jurisprudential analysis begins with an analysis of
authoritative sources, competent decisionmakers, and sanctions; all legal
analysis begins with written instruments.
Utilitarianism was not a reflective or theoretical enterprise, but a
discursive practice of public enlightenment. It aimed at creating a
transparent process of government. This process would permit the public to
contribute information about its interests, to see that information being used
to develop and justify policy, to see that policy being faithfully
implemented, to reward dutiful officials, and to punish delinquent ones. By
these means the public welfare would be looked after, but more importantly,
by these means the public could assure itself its welfare was being looked
after. The entire project of securing utility depended upon public
information and public understanding.
The first requisite was a transparent language of legal and policy
analysis. But there were three other procedural conditions for a utilitarian
policy process. First, legality, involving a clear separation of lawmaking
functions from law applying functions. This would require legislative
supremacy, formal (and clearly intelligible) rules of law, and sanctions
against the exercise of administrative and judicial discretion. Second,
democracy, requiring the popular election of legislative representatives.
Third, publicity, requiring that the public be informed of every government
decision and the information, policy reasons, and legal authority supporting
it. The next section examines these three "securities against misrule," which
comprise the requisite conditions for the utilitarian policy process.
VI. SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: LEGALITY, DEMOCRACY, PUBLICITY

A. Legality
Bentham's notion of legality had two key components: legislative
supremacy, and administrative regularity. Bentham's complaints about the
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common law drove him to design a political system in which all law was
promulgated by a legislative body based on a calculation of utility. 24 6 To
24 7
remedy the common law's obscurity, inaccessibility, and ambiguity,
Bentham proposed that laws should be codified by elected legislators,
publicized and distributed widely, and subject to as little judicial
interpretation as possible.
Much of Bentham's animosity toward the common law focused on
judges. He saw government as a self-promoting enterprise he called "Judge
and Co.," and he saw "judge made law" as a corrupt enterprise like "priest
made religion."' 24 8 Bentham charged that the bench and bar "love the
sources of their power, of their reputation, of their fortune: they love
unwritten law for the same reason that the Egyptian priest loved
hieroglyphics, for the same reasons that the priests of all religions have
loved their peculiar dogmas and mysteries." 2 49 He also argued that the
object of judicial legislation was "the sacrifice of the universal interests of
all men in the character of the justiciables, to the particular and sinister
interest-either of the Judge, or of the despot, whose creature and
2 50
instrument he is, or both together."
In response to these concerns, Bentham proposed to vest lawmaking
power exclusively in legislators who would be directly accountable to the
public for their decisions, would have access to all the information necessary
to calculate under the utility principle, and would deliberate publicly. Once
promulgated, these laws would govern all members of the community,
particularly government officials, such as McCloskey's sheriff. The
judiciary would have to render decisions in strict compliance with such
See DINWIDDY, supranote 93, at 64.
247. See G.J. Postema, The Expositor, The Censor, and the Common Law, in 3
JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 227, 229 (Bikho Parekh ed., 1993).
246.

248. See Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 8-9, 25-26, 75; see also
Jeremy Bentham, Letters to Lord Greenvilleon the ProposedReform in the Administration of
Civil Justice in Scotland, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 3, 5-8 (John Bowring ed.,

1962) [hereinafter Letters to Lord Greenville]; Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Judicial
Procedurewith the Outline of a ProcedureCode, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1,

125-26 (John Bowring ed., 1962) [hereinafter Principles of Judicial Procedure]; Jeremy
Bentham, Rationale of JudicialEvidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 197-98

(John Bowring ed., 1962) [hereinafter Rationaleof JudicialEvidence, vol. 7].
249. Jeremy Bentham, General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in 3 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 206 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
250.
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: SECURITIES
AGAINST MISRULE AND OTHER WRITINGS FOR TRIPOLI AND GREECE 252 (Philip Schofield ed.,

1990) [hereinafter SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE].
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laws. 2 5 1 The role of the judiciary would therefore be confined to "giving due
execution and effect to the Laws, whatsoever they may be," 2 52 but not to
extending or limiting them by interpretation.
Bentham's legislature was omnicompetent, and Bentham held that the
executive's "sole declared end and purpose is the giving execution and
25 3
effect to the will formed and declared by the members of the legislature.
Executive and judicial officials were denied any authority to create law.
Within the executive, Bentham envisioned a tight chain of command. 2 54 For
example, if a subordinate abused her post, or otherwise breached an order,
her superior would dismiss her. 2 5 5 Inversely, if a subordinate believed her
superior had betrayed the will of the legislators, she would report it to the
legislature and protect herself by sending copies of her complaint to the
press and every official in the dominion. 25 6 L.J. Hume commented that
"Bentham was opposed to a fermenting bureaucracy whose members might
develop and apply their own standards of what was tolerable and intolerable,
or their own notions of the public interest,"'2 57 and thus "only the publicacting through the legislature-could speak for the public interest." 258
This structure permitted officials no opportunity to exercise independent
judgment regarding the good of the community or to act outside of

251.
252.
253.
254.

See Postema, supranote 73, at 316.
BENTHAM, SECURrrIEs AGAINST MISRULE, supra note 250, at 252.

Bentham, RationaleofJudicialEvidence vol.7, supranote 248, at 122.
See FREDERICK ROSEN, JEREMY BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMoCRACY: A
STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 163-64 (1983); see also B.B. Schaffer, The Idea of the
Ministerial Department: Bentham, Mill and Bagehot, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL
ASsEssMENTS 836, 840 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993).
255. See Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 383-417; see also ROSEN,
supra note 254, at 65, 86.
256. Bentham gives explicit instructions:
Suppose for example by one such functionary or set of functionaries information of
an act of oppression received and committed to writing: if their situation is that of a
set of functionaries constituting a Judicatory of the highest order, then suppose a
copy sent to every Judicatory in the dominion, and by the joint authority of them all
made public at one and the same time: made public, by whatsoever means of
publicity happen to be at their command. Here the security against vengeance from
the oppressor is at its maximum: unless it should be deemed advisable that from this
branch of the authority of the state communication be also made to the military.
BENTHAM, SECURrrIES AGAINST MISRULE, supranote 250, at 42.
257. L.J. Hume, Jeremy Bentham and the 19th Century Revolution in Government, in
3 JEREMY BENTrHM: CRIcTA. ASSESSMENTS 820, 825 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993).
258. Id.
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designated channels. In fact, the oath taken by the judiciary captures this
relationship:
I will on each occasion use my best endeavors to give execution and effect to
every part of [the law], according to what shall appear to me to be the intent
of the Legislature for the time being: not presuming on any occasion to
substitute any particular will of my own, to the will of the Legislature, even
in such cases, in any, where the provisions of the law may appear to me
inexpedient: saving only the exercise of such discretionary suspensive power
...

259
with which the Legislature may have thought fit to intrust me.

The above named "suspensive power" provided the judge's only
authorized procedure for initiating reform in the legislative code. 2 60 John
Dinwiddy explains:
Bentham recognized that cases would arise in which the strict application of
the code as it stood would produce an outcome that conflicted with the
greatest happiness principle. In such circumstances, the judge could not
simply override the code, basing his decision on a direct appeal to the
principle of utility. This would be tantamount to making or amending law on
his own authority.... [b]ut what the judge could do was to postpone a final
decision on the case, and to propose to the legislature, through the Justice
Minister, an amendment or refinement of the law. 26 1
Hence, instead of determining what decision would maximize utility in the
particular case, Bentham expected the judge either to apply the law, or
propose a more efficacious rule to the legislature and the public. 26 2 Any ad
259.
260.
261.
262.

See Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 533.
Hume, supra note 257, at 820, 825.
DINWIDDY, supra note 93, at 68; see also RosEN, supranote 254, at 163-64.
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Postema argues that a judicial power to maximize utility by over-riding the law must follow
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question. In fact, Bentham's explicit rejection of such a judicial power in his Constitutional
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366 (1989).
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hoc exception made by a judge or other administrator would be unauthorized
and thus unlawful. 2 6 3 The law would stand until legislatively altered: "on
any occasion, an ordinance, which to some shall appear repugnant to the
principles of this constitution, shall come to have been enacted by the
legislature, such an ordinance is not on that account to be, by any judge,
treated or spoken of, as being null and void. .,,264
Bentham's scheme would require officials like McCloskey's sheriff to
carry out the law, regardless of the consequences. Bentham demands that
both private individuals and officials follow the maxim: "To obey
punctually: to censure freely. '2 65 While the sheriff must yield to the
legislature's will, the authorized means of reform remain available to her. A
sheriff could only frame the innocent if the legislature were to prospectively
and publicly permit this. Should legislators authorize government officials
to frame the innocent? As Sissela Bok points out, we do occasionally
legislate to allow certain forms of governmental deception, for example in
our use of unmarked police cars to discourage speeding. 26 6 Yet, a public
policy of framing the innocent whenever officials deem it useful seems far
less likely to advance utility, for reasons explored earlier. As Bok poses the
question,
Do we want to live in a society where public officials can resort to deceit and
manipulation whenever they decide that an exceptional crisis has arisen?
Would we not, on balance, prefer to run the risk of failing to rise to a crisis
honestly explained to us, from which the government might have saved us
through manipulation? And what protection from abuse do we foresee
2 67
should we surrender this choice?
For Bentham, the latter consideration would have been decisive. The
constant threat of despotism inherent in ad hoc and secret official
decisionmaking exacts a huge cost in security, far outweighing the
263. But see Bentham, Constitutional Code, supra note 202, at 160 (stating that
"[o]nly by unalterable physical impotence, is the Supreme Legislature prevented from being
its own executive, or from being the sole Legislature."); see also Hume, supra note 257, at
820, 831.
264. JEREMY BENTHAM, CONSTTrUTIONAL CODE (1830) (reprinted in JEREMY
BENTHAM'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 218 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1973)); see also Bentham,
ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 41-46.
265. Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 230 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
266. BOK, supra note 88, at 177.
267. Id. at 180.
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satisfaction derived from any dubious prospect of enhancing utility on a
given occasion. Bentham thought security best ensured by subjecting
executive and judicial officials to legislatively defined rules. The next
problem was how to ensure that the legislature would pursue the public
interest. Bentham solved this problem by placing the legislature under the
supervision of the public by two devices: elections, and publicity.
B. Democracy
Bentham voiced an increasing commitment to representative democracy
over the second half of his life, particularly in three important works on
constitutional law: Plan for Parliamentary Reform in the Form of a
Catechism, ConstitutionalCode and Securities Against Misrule and Other
Writings for Tripoli and Greece. In his Constitutional Code, Bentham
defines "good rule" as follows:
The only species of government which has or can have for its object and
effect the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is... a democracy: and
the only species of democracy which can have place in a community
numerous enough to defend itself against aggression at the hands of external
adversaries, is a representative democracy....
Every other species of government has, necessarily, for its characteristic
and primary object and effect, the keeping the people or non-functionaries in
a perfectly defenceless state, against the functionaries or rulers, who being,
in respect of their power and the use they are disposed and enabled to make
of it, the natural adversaries of the people, have for their object the giving
facility, certainty, unbounded extent and impunity, to the depredation and
26 8
oppression exercised on the governed by the governors.
Bentham's mature views are summarized by Frederick Rosen:
Bentham's aim was to achieve intelligent and responsible government at
minimum expense, and he believed this could only be achieved through a
representative democracy based on near universal suffrage, the secret ballot,
frequent elections, a free press, open government, and military and judicial
systems which incorporated accountability to the people wherever possible.
He believed strongly in the virtues of popular participation but saw the real
danger to representative democracy not in too little participation but in the
268.
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power of ruling elites, even those elected or removable by the people, to use
their powers to profit at the expense of the people generally. Many of the
detailed provisions of Constitutional Code are designed to increase
accountability and to place educated and competent officials in positions of
power. Bentham was less interested in simply limiting the powers of
government and more interested in limiting the powers of government to rule
2 69
arbitrarily and oppressively.
Elie Haldvy dates Bentham's enthusiasm for democracy from 1808 and
explains it as the product of two factors: Bentham's resentment of the
aristocratic government's indifference to his prison reform proposals, and
the influence of James Mill. 2 70 Yet H.L.A. Hart rejects Haldvy's account as
too crude to explain Bentham's vacillating enthusiasms. 2 7 1 Hart, instead
divides Bentham's thinking about democracy into two distinct phases; the
first exemplified by his "antipathy and rejection" toward the Declarationof
Independence and its guiding principles of natural rights, and the second
characterized by an "indiscriminate admiration" for the actual forms of
2 72
governance at work in the young United States.
Much of the difficulty of tracing the development of Bentham's political
attitudes can be attributed to the presence of so many implicit democratic
principles in his early work. As early as the 1776 Fragmenton Government,
'' 27 3
Bentham resolved "to call the cause of the people the cause of [v]irtue.
During the early years of the French Revolution Bentham had already
"recommended first for France and then for Britain, . .

a system of

representative democracy with near universal suffrage." 274 Instead of
finding a single definitive moment of democratic revelation, we see
Bentham slowly losing reasons to support his monarchy, while gaining
reasons to endorse democratic structures. When the scales of utility tipped
against his previously held positions, around 1809, he then endorsed the
superior model.
269. See ELiE HALI VY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM 254-56 (Mary
Morris trans., 1966) (1955). For a careful discussion of Bentham's attitude toward the denial
of his Panopticon program, see JAMES STEINTRAGER, BENTHAM 78-82 (1977).
270. Rosen, supra note 101, at xlvi; see also M.H. James, Bentham's Democratic
Theory at the Time of the FrenchRevolution, 10 THE BENTHAM NEWSLETTER 5-16 (1986).
271. See generally HART, supranote 101.
272. Id. at 56.
273.
JEREMY BENTHAM, COLLECTED WORKS: A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND
A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 440 (1977).
274. Rosen, supranote 101, at xliv; see generallyROSEN, supra note 254.
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Some have argued that, since Bentham's utilitarianism commits to
nothing without an analysis of utility, there is nothing inherently democratic
about the system. Such critics cite the example of Catherine the Great of
Russia despotically applying similar principles, 2 75 and add that
utilitarianism could approve a totalitarian system that successfully
conditioned its citizens into happy submission. 27 6 R.C. Pratt has even
argued that Bentham's ultimate theory of democracy is "sharply inconsistent
with the main body of Benthamite doctrine." 2 7 7 Such arguments live off of
Bentham's refusal to proclaim inherent goods and truths before actually
applying the utility calculus.
Yet there is a content to Bentham's conception of utility that is hard to
disentangle from democracy. Public utility, after all, means "that which
gratifies popular preference." Frederick Rosen has argued that "what
counted with a proposed reform was that the people for whom it was
intended saw it as being in the public interest to adopt it." 2 7 8 Moreover, to
the extent that Bentham identified utility with security of expectation, public
utility became closely identified with institutional conditions that could
guarantee the gratification of popular preference. Finally, when one recalls
that the utility principle presupposed the prevalence of egoistic motives, it
would seem that no official could be counted on to serve popular preference
unless checked and overseen by popular will. Only popular sovereignty
could insure the subservience of government to popular preference. The
association of utility with democracy therefore seems hard to escape.
How, then, can one account for Bentham's long periods of ambivalence
about democracy? These are largely explained by his spirit of positivism.
This spirit not only inspired, but transcended the notion that law had no
existence unless embodied in effective institutions. His writing is pervaded
by a suspicion that normative ideals such as right, good, virtue and morality
have no precise meaning unless embodied in effective institutions. So too,
with democracy. Accordingly, when democracy was advocated as an
abstract ideal of popular sovereignty founded on the chimera of natural
liberty, Bentham was skeptical. And when such rhetoric was invoked to
support a demagogic reign of terror that attacked the security of civil liberty,
he was repelled. By contrast, governing institutions that secured civil liberty
and thereby maintained the consent of a populace with the practical power to
275.
276.
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remove them had greater claim to legitimacy. In Bentham's view the power
even of a monarch was entirely constituted by the obedience of the
2 79
governed, and hence by public opinion.
Whether particular institutions in fact responded to popular preference
was therefore an empirical question. The important point to grasp is that
Bentham's positivist spirit impelled him to reduce all abstract values to
concrete institutions. This is no less true of "utility" than of "democracy."
After all, he spent his entire professional career on the task of giving
institutional definition to the utility principle, and devoted very little effort
to giving it conceptual definition. Modern critics of utilitarianism ignore the
details of Bentham's proposals which they regard as empirically contingent
judgments about the means to achieving utility in one possible world. But
Bentham's proposals about political process are not so much means to
achieve utility as they are means to identify it and to insure its influence.
Over a lifetime of experience in promoting reform, Bentham became
convinced that democratic representation, like linguistic transparency,
legislative supremacy, and administrative regularity, was a procedural
2 80
precondition to the pursuit of utility.
By his own admission, Bentham was initially blinded to the
complementary relationship between utility and democracy by the
references to natural rights in the founding documents of the United States.
Bentham's initial polemics against natural rights appeared under the name of
John Lind, a business acquaintance of Bentham's father who became
Bentham's close friend and collaborator. In 1775, Bentham assisted Lind
with his Remarks on the PrincipalActs of the Thirteenth Parliamentof
GreatBritain, which argued that the British parliament was justified in its
enactment of the "Intolerable Acts" of 1774.281 Bentham also worked with
Lind on his 1776 Answer to the Declaration of the American Congress,
which began, in Hart's words, a "long sceptical campaign against the
doctrine of natural and unalienable rights of man." 2 82 Lind and the young
279. Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 51.
280. See NANCY ROSENBLUM, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 85 (1978)
(arguing that 'The Catechism" illustrates why it remains unclear whether and when Bentham
became a committed democrat: his principal arguments for democratic institutions were either
speculative deductions from utility or preferences based on the estimate that popular elections
appeared to be the least objectionable method of choosing governors). See also id. at 83-86.
281. But see Jeremy Bentham, Emancipate Your Colonies! Shewing the Uselessness
and Mischievousness of DistantDependencies to an European State, in 4 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 408-18 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (urging emancipation of colonies based
on strict principles of utility).
282. HART, supranote 101, at 53.
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Bentham held that the "terms natural and inherent rights, when applied to
men in such a state, are . . . perfectly unintelligible," and therefore he
283
believed "the Citizen is to look for his rights in the laws of his country."
Bentham and Lind coined the slogan that "liberty is the name of nothing
positive" and rejected the notions of natural property and natural rights in
favor of legally constructed versions of these goods. 2 84 Thus the colonists'
cry of no taxation without representation rested on a mistake: colonists
mistakenly believed their property belonged to them independent of law, and
therefore they understood taxation as a form of a payment for services that
they could withdraw when dissatisfied. For Bentham and Lind, property is
constituted by law and is inherently subject to legal burdens: "Take away the
fence which the law has set around this thing . . . and where would your
right or property be then?"'2 8 5 Taxation was such a legal burden that defined
and conditioned entitlements to property. 28 6 The notion of a right antecedent
to law was for Bentham an absurdity, famously "nonsense upon stilts." Such
talk of natural rights sprung from the "imagination" 2 87 and signaled the
"effusion of a hard heart operating upon a cloudy mind."'2 8 8 "[D]eaf,
unyielding, and inflexible," principles of natural rights "will hear of no
modification... [and] will look at no calculation."2 89 Thus when Bentham
read the Declaration of Independence, with its preamble infused with
references to unalienable rights, he saw merely "bawling upon paper." 29 0 To
Bentham's annoyance, the Englishman Richard Price sought to justify the
American cause with the maxim "Every Man His Own Legislator." Once
Bentham looked beyond the fallacies of the new nation's arguments and into
283.

JOHN LIND, REMARKS ON THE PRINCIPLE ACTS OF THE THIRTEENTH PARLIAMENT OF
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284. See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
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285. LIND, supra note 283, at 54-56.
286. See Jeremy Bentham, A Manual of Political Economy, in 3 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 75-80 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
287. See Jeremy Bentham, Plan of ParliamentaryReform in the Form of a Catechism,
in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 515 (John Bowring ed., 1962)("imagination, with its
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288.
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the merits of its practices, he admitted that irritation might have distorted:
29 1
"Dr. Price with his self-government made me an anti-American."
As late as 1782 Bentham could find little to reform in his home
constitution: "The Constitutional branch of the law of England, taking in its
leading principles, would probably be found the best beyond comparison
that has hitherto made its appearance in the world; resting at no very great a
distance, perhaps, from the summit of perfection." 2 9 2 By 1809, Bentham
still believed England lived under a "Matchless Constitution," but now
"matchless in rotten boroughs and sinecures! ' '2 9 3 Throughout his career
Bentham struggled with the problem of fashioning a form of government
that would genuinely serve the greatest happiness for the greatest number. If
individuals are primarily motivated to serve their own interests, how can a
community ensure that its governors will serve the interests of their
constituents rather than their own? Maintaining the dominion of "majority
interests" of the people over the "sinister interests" of the rulers remained a
central concern throughout Bentham's work, and this difficulty ultimately
led to his disillusionment with English institutions. Bentham became
increasingly dismayed by the amount of patronage controlled by the King.
This power rendered the King unduly persuasive withParliament, thereby
compromising its ability to challenge the King's agenda. Once the party
leader and members became indebted to the King for favors, the King could
then quash or pass legislation, extending his power. 2 94 The King's power of
patronage also contaminated the press. Under the pretense of maintaining
loyalty and military secrecy during the Napoleonic Wars, the press failed to
remark the King's gradual rise to absolute rule, and when The Times refused
to print Bentham's calls for reform in 1809,295 he concluded that they had
2 9 6 Without
been "bought or intimidated into a state of mendacious slavery."
an independent press, the King's march toward despotism could proceed
297
unchecked, to the people's detriment.

291. Bentham, Manuscriptsat University College,London, supra note 203, clxx (cited
in HART, supra note 101, at 61).
292. Jeremy Bentham, On the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation,
in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171, 185 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
293. Bentham, Plan ofParliamentaryReform, supra note 287, at 437.
294. See STEInrRAGER, supra note 269, at 84-86.
295. In fairness, the 10,000 word document may have been too long for The Times to
accept.
296. Bentham, Manuscriptsat University College, London, supranote 203, clxx 126.
297. STEINTRAGER, supranote 269, at 84-85.
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With the aristocrats "powerful, opulent, and tired,"'2 98 and the King fully
disassociated from the interests of the masses, 2 99 political reform was
imperative: "the country, if my eyes do not deceive me, is already at the
very brink:-reform or convulsion, such is the altemative. ' '3 00 The prospect
of reform, however, seemed unlikely, since it required the legislators to take
a position contrary to their own interests. At the very least, reform required
an extension of the franchise that would make the legislators subordinate to
the will of the people, and it seemed improbable that the legislators would
initiate such a sacrifice of their power. As Steintrager wrote such reforms
would entail the "end to sinecures, and places for themselves and for their
friends and relatives ... a loss of power to borough holders and opulent
country gentlemen ... [and] the Members in general would actually have to
'30 1
attend the sessions of Parliament and to work at their legislative duties."
Additionally, Napoleon's threat made calls for reform particularly untimely,
and the increasing limitations on the press and fear of sanction caused
Bentham to refrain from publishing on these matters from 1809 until
1817.302 Considering these conflicts between the governors and press and
the governed, Bentham's outlook was bleak:
Gagging Bills-suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act-interdiction of all
communication between man and man for any such purpose as that of
complaint or remedy-all these have already become precedent-all these
are in preparation-all these are regarded as things of course.
The pit is already dug: one after another, or all together, the securities
30 3
called English libertieswill be cast into it.
At this point, Bentham began thinking more seriously of the advantages
of democracy and the apparent success of the United States. The United
States represented the very obverse of English repression: it had "No
dungeon acts, no gagging acts, no riot act," freedom of press and speech,
public offices filled by skill rather than family name, no standing army, no
established church, no hereditary honors, no sinecures, and a simple
functionality that operated "without so much as a single useless place,
. 298.
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needless place, overpaid place, unmerited pension-not to speak of
sinecures-not so much as a peerage, to settle or a borough to buy off a
country gentleman." 30 4 In contrast to the situation in France, Bentham heard
of growing propriety and safety with the expansion of suffrage. It now
seemed possible, in light of the American model, that the sinister interests of
the governors could be successfully harmonized with and subordinated to
the interests of the majority, and the fears he partially shared with the
English aristocracy that majority rule would result in the dissolution or
305
radical redistribution of private property were allayed.
As evidence that a viable form of government could indeed promote the
greatest good for the greatest number, the United States became Bentham's
favorite topic, and "Look to America" his favorite slogan. 30 6 The
democratic themes in his theories now advanced to the fore, and he urged
England and all nations to adopt universal suffrage, secret balloting, short
parliaments, equal electoral districts, and a general system of representative
democracy. He hailed the United States as "that newly created nation, one of
the most enlightened, if not the most enlightened, at this day on the
globe, ' '3 07 "the best government that is or ever has been," 30 8 and a
"matchlessly felicitous system." 30 9 Although Bentham retained his distaste
for the natural rights doctrines Americans invoked, he was quick to
dissociate bad philosophy from good government:
Who can help lamenting, that so rational a cause should be rested upon
reasons, so much fitter to beget objections, than to remove them? But with
men who are unanimous and hearty about measures, nothing so weak may
pass in the character of a reason: nor is this the first instance in the world,
where the conclusion has supported the premises, instead of the premises the
3 10
conclusion.

Bentham confessed his own past misconceptions of democracy in order to
ease the conversion of others. "Anarchy is one bugbear; Democracy
304. Bentham, Plan ofParliamentaryReform, supranote 287, at 472.
305. See HART, supra note 101, at 70-71.
306. See Bentham, Plan of ParliamentaryReform, supra note 287, at 433,447, 494;
Jeremy Bentham, The King Against Edmonds and Others: Set Down for a Trial at Warwick
on the 29th of March 1820, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 239, 246 (John
Bowring ed., 1962).
307. BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 309.
308. Bentham, Planof ParliamentaryReform, supra note 287, at 472.
309. Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supranote 202, at 63.
310. See BENTHAM,supra note 82, at 311.
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another," he wrote, and conflations of the two "are sent forth to strike terror
into weak minds... to frighten men out of their wits and prevent them from
' 311
forming any sound judgement.
Bentham was now prepared to support a fully representative democracy.
His overriding objective, to establish a government that would achieve the
greatest good for the greatest number, required that the interests of the
legislators be reconciled with the greatest good of the people. Bentham
viewed constitutional law as he viewed criminal law: as a means to
artificially reconcile the interests of a potential malefactor with the interests
of the general public. The threat of punishment causes each individual to reevaluate the potential costs and benefits of criminal acts, and thereby steers
the self-interest of the potential criminal back in line with the general
interest of the public. Bentham viewed legislators with the same eyes:
forever tempted to favor their own interests over the public's, they were
potential criminals in need of legal deterrents. Bentham repeatedly warned
the public to "Minimize Confidence" and "Maximize Control," and he
concluded that the only way to control the legislators was to subject them to
appointment and dismissal by the majority whose interest they were to
serve. Constantly scrutinized by a public that could remove him from his
post, the legislator, like the criminal, would be forced to find her own best
interests in service to the majority interest.
While originally Bentham believed that a mixed constitution with some
elected elements would suffice to identify the governors with the governed,
he later became convinced that only a full democracy would ensure this
coincidence. 312 Although he would not publish such an argument until
1817, 3 13 he formulated it in 1790, in his unpublished On the Efficient Cause
and Measure of ConstitutionalLiberty:
The propositions I lay down are these: (1) That the efficient cause of
constitutional liberty or of good government which is another name for the
same thing is not the division of power among the different classes of men
entrusted with it but the dependence immediate or mediate of all of them on

311.
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the body of the people. (2) That the whole sovereign power ought to rest in
3 14
the hands of persons placed and displaceable by the body of the people.
Bentham reasoned that the people will choose representatives who will serve
their interests, and those who seek to gain and hold an office therefore must
attend to the popular will. 3 15 In his Constitutional Code, Bentham argued
that the desire of the legislator to become and remain a legislator will form a
"junction of interest" with the interests of the people to elect and be served
by someone advocating their desires. 3 16 Thus, Bentham writes to the
legislator
Should it be asked, Why it is your desire that the greatest happiness of all...
should be the end to which . . . [government] should be directed? [M]y
answer is,-because on the occasion in question, such is the form, the
establishment of which would in the highest degree contributory to my own
3 17
greatest happiness.
Once the interests of the governed and the governors have been
harmonized, sinister interests must be continually guarded against. Since the
legislators were the lynchpin in Bentham's representative democracy, he
insisted on reforming the process of their election. 3 18 Representation of the
welfare of all required universal suffrage (including females and resident
aliens) and any exceptions needed to be justified by a utility analysis. In
addition to the extension of franchise, ballots were to be secret, elections
annual, and electoral districts equal. 3 19 The function of the election process
was to choose legislators competent to act in the interests of their
constituents, not simply to translate their opinions into law. Bentham
considered the layman "essentially unapt" to make law, but fully competent
to select a good lawmaker. 320 An election, therefore, is not intended to
314. Bentham, Manuscriptsat University College, London, supra note 203, cxxvii 5
(citedin HART, supranote 101 at 61).
315. See Peardon, supranote 298, at 625.
316. Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 6.
317. Id. at 7.
318. Bentham stressed the importance of elected representatives in his 1789 Essay on
Representation intended for France. See Bentham, Manuscripts at University College,
London, supra note 203, clxxx, 87-121.
319. See Bentham, Planfor ParliamentaryReform, supra note 287, at 435.
320. Bentham did have opinions on the qualities of a good law maker, which he
divided into three characteristics: appropriate probity, appropriate intellectual aptitude, and
appropriate active talent. On appropriate probity he wrote:
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collect the people's views on any particular substantive issue, but rather
merely to appoint competent and conscientious officials. 32 1 Like a doctor,
the legislator is judged by the success of her treatment, not her conformity to
the patient's prescriptions.
To ensure personal accountability for legislative action, Bentham
strongly discouraged decisions by committee, devised clear parliamentary
322
procedures, and demanded uninterrupted attendance of all sessions.
Publication of the legislatures' proceedings, determinations, and conflicts
was essential to enable voters to assess each legislator's representation of
their interests. In addition to outlining proper reporting and publication
procedures for legislative action, Bentham devised a system of bookkeeping
that would ensure transparent execution of legislatively mandated policy.
Bentham demanded "clear, correct and comprehensive" records be kept, 3 so
23
that the public could assess the effects of policy and uncover corruption.
An unrestricted press would call attention to this information.
Bentham believed that, when protected by these safeguards, the
community could not be wrong about its own interests. Bentham thought a
community's pursuit of its own desires, even if misguided, was always
preferable to the sinister rule of oligarchs. Even if the public occasionally
judges its interests poorly, or ineffectively pursues those interests by
electing the wrong legislator, its judgment would improve with
experience-provided that publicity, and a transparent language of
governance enabled the public to understand its own experience. Bentham
On each occasion, whether in speaking or delivering his vote,--on the part of a
representative of the people, appropriate probity consists in pursuing that line of
conduct, which, in his own sincere opinion, being not inconsistent with the rules or
morality or the law of the land, is most conducive to the general good of the whole
community for which he serves; that is to say, of the whole of the British empire:forbearing, on each occasion, at the expense either of the general good, or of his duty
in any shape, either to accept, or to seek to obtain, or preserve, in any shape
whatsoever, for himself, or for any person or persons particularly connected with
him, any advantage whatsoever, from whatsoever hands obtainable; and in particular
for those hands in which, by the very frame of the constitution, the greatest mass of
matter of temptation is necessarily and unavoidably lodged, viz. Those of the King,
and other members of the executive branch of the govemment,-the King's
Ministers.
Id. at 539.
321. See Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 98-99.
322. Jeremy Bentham, Catechism of ParliamentaryReform, in 3 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM, 540 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
323. Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supranote 202, at 23. See generallysupraat 232-
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envisioned a time when the desires of the public would be synonymous with
their true best interests:
Even at the present stage in the career of civilization, its dictates coincide, on
most points, with those of the greatest happiness principle; on some,
however, it still deviates from them: but as its deviations have all along been
less and less numerous, and less wide. Sooner or later they will cease to be
3 24
discernable.
The public comes to best comprehend its own interests through experience,
examination, explanation, and argumentation, and therefore education and
the free exchange of information became imperative. Thus John Stuart Mill
spoke of the emphasis on education in the thought of James Mill, Bentham's
partner in electoral reform:
So complete was my father's reliance on the influence of reason over the
minds of mankind, whenever it is allowed to reach them, that he felt as if all
would be gained if the whole population were taught to read, if all sorts of
opinions were allowed to be addressed to them by word and in writing, and
if by means of the suffrage they could nominate a legislature to give effect to
32 5
the opinions they adopted.
Bentham and the elder Mill believed the strength of the best arguments and
legislation would win over all citizens who were allowed to freely examine
their desires and the objectives of their community. Government was not a
forum for the struggle of interest groups, but for the discovery and rational
justification of policies that could generate a consensus among
32 6
participants.
C. Publicity
To ensure that self-interested officials would properly perform the utility
calculus, Bentham proposed a public process of governance. Bentham had
324.
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little confidence in his legislators, and he took every precaution to ensure
that the public could monitor their every move. 3 27 Publicity of political
process, according to Bentham, was a necessary safeguard against misrule,
and he barred any suspension of this security. Bentham's constitutional
scheme guaranteed that his public would know, or at least could know upon
inspection, all of the information available to the legislature, the decision
made by the legislature, and its stated rationale. In order to assure that each
decision would be made by the appropriate legislator and that no
administrator could overstep her authority, Bentham erected a hierarchy of
decision-making responsibility. He sought to ensure that the decision-maker
would always be the person most knowledgeable about the issue, and would
be held accountable for her decision. The "public must keep a careful eye on
legislators and administrators alike," he believed, "lest they corrupt one
another to the detriment of the greatest happiness of the greatest number,"
and thus only "when such suspicion exists will the services that can be
rendered to the public actually be given." 3 28 Bentham saw public inspection
of governmental decisions as the only sure safeguard against corruption and
misrule, and he therefore constructed a transparent deliberative structure
which would allow the public full access to all of the state's proceedings.
This public review of governmental functions was a sine qua non of
329
security.
To watch over the judges and lawyers Bentham proposed:
[a] constantly existing body of assessors to the Judge... under the name
of a Jury. .

.

. Of this Jury the decision might either be obligatory, as

according to the present practice, on the Judge, or not. One great service will
be rendered by it in either case: namely the imposing on the Judge a sort of
moral necessity to lay open to the public ear the grounds of every thing that
he does. For this reason the Jury should be in attendance whensoever the
judge himself is in attendance, for if the intentions of the Judge are evil, a
single moment in which he acts by his own uncontrol[l]ed authority may
suffice to deprive the party who is in the right of the benefit looked for at the
hands of a Jury.
In Judicature, where there is no publicity, there is no justice: no tolerably
adequate security for the giving due execution and effect to the laws,
327. See STEINTRAGER, supra note 269, at 99.
328. BENTHAM, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supra note 250, at 351; see also
STEINTRAGER, supra note 269, at 111.
329.

BENTHAM, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supra note 250, at 252.
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whatsoever they may be. That justice should have been the object where the
3 30
doors of the Judicatory have been kept regularly closed is not possible.
The primary function of this jury is not to render verdicts, but to witness the
judge's work. When drafting a plan to reorganize the French judiciary,
Bentham stated that "[plublicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest
spur to exertion, and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the
judge himself, while trying, under trial. ' 33 1 The jury would hear evidence,
ask any relevant question, inspect documents and exhibits, render opinions,
and while the judge was not obligated to follow the jurors' decisions, their
statements would be recorded in the official record. 3 3 2 In addition, Bentham
would have filled the court with spectators, representing public opinion. He
named the members of this audience "Judicial Inspectors," and suggested
legislation to ensure their presence at every trial. 3 33 "Their mere presence,"
he believed, "would guarantee publicity and assure that some attention
would be paid to the Greatest Happiness Principle." 3 34 Bentham's similar
use of surveillance as a disciplinary technique in his model prison fascinated
Foucault. In this "Panopticon" the behavior of all prisoners and the
performance of all employees are transparent to the director; yet any
member of the public can similarly survey and assess the director's
management of the facility. 33 5 Bentham's courtroom was a similar
Panopticon, putting both the defendant and the law on public display.
In order that both the judge and jury hear any and all information that
might be relevant to a decision, Bentham endorsed exceedingly liberal rules
of evidence. 33 6 In his study of Bentham's theory of evidence, William
Twining nicely captures Bentham's position when he explains that the
330. Id.
331. Jeremy Bentham, Draught of a Code for the Organization of the Judicial
Establishment in France: With Critical Observations on the Draught Proposed by the
National Assembly Committee, in the From ofa Perpetual Commentary, in 4 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 285, 316 (John Bowring ed., 1962); see also BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF

PENAL LAW, supra note 29, at 1, 145; Ross HARRISON, BENTHAM 131 (1983).
332. See Peardon, supra note 298, at 621, 634.
333. See id.
334. Id.
335. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLNE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF A PRISON 204 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977).
336. See generally Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence vol. 7, supra note 248;
see also TWINING, supra note 73, at 27-28 (summarizing Bentham's theory of evidence); Dale
Nance, Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 292 (1988) (Bentham saw no reason to
distinguish between judge and jury regarding the appropriateness of the rules of evidence).
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"direct end of evidence and procedure is to implement substantive laws
deemed to be consonant with utility ...[and t]he means of achieving this
end is by establishing the truth through the rational and efficient collection,
presentation and weighing of evidence. ' 3 37 With this end in mind, Bentham
stated that the court should "hear everybody who is likely to know anything
about the matter: hear everybody, but most attentively of all, and first of all,
those who are likely to know most about it-the parties."'3 3 8 Bentham
opposed evidentiary constraints based on the protection of confidential
relations, 3 39 attorney-client privilege, 34 0 the right against self-incrimination,
and the right to silence. 34 1 These same evidentiary rules would apply, when
relevant, to the legislator investigating questions of policy.
Bentham also insisted that all proceedings of the state should be printed
in the newspapers, 342 including the issues under review, the evidence
offered, and the conclusion reached. 34 3 This, in Bentham's opinion, allowed
the community to monitor and assess governmental decisions, and enabled
the citizenry to report abuses of executive authority to the violator's
superior. Bentham believed such critical exchanges between the rulers and
the ruled should be encouraged, and that these lines of communication
34 4
should be "as free and unclogged as possible."
337. TwiNING, supra note 73, at 89; see also M.A. Menlowe, Bentham, SelfIncrimination,and the Law of Evidence, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 252,
268 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993) (explaining that for "utilitarians, the law of evidence is a
judicial tool for maximizing utility. He thinks that the function of the law of evidence is to get
at the truth because he believes that serves the fundamental utilitarian goal. Truth is most
likely to be obtained when all evidence is prima facie admissible.").
338. Bentham, Rationale ofJudicialEvidence vol. 7, supra note 248, at 599. See also
DINWIDDY, supranote 93, at 64.
339. See BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EvIDENCE 327-49 (1827); see also
TWINING, supra note 73, at 99.
340. See BENTHAM, supra note 339, at 302-25; see also TWINING, supranote 71, at 99.
341. See TwINING, supra note 73, at 99; see also L.J. HUME, BENTHAM AND
BUREAUCRACY 172-73 (1981).
342. BENTHAM, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supra note 250, at 11, 50.
343. See HUME, supranote 341, at 99.

344. HUME, supra note 341, at 100 (citing Bentham, Manuscripts at University
College, London, supra note 203, lxxxvii). We could discuss at length Bentham's
commitment to open communication as a corollary to his principles of evidence, and we refer
the reader to Mack's discussion, where he states: "There is, finally, the principle of free
communication. It would be nearly impossible to exaggerate its importance in the Utilitarian
canon. From first to last Bentham demanded total freedom to assemble, speak, write, and
publish; in open-air meetings, Parliament, the courts; in books, magazines, and newspapers.
'Let all things be known' was a vital commandment of the Utilitarian gospel. Unless
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As an additional benefit of such publicity, citizens would become aware
of the decisions made and reasons cited by their appointees, and voters could
hold officials politically accountable at the next election. 34 5 For the
populace to cast their vote for the candidate who best deserved their
confidence, they had to know the legislator's opinions. Bentham wondered
"[h]ow are they to know this but by knowing... how he has given his vote
and what reasons if any he has assigned for giving it? And in nine cases out
'3 46
of ten how can they judge ... without learning any thing of the reasons?
Debates, hearings, and legislative sessions would be transcribed, relayed by
the press, and reviewed by the public, and the electorate would choose their
leaders based on this information. 3 47 Because transgressions would be
punished by a loss of popularity, Bentham thought publicity would
34 8
discipline politicians: "the eye of the public makes statesmen virtuous."
Bentham realized that a "law conformable to utility may happen to be
contrary to public opinion," but he believed this to be "only an accidental
and transitory circumstance" since "[a]ll minds will be reconciled to the law
as soon as its utility is made obvious. As soon as the veil which conceals it
has been raised, expectation will be satisfied, and the public opinion will be
gained over." 34 9 Bentham believed it was the legislator's duty to convince
the community of the merit of the laws it endorsed, and if it failed to do so it
3 50
would suffer at the next election.
Bentham saw publicity as the dominant protection against misrule. He
saw no need for a system of checks and balances, distributing power through
separate branches of government. 35 1 "Without publicity," he writes, "all
other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are
of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions might
present themselves in character of checks, would be found to operate as
communication is free there can be neither good government nor indirect legislation." M.P.
MACK, JEREMY BENTHAM: AN ODYSSEY OF IDEAS 315 (1963).
345. HUME, supranote 341, at 99-100.
346. MACK, supra note 344, at 320 (citing Bentham, Manuscripts at University
College, London, supra note 203, lxxxvii, 114).
347. See STEINTRAGER, supranote 269, at 106.
348. Jeremy Bentham, Extracts from Bentham's Commonplace Book, in 10 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 145 (John Bowring ed., 1962); see also DINWIDDY, supra note
93, at 83.
349. Jeremy Bentham, Civil Code, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 324 (John
Bowring ed., 1962); see also Ross Harrison, The People is my Caesar,in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM:
CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 900, 915 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993).
350. See STEINTRAGER, supra note 269, at 107.
351. See DINWIDDY, supra note 93, at 89.
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cloaks rather than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in
appearance." 3 52 He proclaimed the most insidious political disease to be
"[p]olitical gagging: i.e. obstruction in any way of the communication
between mind and mind for the melioration of the common lot on any
subject of discourse: more especially on a political subject."'3 53 Bentham
prescribed one "word-publicity, for conveying the like conception of the
remedy:-the only remedy (it will be seen) which, without a change in the
'3 54
form of the government, the nature of the disease admits of."
Bentham regarded the public monitoring function as a constitutional
structure, an organ of government that he referred to as the "Public Opinion
Tribunal. '3 5 5 Membership in the Public Opinion Tribunal consisted of the
"whole number of the members of the political community in question as
constituting the entire body, the functionaries of government, all ranks
together . . .[and] all those by whom any cognizance is taken of public
affairs may be considered as constituting the Tribunal of Public
3 57
Opinion," 3 56 Bentham viewed newspaper editors as leaders of this body.
Just as membership was afforded to all citizens, the Tribunal's authority
ranged over the entirety of political life, and it "may be conceived as
constituted by so many Sub-Committees as there are aggregates of
individuals who on any occasion in any place take actual cognizance of this
or that operation of a political nature, to whatsoever part of the field of
government it appertains. '3 5 8 The Tribunal's physical presence would be
felt through audiences at legislative and judicial sittings, public meetings,
and also via those who explicitly took up political issues in speeches and
35 9
writings.
Bentham imagined the Public Opinion Tribunal performing the
following functions:
1. Receiving claims and accusations. 2. Receiving oppositions and defense.
3. Receiving, compelling, collecting and storing evidence. 4. Receiving and
hearing or reading arguments of parties litigant or advocates. 5. Forming
opinions or judgment on ditto: with correspondent will. 6. Giving expression
352.

BENTHAM, supra note 339, at 524.

353.

BENTHAM, SEcuRITIEs AGAINST MISRULE, supranote 250, at 26.

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id. at 25.
id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 59.
See ROSEN, supra note 208, at 27.
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to such judgment at will. 7. Giving impression to such expression. 8. Giving
diffusion to such impression. 9. Giving execution and effect to such
36 0
judgments[s] and will.
In his ConstitutionalCode, Bentham also required the Tribunal to perform a
"statistic or say evidence furnishing function." In this capacity, the Tribunal
was to provide information that might serve as "grounds for judgment.., in
relation to any public institution, ordinance, arrangement, proceeding
measure, past, present or supposed future contingent, or to any mode of
conduct, on the part of any person, functionary or non-functionary, by which
the interests of the public at large may be affected ... .- 361 The Public
Opinion Tribunal, thus, would gather all the information relevant to
governmental activities (the statistical function), review it, identify
indiscretions (the censorial function), suggests changes (the meliorativesuggestive function), and publicly voice its opinions. 36 2 The Tribunal was
free to level any attack against governmental impropriety, and Bentham
placed no restrictions on the intensity of its criticisms, for in his opinion the
"military function gets paid for being shot at. The civil functionary is paid
'3 6 3
for being spoken and written at."
The Tribunal was indispensable to the operation of a utilitarian policy
process:
Regarding then this [political] body in the character of a workman, operating
on the minds of public functionaries, publicity may be stated as the
characteristic and indispensable instrument of this workman: an instrument
no less indispensable and characteristic than the turning-latheis of the sort
of workmen called a turner. It is by publicity that the Public Opinion
Tribunal does whatsoever it does: any further than employment is given to
3 64
his instrument, the workman can not do any thing.
Because of its centrality to utilitarianism, Bentham took every measure to
facilitate
the Public Opinion
Tribunal's performance
of its
responsibilities. 36 5 Bentham demanded that governmental departments keep
360. BENTHAM, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supranote 250, at 60-61.
361.
Bentham, Constitutional Code, supra note 202, at 41-46; see also BENTHAM,
supra note 264, at 213.
362. Peardon, supra note 298, at 621, 641; see alsoROsEN, supra note 208, at 27.
363. Peardon, supra note 298, at 621, 641.
364. BENTHAM, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supra note 250, at 28.
365. DINWDDY, supra note 93, at 83.
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their books and records accurate, logically organized, and easily accessible
to the public. 36 6 Bentham believed any person obstructing the operations of
the Public Opinion Tribunal should be "numbered among the enemies of the
human species," and he stated:
Every act, whereby ... a man seeks to weaken the effective power of the
Public Opinion Tribunal, or by falsehood, or.. . by suppression of truth, to
misdirect it, is evidence of hostility on his part to the greatest happiness of
the greatest number: evidence of the worst intentions, generated by the worst
motives.... Every act, whereby a man seeks to diminish the circulation of
opinions opposite to those which he professes, is evidence of his
consciousness of the rectitude of those which he is combating, and thereby
of the insincerity, hypocrisy, tyrannicalness, and selfishness which have
36 7
taken possession of his mind.
Bentham would not tolerate any interference with the Public Opinion
Tribunal, nor could he imagine any reason to suspend publicity.
Along with democracy, legality, and discursive transparency, publicity
is a fundamental feature of a utilitarian constitution. Together, these four
"securities against misrule" fulfill the dual function of disciplining officials
to gratify the public and reassuring the public that their servants are thus
disciplined. Because they are procedural conditions for collective rationality,
they are not just contingently useful instruments. They are constitutive of the
public interest or the utility that utilitarianism promotes. By designing
publicity into the structure of governing institutions and supporting it with
additional institutional structures like a free press, Bentham's Constitutional
Code would bring into being the constitutional organ of an informed and
mobilized public: the Public Opinion Tribunal, which oversees all
government activity and holds administrators accountable for betrayal of the
public interest. Citizens ultimately "direct their rulers, through public
opinion and the vote, to accept reforms and advance policies that can be
justified in terms of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. ' '3 68
Publicity is the indispensable condition for the emergence of a genuine
popular sovereign. This popular sovereign is the ultimate audience for

366.

Peardon, supra note 298, at 621, 636, 642; see also RosEN, supra note 208, at

367.

BENTHAM,

368.

See RosEm, supra note 208, at 40.

112.
supra note 264; see also ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 41-
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utilitarian discourse, and the existence of that audience is the condition for
the meaningfulness of that discourse.
How would Bentham's commitment to publicity of government action
apply to the case of an official like McCloskey's sheriff bent on framing an
innocent person to pacify a bloodthirsty mob?
First, when we consider Bentham's insistence on strict adherence to
formally promulgated laws and his antipathy toward judicial and
administrative discretion, it seems unlikely that he would permit a petty
police official to take matters into his own hands and disregard all of the
procedural safeguards against misrule. Bentham constructed this entire
procedural apparatus with the aim of checking legislators, administrators
and judges, and he structured the making and implementation of law so as to
allow these high-ranking officials no unscrutinized discretion whatsoever.
Bentham believed no one should be allowed to act on behalf of the
community without a full review of their actions by the Public Opinion
Tribunal, and a sheriff would not be exempt from this safeguard. If Bentham
could not trust an elected legislator to perform the utility calculus without
publishing in the newspaper all of the evidence before her, her decision, and
the reasons given for her choice, then surely a lone sheriff would not be
afforded the opportunity to secretly decide the fate of her community.
Similarly, if a judge was not even allowed to interpret a law without a jury
present because, in Bentham's words, justice is not possible "where the
doors of the judicatory have been kept regularly closed," how could a sheriff
secretly appropriate the functions of judge, jury, and executioner?
Second, Bentham's emphasis on transparent government and public
evidence similarly deflates the claim that a sheriff could frame an innocent
person. If we consider the actions that a sheriff would actually need to take
to accomplish such a scheme, she would quite clearly need to violate several
of her nation's procedural laws. In mounting the case to frame the innocent
person, she would need to hide or destroy exculpatory evidence and
fabricate inculpatory evidence, and Bentham clearly forbade such
deception. 36 9 Her official records would subsequently contain falsified and
369. See SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supra note 250, at 85-86, where Bentham
enumerates the offenses:
Liberty of communication by word of mouth, to as many as chosen, information
in any shape in which it is regarded by the individual in question as contributory to
greatest happiness.
Right recognized. Giving expression andpublicity to all facts and observations of
which, in the judgment of the individual in question, the conception promises to be
contributory to the greatest happiness of the greatest number: whether the tendency
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incomplete information. These transgressions would obstruct the proper
review of her decision by the public, and she would thus be "numbered
among the enemy of the species."' 37 0 In the end, it would be the sheriff who
was punished both for disregarding the rule of law 37 1 and for improperly
3 72
punishing an innocent party.

of the correspondent information be to raise or lower this or that person in the scale
of public opinion.
Correspondents acts of power prohibited as being violations of these rights
[include] ...4. Seizing, detaining, destroying or deteriorating any paper or other
substratum on which signs expressive of a discourse in question are marked. Issuing
or contributing to the issuing of any order for such seizure, detention, destruction or
deterioration. Giving or contributing to give execution to any such order. 5.
Obstruction by force, intimidation or deceit the approach, entrance or continuation of
persons in any number to, into or in any place in which they have separately any
right to station themselves. Obstructing them while in the act of making reciprocal
communication of such their information and the opinions and wishes suggested by
it.
370. BENTHAM, supra note 264, at 216; see Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note
202, at 41-46.
371. T.P. Schofield, 'Economy as Applied to Office' and the Development of
Bentham's Democratic Thought, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 868, 875
(Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993) (citing Bentham, Manuscripts at University College, London,
supranote 203, cxiii, 30-33).
372. See BENTHAM,SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supra note 250, at 88-89.
Whensoever, on the alleged ground of justice, the person of any man is put under
confinement, information thereof shall be given in the most public manner to the
end that all persons taking an interest in his welfare may have it in their power to
take lawful measures for securing him against injustice. 2. To this end, the name
and situation of every habitation designed by authority to be used as (a place] of
confinement, whether on the score of delinquency or insanity, shall be entered in an
appropriate register, one exemplar whereof shall be kept in the metropolis in the
Office of the Chief Judicatory; and of this exemplar a copy shall be kept at the
Office of every other Judicatory.... 10. Every person who knowingly and willfully
has been contributory to the injurious imprisonment of any person shall himself
suffer imprisonment for a length of time equal to that during which the
imprisonment had place: and shall moreover, to the extent of his means, be
compelled to furnish, or contribute to the furnishing, compensation in a pecuniary
shape for the injury.
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VII. INSTITUTIONAL UTILITARIANISM AND ETHIcAL UTILITARIANISM

A. UtilitarianPenology as an Application of InstitutionalUtilitarianism
Utilitarian penology was not an outgrowth or application of utilitarian
ethics. Utilitarians like Beccaria and Bentham were interested in reforming
public institutions to beiter serve the public welfare. Since they thought that
individuals were destined to pursue their own welfare they did not see
ethical preachments as a particularly useful enterprise. They thought of
public utility as a public criterion of judgment for settling political
arguments, rather than as a motive for individual action. It was primarily a
criterion for use in legislation.
For someone of a skeptical, positivist turn of mind like Bentham, a
standard of judgment like utility had no meaning apart from some concrete
institutional process of decisionmaking. Bentham endeavored to design
institutions that would not so much maximize utility as they would realize
utility by providing a process for identifying it that could be publicly
accepted as legitimate. Bentham thought of public confidence that
government was guided by the public welfare as the major portion of the
public happiness sought.
This larger aim of public confidence or "security" in the utilitarian aims
of government necessitated a number of procedural constraints on
government action. Thus, all government action should be pursuant to
legislation promulgated by democratically elected representatives.
Legislation should take the form of clear formal rules, couched in language
intelligible to the public, and justified by reasons of public welfare clearly
intelligible to the public. It should be faithfully implemented and enforced
by executive and judicial officials with little discretion, subject to public
monitoring and sanctions for misbehavior. Governmental publicity,
education, a free press, and a lucid language of policy analysis and critique
were all necessary to enable the public to assess the performance of
government. The entire utilitarian policy process depended upon the
circulation of information: the ingathering by government of information
about individual interests and social conditions; the outflow of information
to the public about the nature, grounds and effects of government decisions;
the exchange of information and opinions among members of the public
about public needs and the performance of government. This circulation of
information was crucial not only to enable government to serve the public
interest, but to compel it to do so, and to reassure the public that government
was so compelled.

2000]

FRAMED: UTILITARIANISM AND PUNISHMENT

These procedural requisites of utilitarian government combine with
other utilitarian constraints to keep utilitarian punishment within narrow
channels. Utilitarian penology begins with the idea that punishment is an
evil that purposefully destroys welfare. It adds the observation that
punishment is nevertheless useful in enforcing public will and deterring
malevolence in so far as it can be seen to be precisely directed at
wrongdoers. Yet, the weapon of punishment often cannot be aimed with
great precision. Errors will be made, and in an interdependent society, the
harmful effects of deserved punishment cannot be confined to the guilty.
Utilitarian penology acknowledges that dutiful, law-abiding citizens cannot
assure themselves they will not be punished undeservedly. The result is that
the use of punishment not only inflicts costly suffering but inevitably
threatens the very public security it is designed to serve.
The utilitarian responds in two ways. First, the utilitarian strives to use
less destructive methods of social control whenever possible: positive
incentives, education, therapeutic treatment, moral persuasion, architecture,
surveillance, publicity, and so on. The utilitarian would rely on legislative
decriminalization rather than judicial, prosecutorial or police discretion to
avoid unnecessary punishment. Second, the utilitarian hedges the imposition
of punishment with procedural rules designed to assure the public it is as
regular and accurate as possible. When conceived as public security, utility
turns out to demand much of the familiar civil libertarian agenda in criminal
justice. Punishment should be conditioned on offenses that are defined
legislatively, prospectively, specifically and publicly. Offenses should be
conditioned on voluntariness and culpability so that only deterrable
wrongdoing is punished and citizens can be confident they have some
control over whether they subject themselves to punishment. Prosecutions
should meet exacting standards of proof, and evidentiary reliability.
Punishments should be reversible and convictions subject to exhaustive
review and appeal. Criminal justice decisionmaking at all levels should be
publicly monitored and reviewed.
Utilitarian penology is not organized around the goal of maximizing
deterrence or minimizing crime. It is organized around the goal of
maximizing utility, which chiefly depends on creating a democratically
controlled, procedurally regular, transparent, formalistic, bureaucratically
rational process of governance. Public confidence that government can be
publicly compelled to serve the public welfare is more important to utility
than the particular consequences for the public welfare of any policy
decision.
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On this interpretation, utilitarian penology cannot be charged with
condoning or demanding punishment of the innocent (except in the limited
sense that all efforts to punish the guilty entail risks of inadvertently
punishing the innocent and unfairly harming innocent associates of the
guilty). Since utilitarian penology does not rest on any ethical theory, it does
not entail an ethical obligation on the part of individuals to act so as to
maximize utility. Hence, it entails no ethical obligation to bear false witness
or frame the innocent or otherwise subvert legal process, even if an
individual could know that such an act would maximize utility on a
particular occasion. Utilitarian penology could not recommend a
government policy of publicly and deliberately punishing innocent people
because this would impose needless suffering, create perverse incentives,
and destroy public security. Utilitarian penology could not recommend a
government policy of secretly framing the innocent, because a system of
criminal justice could only advance its primary aim of public security if it
was sufficiently transparent in design to guarantee the public that such acts
would be discovered and punished.
An illuminating modem example of this kind of utilitarian penology is
Henry M. Hart's famous essay The Aims of the Criminal Law,3 7 3 which
offers a consequentialist argument for restricting punishment to
blameworthy conduct. Hart poses the question of the justifying purposes of
punishment by imagining a concrete decisionmaker-a constitutional
commission-charged with deciding whether to include punishment among
the powers of government. 3 74 He reasons that while deterrence is an
important purpose of criminal law, 37 5 it cannot suffice as a justification for
punishment because onerous civil sanctions also deter. 3 76 Hart argues that
the feature distinguishing punishment from other onerous sanctions is that it
also expresses blame and thereby inflicts humiliation. 3 77 Yet Hart does not
then proceed to argue, as might a retributivist, that officials are ethically
obliged 37to8 blame only the blameworthy. Instead, he argues that the
"utility"
of official blaming lies in inculcating a sense of moral and social
responsibility among citizens, and investing their social and self-esteem in

373.
401 (1958).
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23
See id. at 402.
See id. at 406-08.
See id. at 403-04.
See id. at 404-06.
See id. at 406.
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obedience to law. 37 9 Hart concludes that punishment should be
constitutionally restricted by this educative function. 3 80 Accordingly,
legislatures should only be permitted to criminalize, and courts to punish,
blameworthy conduct. 3 8 1 Prosecutorial and police discretion should be
curbed to the same end. 38 2 These restrictions, Hart reasons, will conserve
the moral authority, and hence the educational efficacy, of the criminal law.
Note that while Hart's overall question is how punishment can best
serve the public welfare, he divides it into a series of questions about how
particular institutional mechanisms should be used in a structured process of
making and applying criminal law:
In the criminal law, as in all law, questions about the action to be taken do
not present themselves for decision in an institutional vacuum. They arise
rather in the context of some established and specific procedure of
decision.... This means that each agency of decision must take account
always of its own place in the institutional system and of what is necessary to
38 3
maintain the integrity and workability of the system as a whole.

Hart's conclusion that public welfare requires restricting punishment to the
blameworthy depends heavily on his starting the analysis at the level of
constitutional design, like Rawls and Bentham, rather than at the level of
police discretion, like McCloskey. Once Hart's constitutional commission
has exercised its discretion to define the public welfare, McCloskey's sheriff
has little discretion to do the same.
Hart, of course, is not commonly described as a utilitarian: he is known
as a major exponent of the postwar "Legal Process" school which
emphasized the proper allocation of policy decisions to competent
institutions. 3 84 Yet, if we are right in characterizing utilitarianism as a
design for a rational policy process, Hart's legal process analysis of
punishment is a legitimate heir to Bentham's utilitarian penology. Indeed,
we think much contemporary legal policy analysis is more closely related to
Bentham's original project of legal reform than the "utilitarian" ethics
debated by contemporary academic philosophers.
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B. The Invention of Ethical Utilitarianism
Utilitarian ethics is a simple and elegant theory, and as such very useful
to philosophers who must teach undergraduate courses in ethics and advance
the discipline in fifteen page increments in the pages of philosophy journals;
if it did not exist it would have to be invented. Yet it is entirely unnecessary
to the Benthamite project of designing a welfare maximizing policy process.
The discontinuities between Bentham's concerns on the one hand, and those
of, say, J.J.C. Smart on the other have, sometimes been noticed upon but, we
think, usually mischaracterized. According to Alan Donagan, for example,
the difference is that the original utilitarians were "rule utilitarians:"
The early utilitarians, Bentham and the Mills, did not treat it as the office of
a moralist to calculate the consequences of individual acts, this murder or
that lie, but only whether the consequences of classes of acts like murders or
lies are better or worse than the consequences of the classes of alternative
acts in which the agents refrain from murdering or lying. Not all utilitarians
have followed Bentham and the Mills in this. Professor J.J.C. Smart, for
example, has argued that to "restrict" utilitarianism as in practice Bentham
and the Mills did leads to absurdities .... 385
According to this formulation, the chief difference between the original
utilitarian reformers and their modem academic epigones is a disagreement
about ethics. Whereas "act-utilitarians" like Smart believe we should each
act so as to enhance utility, rule utilitarians believe we should act in
conformity to rules that would enhance utility if followed universally. But to
call Bentham and the Mills rule-utilitarians is to suggest that they were
interested in identifying utility-maximizing policies to preach them as moral
duties rather than to enact and enforce them as legislation.
Of course, on utilitarian premises, rule-utilitarian moralizing would not
be very effectual in advancing the public welfare. Utilitarian psychology
predicts that moral preaching will seldom motivate action, and ruleutilitarian norms only advance the public welfare if they are followed
systematically (otherwise they are act-utilitarian norms). Those early
utilitarians who did write about moral duties, like Hume and Paley, argued
that they had to take the form of rules in order to be potentially enforceable
by sanctions. In other words, even those early utilitarians who wrote about
morality treated it as an institution, not just a set of ethical duties. But for the
most part, the early utilitarians were practical reformers, not speculative
385.

See Donagan, supra note 13, at 187-88.
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philosophers. They were interested in rules primarily because they were
trying to improve law.
Certainly Bentham, and his most immediate forebears Helvetius and
Beccaria, had virtually no interest in ethics. Their views on law were not
"restrictions" of any views about ethical duties. John Stuart Mill, like Hume,
is a more complicated case. Mill was primarily a political theorist and
reformer, famed for his advocacy of democracy 3 86 and civil liberties. 3 87 Yet
his pamphlet Utilitarianismseems to set forth a conception of utilitarianism
as an ethical standard for judging all acts: "The creed which accepts as the
foundation of morals 'utility'. . . holds that actions are right in proportion as
they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness. ' 38 8 Nevertheless, J.O. Urmson has made a convincing case that
for Mill, utilitarianism has a far more restricted scope as an ethical
standard.According to Urmson, Mill places us under no ethical obligation
to maximize. Mill judges actions as morally wrong only if they violate a rule
of conduct, the violation of which usually substantially harms the public
welfare. 3 89 These moral wrongs are of two types: violations of legal rules,
which merit punishment, and violations of ethical rules, which merit the
"moral sanction" of public disapproval. For Mill, it is not utilitarianism that
is restricted, but ethics. Ethics concerns not the general question of what
actions should be done, but the narrower question of what actions should be
done out of a sense of ethical duty. 390 "Ninety-nine hundreths of all our
actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done if the rule of duty
does not condemn them."' 39 1 Utility is best served if individuals pursue their
own happiness most of the time; to act always or even very frequently out of
a sense of duty spoils the enjoyment of life. Moreover, like Bentham, Mill
thought law more important than morality as a definer and enforcer of
duties:
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Utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the
• . . interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the
interest of the whole; and, secondly, that education and opinion, which have
so vast a power over human character, should so use that power to establish
in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own
happiness and ... the practice of such modes of conduct ...
3 92
the universal happiness prescribes.

as regards for

Mill was a utilitarian; and he adhered to a sort of Kantian ethics of
universalizable rules, with utilitarian benefits. But his utilitarianism, which
was chiefly a program of legal and political reform, far exceeded this "ruleutilitarian" ethics. As Russell Hardin comments:
Much of the mid-twentieth-century effort to read earlier utilitarians, such as
Mill, as really rule-utilitarians largely misses the point of the earlier concern,
which was with institutional arrangements that would help secure good
consequences and not with individual rule following. To avoid such
confusion we should speak not of rule-utilitarianism but of institutional
39 3

utilitarianism.

Thus the early utilitarians cannot be placed on one side or the other of
contemporary debates within utilitarian ethics. In so far as they were
utilitarians, they were not ethicists, but political and legal theorists.
Ethical utilitarianism was invented by Henry Sidgwick in his 1874
treatise, The Methods of Ethics.39 4 Here he defined ethics as an academic
discipline-the "ideal" or normative "science" or study of "conduct, 3 95 by
which he meant "the voluntary action of individuals. ' 39 6 Ethics was
therefore to be distinguished from jurisprudence and politics. 39 7 Sidgwick's
subject was "methods" of acquiring knowledge about what actions are right
for individuals to do. 3 98 He distinguished two general methodological
approaches: inquiring into the consequences of an action for happiness, and
inquiring into opinions or "intuitions" about the rightness of an action.
Among consequentialist approaches, he distinguished utilitarianism, or
392.
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"universalistic hedonism" from "egoistic hedonism." 39 9 In thus comparing
ethical methods, Sidgwick admitted that he was not studying them
"historically, as methods that have actually been used or proposed for the
regulation of practice; but rather as alternatives between which . . . the
human mind seems necessarily forced to choose when it attempts to frame a
complete synthesis of practical maxims and to act in a perfectly consistent
manner." 40 0 Thus in expounding "utilitarianism," Sidgwick made no claim
to offer an accurate interpretation of the thought of Hume, Helvetius,
Beccaria, Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, or any other actual figure
in the history of utilitarianism. He was attempting to work out the
implications for individual obligation of an ethical theory built on a
foundation of universal hedonism. In so doing, he distinguished his
enterprise, "the scientific study of right conduct," from that of previous
writers, who, he opined, were drawn into confusion and inconsistency by the
'40 1
exigencies of "practical reason.
While Sidgwick developed a utilitarian ethics in The Methods of Ethics,
he apparently did not regard utilitarianism as exclusively or fundamentally
an ethical doctrine. Rather, he saw utilitarianism as a conception of the good
with implications for jurisprudence and political theory as well as ethics.
Moreover, he saw these jurisprudential and political implications as more
centrally important from a utilitarian standpoint. 4 0 2 Nevertheless, he saw
some moral obligations flowing from the great utility of laws in advancing
the general welfare. Thus, order being preferable to chaos, even non-optimal
laws should generally be obeyed and defended; citizens should endeavor to
increase the utility of the laws when they could do so without threatening
social order.4 0 3 Sidgwick devoted two chapters to critiquing intuitionist
views on law and justice, 4 04 but his aim was to refute claims that law should
be ruled by deontological morality, and that legal burdens and benefits
should be distributed on the basis of desert without regard to behavioral
incentives. 4 05 Thus he was chiefly concerned with freeing law and policy
from ethics.
Sidgwick succeeded in laying out the boundaries of ethics as an
academic discipline, with the result that utilitarianism was afterwards
399.
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understood as an ethical doctrine primarily. Professors of ethics forgot that
utilitarianism was a program of legal reform before it was an ethical theory,
and came to see the legislative agenda as a restricted application of
utilitarian ethics.
C. The Revival of InstitutionalUtilitarianism
A number of contemporary philosophers have begun to revive the
institutional utilitarianism of Beccaria, Bentham and Mill. Yet, even they
find it difficult to separate this earlier tradition from the ethical
utilitarianism of Sidgwick. In Morality within the Limits of Reason, Russell
Hardin writes:
Utilitarianism provides both an individual and a social moral theory because
the one is inherently incomplete without the other. To a large and sad extent,
this view was lost in much of twentieth-century utilitarianism, which, in the
spirit of most twentieth-century moral theory of all philosophical varieties,
has typically focused on essentially personal problems of choice in small406
number interactions such as personal promising and face-to-face charity.
Hardin concludes that utilitarian policy analysis depends upon and
"completes" utilitarian ethics. Assuming that ethics have always been
integral to utilitarianism, Hardin reasons that utilitarians were driven to
pursue utility by institutional means because of the incompetence of
individual moral actors to identify and pursue the public welfare on an ad
hoc basis.4 0 7 And he reasons that utilitarians will usually proceed by means
of rules rather than calculation because of the high cost of information.
Hardin rejects all criticisms of utilitarianism based on hypothetical examples
involving an individual with perfect knowledge of causal relationships at
odds with common experience. 40 8 Accordingly, he rejects Carritt's and
McCloskey's charge of punishing the innocent, on reasoning similar to that
offered by Rawls:
If utilitarianism recommends an institution for punishment of properly
convicted persons, then that is the kind of institution a utilitarian would
want. We must create institutions to achieve utilitarian ends because
individual actions unconstrained and unguided by institutional structures will
406.
407.
408.
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not achieve them as well. There is perhaps no more grievous limit to
individual human reason than this. It is precisely the point of such an
institution as... criminal justice to override individual reason for the social
409
good.

For Hardin, institutional utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism are simply
versions of act-utilitarian ethics that recognize the "limits of reason."
Another proponent of institutional utilitarianism is James Wood Bailey.
Bailey also moves from act-utilitarian premises to institutional utilitarianism
by noting the disabilities of individual moral actors as utilitarian
decisionmakers. Like Hardin, Bailey adverts to cognitive disabilities:
individuals are much more competent to identify their own interests than to
identify those of other people. The pooling of information necessary for
utilitarian social planning requires democratic or bureaucratic institutions, or
pricing mechanisms policed by judicial institutions. But mostly, Bailey is
interested in the motivational disabilities emphasizied by Helvetius and
Bentham: individual actors cannot be trusted to sacrifice their own interests
to the general welfare, or to honestly reveal their preferences, unless
constrained to do so by sanctions. 4 10 For Helvetius and Bentham this just
meant that there was little to be gained by preaching benevolence. But
Bailey argues that it is actually immoral to demand that committed
utilitarians subject themselves to exploitation by engaging in unreciprocated
benevolence. This demand imposes too great a burden and makes
utilitarianism an unappealing creed. The likely result is to discourage belief
in utilitarianism 4 11 and so to reduce support for the utilitarian institutions
and policies that can do far more than individuals to advance the public
good. An excessively burdensome morality is self-defeating, and hence, not
useful.

4 12

Like Hardin, Bailey believes that his institutional utilitarianism avoids
the problem of framing the innocent. Bailey treats this problem as part of
two more general objections: that utilitarianism might require "imposed
sacrifices" 4 13 and that it might require "some form of undemocratic and
systematic deception of the people. This is what Bernard Williams
derisively calls 'Government House Utilitarianism.' "414 Bailey responds by
409.
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arguing that these dangers are both precluded by his principle that
utilitarians must protect themselves against exploitation by those whose
motives are non-utilitarian. As Rawls argued, utility is not served by
creating dangerous institutions checked only by the benevolent impulses of
those administering them. Institutional power must be checked by individual
rights, and by regular and public public procedures. In an imperfect world,
[Olpen political procedures are an institutional requirement of utilitarian
political theory. The omnipresent possibility of exploitation through
manipulation of the process makes any kind of Government House
untenable. No sane citizenry would ever tolerate the existence of an elite,
which makes choices about what morality the rest of us are to believe, for
the excellent institutionalist reason that would-be exploiters would find their
way into Government House like ants into a picnic basket. And that invasion
4 15
would lead to an outcome that would be disastrous in utilitarian terms.
Bailey's non-exploitation principle is functionally identical to Bentham's
aim of security. Bailey derives not only a requirement of publicity, but also
a requirement of democracy, 4 16 and a scheme of individual civil and welfare
rights 4 17 from this concern. The resulting theory has every claim to the label
"utilitarian" since it is barely distinguishable from Bentham's. Whether it
retains much relationship to its supposedly act-utilitarian premises is open to
question, however.
A third advocate of institutional utilitarianism, Robert Goodin, offers a
much simpler proposal in Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Like
Hardin, Goodin assimilates the original utilitarians to Sidgwick and so treats
them as both ethical and institutional utilitarians. But he considers
institutional utilitarianism to have been much more central to their
enterprise: "Jeremy Bentham was famous in his own day primarily as a
reformer of legal systems; James Mill as an essayist on government; John
Stuart Mill as an essayist, social reformer, and parliamentarian; John Austin
as a jurisprude." 4 18 Like Hardin, Goodin laments the virtual disappearance
of institutional utilitarianism in the twentieth century:
There was an important shift among utilitarian writers that came
somewhere between Sidgwick's 1874 Methods of Ethics (where public
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affairs loomed large) and G.E. Moore's 1903 PrincipiaEthica (where the
greatest good is defined in terms of more private ideals, such as friendship
and aesthetic appreciation). Whatever the cause of that shift, its
consequences could not have been more deleterious to the proper defense of
the utilitarian cause....
Throughout the twentieth century, defenders of utilitarianism have been
primarily concerned to defend it in its least plausible form, as a code of
4 19
personal conduct.
Goodin argues that utilitarians can defend their doctrine against its strongest
criticisms and rid it of its greatest flaws, by simply abandoning ethical
utilitarianism. As Goodin explains,
[Aidvocating utilitarianism as a public philosophy spares us the burdens
associated with maximizing at the margins in each and every case. It
involves instead adopting institutions and practices and policies, on a
utilitarian basis; and those must, by their nature, be publicly accessible and
relatively long lasting. That in turn means that in choosing institutions and
practices and policies we cannot maximize at the margins, adapting our
choices to peculiarities of utility mixes in particular cases. We must instead
adapt our choices to standard situations recurring across protracted periods,
and do so in full knowledge that the nature of our choices will sooner or later
4 20
become common knowledge.
Goodin reasons that this public and political conception of the role of
utilitarian reasoning precludes framing of the innocent, killing people to
harvest their organs for transplants, and other such practices. The supposed
benefits are overwhelmed by the costs to the general security and confidence
if these practices become public. 42 1 Goodin identifies his "public
utilitarianism" as a discursive enterprise much like the one we attributed to
Bentham. Goodin reasons that utilitarian policy analysis requires
interpersonal comparisons of utility and that while such comparisons can be
made, they cannot be made precisely. Because of this and other "limits of
reason" utilitarian calculations can never be precise and are always subject
to rational argument.
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That is not necessarily a telling criticism of utilitarianism, though. It
merely amounts to saying that utilitarianism leaves some room for public
debate and deliberation-in other words for politics as it is ordinarily
conceived. We would, I think worry about any political theory that did not
do that....
Furthermore, even where utilitarianism proves indeterminate, it sets the
terms of that public debate. It tells us what sorts of considerations ought to
weigh with us, often while allowing that how heavily each of them actually
422
weighs is legitimately open to dispute.
This conception of utilitarian reasoning as a democratically structured
discursive process may sound fashionably post-modem, but it is true to the
origins of utilitarianism in an era of expanding political participation. At the
dawn of democracy, political theorists and reformers confronted the
questions of how to fit the people to the responsibilities of rule, and how to
peacefully subject them to the rule of their equals. The utilitarians offered
the same solution to both problems: a rational discourse of public policy, a
discipline that would compel the people to debate the public interest, thereby
ennobling, legitimizing, and ultimately settling disagreement. From the
beginning, utility's proponents were inspired by its promise to civilize
democracy by transforming political conflict into rational debate. The
function of the utility standard was to guide public discussion, not individual
action. Institutional utilitarianism addresses the public in its political
capacity, not the individual in her ethical capacity. Hence it cannot direct the
individual to pervert public discourse by bearing false witness.
The traditional charge against utilitarian penology, that it requires
framing the innocent, is false. That charge may apply against ethical
utilitarianism, but utilitarian penology did not arise from and does not
depend upon ethical utilitarianism. It arose from and depends upon the
venerable tradition of institutional utilitarianism. And institutional
utilitarianism does not require, entail, or presuppose any views on ethics
whatsoever.
D. The Boundariesof InstitutionalUtilitarianism
In refraining utilitarian penology as an application of institutional rather
than ethical utilitarianism, we have exonerated it of the traditional charge of
422.
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framing the innocent. But we have not necessarily immunized it against all
forms of the charge of punishing the innocent. Indeed, institutional
utilitarianism may be more vulnerable to the charge of collective punishment
than is ethical utilitarianism. This potential vulnerability to the charge of
collective punishment arises from the positivism of institutional
utilitarianism. Recall that Bentham's positivism encouraged him to prioritize
realizing utility ahead of maximizing utility. From this positivist
perspective, the value of "utility" cannot be maximized until it has been
given concrete meaning by a reliably representative policy process. If it is
more important to realize utility in institutions than to maximize it, difficult
normative questions will arise at the boundaries of utilitarian institutions.
What are the responsibilities of a utilitarian polity toward populations that
are not represented in its policy process? What normative principles govern
a utilitarian polity faced with external threats? The early utilitarians were
highly skeptical of claims that states had international obligations because
they were not convinced that international relations were governed by an
423
effective legal system.
Should a utilitarian polity simply ignore the welfare of foreign
populations, except in so far as those populations engage the sympathy of its
own population? 4 2 4 Should it rely on foreign governments to identify and
represent the interests of foreign populations? What should a utilitarian
polity do when the interests of its population conflict with the interests of a
foreign population? What should it do when its political independence and
survival are threatened by a foreign government? Should a utilitarian polity
encourage or even force foreign governments to adopt utilitarian
institutions? Should it seek to establish a global utilitarian policy process?
Because institutional utilitarianism does not have obvious answers to
these difficult questions, it is vulnerable to the charge that it permits
utilitarian polities to exploit and mistreat foreign populations. One form this
charge could take would be to point to the danger that "raison d'etat" could
justify collective punishment of foreign populations in the context of
international conflict.4 2 5 An obvious answer to this type of charge is that
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absent effective institutions of global governance, the subject of
international justice, like that of individual ethics, is simply outside the
domain of utilitarian analysis. Yet this answer invites the rejoinder that if
institutional utilitarianism is to remain a practical guide to policy, it must
address the policy dilemmas confronting contemporary governments in an
interdependent global environment in which the effects of governance are
4 26
never strictly local.
The charge that utilitarianism mandates framing the innocent became
prevalent in mid-twentieth century England and America, and reflected that
era's anxiety about foreign totalitarian states. Yet, this anxiety was
misapplied to utilitarianism, which, as we have seen, presupposes the
institutional protections of a liberal democratic state. Today, the real dangers
of utilitarianism lie not in the threat it poses to our liberal democracy, but in
the threat our liberal democracy may pose to those beyond its bounds.
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